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4 oeuvres 501 utilisateurs 6 critiques

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Looks primarily at suicide terrorism from perspective of group strategy. Although he does touch on individual motivations somewhat, it is still through the prism of group dynamics rather than personal psychology. This is a weakness in the overall structure of the book's arguments, but there to the extent group-level analysis is your focus this has a lot to offer. The primary theme is that, contrary to the neocon's characterization of the post-9/11 actions, suicide terrorism is not about radical Islam, but primarily about US military insertions. Suicide terrorism is about nationalist striking at an invading occupier, not a religious war against an infidel. That makes perfect sense, and that it is supported by the actual data of who and where suicide terrorism occurs makes the presentation (which for some readers might strike as a tad academic) all the more convincing. This book covers data through 2003; he has a second book from 2010, Cutting the Fuse; I'll be curious to see how the new data modifies his conclusions. I might have given him more stars, but his concluding pages have him beating the gong for building Trump's wall, before Trump even thought it was a good idea.½
 
Signalé
dono421846 | 2 autres critiques | Mar 14, 2018 |
This is *the* foundational academic treatise on coercion through air power. It was published while Pape was faculty at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) in Air University, teaching field grade officers in the Air Force, and has been taught as a subject there since. Other texts take on a similar topic, but with very few exceptions, are mostly focused on military topics. For example, John Warden--who was the director of SAASS while Pape was there--disagreed with Pape, and is roundly criticized in *Bombing to Win*, but is no longer taught in the strategic schools of SAASS, but is part of weapons school training, which is where the individual tactics are taught. Many airmen don't like the implication that strategic bombing doesn't work for coercion, but no one so far has been able to meaningfully refute the finding.

The text is long, but well worth the read for anyone interested in political outcomes in war.
 
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lorinhobenson | 2 autres critiques | Oct 17, 2016 |
This book examines the known facts about suicide terrorism, using data about suicide bombers ages, social class, education and motivation. Pape offers convincing evidence that suicide bombers are not, as a rule, motivated by desperate personal circumstances but by military or economic occupation or domination of their territory. An excellent read, and a must-read book if we want to truly deal with terrorism.
 
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nmele | 2 autres critiques | Apr 6, 2013 |
This is a very thorough and insightful analysis of the strategic logic of suicide terrorism that turns many myths on their head. Here is academic research that shows why people kill themselves for political aims, and also tells us what we can do about it.
 
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sirfurboy | 2 autres critiques | Apr 23, 2009 |
Foundational reading for Pape's definition of coercion theory: denial, punishment, risk, and decapitation strategies.
 
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mchan79 | 2 autres critiques | Apr 11, 2009 |
Fairly academic in tone, but informative nonetheless. I was quite surprised to learn that the only time strategic bombing actually succeeded in coercing someone was in the Vietnam War, when one of Nixon's bombing campaigns forcced North Vietnam back to the negotiating table. Who would've thought.
 
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kranbollin | 2 autres critiques | Jul 14, 2006 |