Karl-Heinz FrieserCritiques

The seminal account of the Campaign in the West in 1940. Blows a lot of myths out of the water and it is a must read for anyone seriously studying the French Campaign.

As part of the planning for the megagame War in the West I bought myself a copy of Blitzkrieg Legend because it is the German Army’s official history (although it didn't get written until the 1990s).

From reading the first couple of chapters and looking through the maps you can see the evolution of the German plan. You can see why the directive was written the way that it was in October 1939.

The most interesting thing for me is that there is no concept of a lightning war, the general staffs & high command all believe that the start of the world war was a gross mistake and spells certain doom for Germany as being too soon to be winnable. the strong belief is that the strength of the economy is what wins wars, not surprise attacks (and for my money they were right).

After the planning phase there is a fairly detailed examination of the attacks themselves. What becomes clear is how lucky the Germans were, although some of this is down to the way that the 100,000 man army has trained its troops, and this training continues into the expanded army. It is human factors rather than technology that makes the blitzkreig work. The Germans were exceedingly lucky, when they infiltrate forward and put small parties over rivers and obstacle the enemy retires rather than counter-attacks.

I would certainly recommend this book strongly to anyone who has an interest in WW2, and particularly the Fall of France in 1940.

This study didn't quite have the impact for me that I thought it would, but that might be a function of how Frieser's conclusions have been influencing the field for years. In any case, this is the classic analysis debunking the notion that there was a theory of "lightning war" before the wholly unexpected rampant success of German arms in May of 1940. Instead, Frieser finds the case of a desperate strategic gamble that was redeemed by German tactical and operational excellence on one hand, and enabled by French operational and organizational ineptitude on the other.

Mind you, this is not to say that German generals such as Rundstedt and Kluge had their wits about them more than French generals such as Gamelin and Georges, but that the German panzer commanders such as Guderian and Hoth could throw success in the face of the chain of command and impose their will on events. This is at least until a belated firming up of the French defense occurred and the strategic gaff of allowing the Dunkirk evacuation took place. For Frieser the last is symptomatic of how the state of German strategic bankruptcy was still in place, if only to be disguised by the new operational art for a little while longer.½

If you read just one book about the May 1940 campaign, this should be it. Frieser clearly shows that the vaunted Blitzkrieg method wasn't a clear doctrine adopted by the German Amry. Instead, it was more or less developed on the spot, as armour commanders such as Guderian and Rommel sought to put their ideas into practise, often against the wishes of higher command.

Frieser's campaign analysis is a real gem. This operational history of one of the most famous campaigns blasts away many commonly held myths about the Blitzkrieg. The Wehrmacht did not plan a lightning strike, did not expect its success and hampered the Panzer forces from achieving the annihilation of the Dunkirk pocket (fortunately for mankind, I might add). Hitler was not the GröFaz but an ignorant, petulant egomaniac whose increasing interference in military matters was enormously detrimental. Hitler's madness was, however, surpassed by the incompetence of the gerontocratic French leadership which squandered their superior resources and lacked the will to fight back.

The success of the campaign lay in the concentration of ten highly mobile Panzer divisions connected by wireless communication and supported by the vertical artillery, the Luftwaffe. Based on an unorthodox idea of Manstein (who was transferred out of the operation for it) and executed by rank insubordination by Guderian, Rommel and Reinhardt who did not stop when ordered until the sickle had cut the Allied armies in two. Well, nearly, as the OKH did succeed to stop them twice giving their opponents valuable breathing space.

Based on a rigorous examination of the literature and a thorough discussion of all aspects of the campaign, Frieser has written a landmark study. The book has plenty of detailed, beautifully coloured maps, exemplary OOBs (up to bat. level) and offers many thoughtful remarks, valuable lessons and observations. (Review of the German 3rd Ed.)