Peter HofschroerCritiques

I’ve long been fascinated by the way in which the British claimed Waterloo as a British, rather than an Allied, victory – particularly as only a minority of the troops under Wellington’s command were actually British. The insistence that the British essentially pulled off victory on their own accounts for the way that the Prussian contribution is regularly dismissed. Nowadays we often read that the Prussians arrived late at the battle and that they had no effect until the very end. Some accounts even suggest that the final advance by the British would have taken place successfully whether or not the Prussians had been there.

This rewriting of history started on the evening of the battle when Wellington rejected Blucher’s suggestion that it be called the battle of La Belle Alliance (after the inn where Blucher and Wellington met at the end of the day), insisting instead that it be called Waterloo, after the town (not on the battlefield) where Wellington had set up his headquarters the night before the fighting started.

The most blatant rewriting of the Prussian involvement centred on a model of the battlefield created by William Siborne, a young army officer who was commissioned by the government to produce a large scale model as a permanent commemoration of Wellington’s victory. Siborne took his commission seriously, corresponding with hundreds of the officers who were at Waterloo, including Prussian officers and, although many were reluctant to discuss it, the French. As a result he was able to produce a picture of the battlefield representing the situation at 7.00pm, just after the fall of La Haye Sainte. Siborne considered that this was the crisis of the battle.

At this point, Prussian troops were already attacking the French in Plancenoit while others had linked up with Wellington’s left, enabling him to strengthen his centre. Hundreds of detailed models of Prussian soldiers were placed to reflect that. Yet if you look at the model today (it’s on display in the National Army Museum) these soldiers aren’t there. At the crisis of the battle, just before the decisive charge by Wellington’s troops, the French are faced only by the British. The Prussians, as so many people still believe, weren’t there. They arrived too late to have any decisive impact on the battle.

I love that model and I’ve visited it several times. I knew it misrepresented the Prussian position and I understood the politics behind it. But this Christmas I was given a copy of Peter Hofschroer’s wonderful book, Wellington’s Smallest Victory and now I know how the model came to be so inaccurate.

It’s a story of a naïve young man who set out to produce something that was to be both the historical record of a famous victory and a significant work of art in its own right. The project ran out of control, taking over his life, and he became quite obsessive about its accuracy. What he did not realise was that he was taking on the Duke of Wellington himself, who had no intention of allowing Siborne’s model ever to see the light of day with the Prussians in place.

It’s a story of a powerful man using money and position to crush somebody who threatened the image he had created for himself. Wellington, it is fair to say, does not come out of the story well.

Hofschroer’s book is incredibly detailed. Very occasionally it even verges on the boring with its accounts of exactly who corresponded with whom as the government tried to deprive Siborne of money owing to him. The detail is important, though, as Hofschroer is presenting a version of the battle of Waterloo which many people, after 200 years of propaganda, will find difficult to accept. He is also attacking the reputation of Wellington, somebody who was practically a demigod while Siborne was working on this model and who is still seen as one of the Great Britons of the 19th century.

The meticulous descriptions of exactly which troops were where helps the reader visualise exactly what was going on and will probably provide new insights even for those already very familiar with Waterloo. Hofschroer also extends the scope of his book to cover Wellington’s response to Prussian setbacks at Charlesroi and Ligny. Again, his account is detailed and convincing and does not show Wellington in a good light. Given how much time I spend reading accounts of Napoleonic battles, it’s worrying how much I struggle with many of these books, but Wellingtons Smallest Victory reads like a crime thriller. It’s gripping.

A fun, well-researched and tightly focused book that covers two things: the specific story of a British officer, William Siborne, who was commissioned to make a scale model of the Battle of Waterloo but soon encountered hostility from none other than the Duke of Wellington; and the general story of Waterloo's historiography, how the story of the battle was told and understood from its earliest reports through to the present day. Hofschröer did his research into Siborne's voluminous papers as well as other reports about Waterloo, and doesn't hesitate to make his conclusions clear: the Duke of Wellington intentionally played down the Prussian role in Waterloo, and (more seriously) concealed how he had hung the Prussians out to dry in pursuit of broader strategic goals after Napoleon stole a march on him in the Waterloo campaign.

Highly readable and enjoyable, recommended for any fan of Napoleonic history.

This book is the second book by this author on the Waterloo campaign. It begins on the end of the battle of Ligny, Dawn June 17th, 1815and carries matters up to the Surrender of the new French Government to the Allied armies in August of 1815. It is very well footnoted as the author is marshalling evidence about the errors and omissions in the Duke of Wellington's two published acounts of Waterloo. It seems there is good evidence that matters were more fondly remembered by the Duke andby his latter english followers than the published orders and memories of his non-British witnesses relate. The army he commanded was ony one third British, and at least two-thirds of the fighting and the losses were to his Prussian and other German allies.
If one wishes an exacting critique of Wellington's stories one should refer to Hofschroer's translation of "On Wellington: A Critique of Waterloo" by Karl von Clausewitz, the Clausewitz who spent the day after Waterloo fighting at Wavre against Grouchy, but has credentials as a man who knew his way around a battlefield.
It does appear that Arthur Wellesley did considerable to keep his own reputation, and that of the army he personally led, bright and shiny, rather than sticking too tightly to the picture revealed by his own written orders, and those of his non-Britannic allies. Definitely a book the scrupulous historian should refer to hereafter.½

I like this book because it is about a military ego versus the truth.
It was the Iron Duke's contention that the British Army won the battle of Waterloo all by itself. Now the truth was it did not, and if the Battle had ended at 6:30 on the day, it would at best have been a draw. But the Prussians came crashing into the French Right/ rear at that time, bringing about the battle that Napoleon always tried to impose on HIS enemies. It was the perfect Napoleonic battle but his enemies brought it off on him!
Wellington reveals the least lovable side of his character when a low-ranking officer, Lt. William Sibourne, was commissioned by the United Services Museum
to recreate a scale model of the battle at the "Moment of Victory" (7:15PM).

Siborne was a careful researcher, and collected over 3000 letters from all the armies present on the battlefield and polled the witnesses for topographical information. His actions created the modern style of battle reportage. His diorama contained over 80,000 three dimensional, hand-painted model soldiers, (thus changing the model soldier business with his emphasis on three dimensional models as opposed to the style of "Flats" that had preceded it.) and was as accurate as he could make it. It wasn't good enough for the Duke.

Though the duke could not see the whole battlefield from his position, he held that Sibourne had been "Hoodwinked by the Prussians" and that the crucial movement of the battle was the British charge following the repulse of the French Guard by the British centre. The fact that the Prussians were at that point pressing into the centre of Napoleon's Army, after four hours of bitter fighting on their part, was ignored by the Iron duke.
The book continues with the acts of vindictiveness that the Duke expressed in blighting Siborne's further, sad, military career. It was indeed, Wellington's smallest victory.

One of the better Men at Arms: gives details on history, tactics, armament, organisation and uniforms. Given the format, this is all very concise, but the author packs a lot of information in a small space.

This book, like all others in this series, are designed to give the casual reader a quick and dirty guide to the campaign with some background information, contextual information, information on the military units and leaders involved as well as a step by step walkthrough of the major battles.

It does all that. But note that it is only 96 pages. So, for the serious reader or student of military history it is just a decent starting point.

It is beautifully illustrated, lots of pictures of the major players, the battle areas as they look today, 3-D maps of the battlefield. Unlike the Jena campaign book, the captions to the numerous pictures and photos add to the text. I found this one a little more approachable, but that could be attributed to having digested one of these already.

All in all, this gave me a good, concise overview of the campaign and a scholarly bibliography to start with. To really understand this in anything more than a superficial manner, I am going to have to read a lot more. I am not sure when I am going to have time for that with the class requiring basically a book per week. We shall see. If I do get the chance to look at the Napoleonic battles in any depth, I might feel equipped to assess the accuracy and true usefulness of this book (and the one on Jena).½