Charles EsdaileCritiques

AR-8

Ákaflega viðamikil saga sem lýsir uppgangi Napóleons Bónaparte, hernaði hans í byrjun 19. aldar þegar hann sigraði hvert ríkið á fætur öðru og að lokum ósigrum hans og niðurlægingu.
Esdaile beinir athygli sinni fyrst og fremst að alþjóðastjórnmálum þessa tíma, skoðanaskiptum fyrirmanna í ríkjunum sem komu að Evrópuhernaðinum en horfir síður til samfélagssögunnar, efnahagshluta hennar né hernaðinum þótt hann gleymi þessum atriðum ekki alfarið.
Þetta er ágætist rit til að fá yfirgripsmikla þekkingu á þessu tímabili og ég fræddist heilmikið um hluti sem voru mér ókunnir. Hins vegar fór í taugarnar á mér að Esdaile útskýrði mikið af ákvörðunum Napóleons sem afleiðing mikilmennskubrálæðis, þorsta eftir frægð og drambs auk þess sem hann kallaði þá sem mæltu ákvörunum franska keisarans bót ýmist Napóleon elskendur eða afsökunarsinna.

Napoleon Bonaparte's decision in 1808 to occupy Spain typically is ranked second only to his invasion to Russia in terms of the disastrous mistakes made by the French emperor. What began as a swift military operation soon degenerated into an "ulcer" that tied down thousands of troops, slowly bleeding France's strength. For this reason, the Peninsular War has never wanted for attention, especially among British historians who have long chronicled the campaigns waged by Arthur Wellesley in his ascent to glory as the Duke of Wellington.

Yet for all of the attention the war has received Charles Esdaile is able to offer something different from most English-language accounts of the war, which is a Spanish-centric focus. This allows him to highlight a number of important points lacking from previous accounts, not the least of which is the importance of the war to the history of Spain itself. This self-evident point is detailed superbly in his book, which shows how the French occupation played into Spanish politics. Dominated by the royal favorite Manuel Godoy, Spain agreed in 1807 to support France invasion of Portugal. Godoy's unpopularity with both the Spanish public and the heir, the future Ferdinand VII, did little to warm the Spanish political nation to their involvement. The political crisis created by the Mutiny of Aranjuez gave Napoleon the opportunity to intervene by exploiting the request to arbitrate the succession crisis between Ferdinand and his father Charles IV by installing his own brother Joseph as king.

Esdaile is sympathetic to el rey intruso, presenting Joseph as a man with good intentions thrust by his younger brother onto a throne he did not desire. These intentions were often thwarted by Spain's limited resources (which Napoleon expected to finance the occupation) and by the war. Esdaile does not minimize the brutality of the conflict, detailing the outrages and atrocities committed on all sides. He is particularly judgmental about the sometimes romanticized guerrilleros, viewing them as having a negligible military impact and describing how they were often viewed as the greater evil by many Spaniards. Esdaile is no less critical of the activities of the Spanish junta and their armies, though he gives them due credit for their performance n several battles.

Nonetheless Esdaile argues that for all of the efforts of the junta and the Anglo-Portuguese army to resist the French occupation, the French were enjoying considerable success in establishing control over Spain prior to 1812. In this respect, the key event in Spain's liberation was not any one battle or domestic political development but Napoleon's decision to invade Russia, which resulted in the withdrawal of French units necessary for maintaining control. Facing a weakened opponent, the Spanish-Anglo-Portuguese forces were able to unravel French control, driving French forces out fo most of Spain by 1814 and setting Spain down a path of political turmoil that would last for over a century.

Esdaile's arguments may challenge the assumptions of some of his readers about the war, but his arguments are difficult to deny. Based on an impressive range of Spanish, English, and French sources, they offer a valuable multi-dimensional account of a complicated and often vicious conflict. While his prose is often blunt, his combined analysis of military operations and Spanish politics make his book necessary reading for anyone interested in the Peninsular War or the history of modern Spain. Though it will hardly be the final word on the subject it will long be one that people will need to consult to understand this event and its lasting repercussions for all involved.

The Battle of Waterloo was, in Wellington’s famous phrase, a “near-run thing,” and if Wellington had not been present, he would have lost. In this book, Charles Esdaile ably makes the argument that, even if Wellington had lost the battle, Napoleon would have lost the war. He would have lost it because, one, France was badly divided by Napoleon’s return, and, two, he was faced by overwhelming numbers of enemies who would not have pulled out of the war because of a single battlefield defeat.½

This is an excellent treatment of the War in Iberia. We visit the politics of England, Spain, Portugal, France and Great Britain to create a remarkably clear picture of what happened from 1807 to 1815 in the Peninsula. Both the Parliaments and the battlefields had great effects on the time and Charles Esdaile has created a masterly synthesis. The weakest point is the dull mapping style, and the collection of the maps into a clumsy mass which taxes the readers' ability to flip rapidly from one section of the book to this selection. But, it is a small drawback to a book that will continue to influence the serious student of this war for at least this generation.½

I agree with the author that this is a revisionist book. His stance that the Spanish Guerrillas' romantic image is due for a downgrading is pretty sound and his evidence is smoothly marshalled. He has also assembled good material about the small amount of purely anti-french military effect generated by the most grass root organizations. The chapter on the gradual death of the guerrilla movement after 1813 is particularly telling. It is a sound piece of work that will be consulted for the coming generation.

The emphasis in this book is upon the interaction between the army and the governments of Spain from 1803 to 1816, not on the mechanisms of Army life in that institution. The reason is that there's not very much documentation in usable forms for the day-to-day life, and the political focus is the subject of much writing at the time. Spain was in a state of enormous upheaval, and the rifts in the society reverberate to this day.
From a modern English speaking world perspective, Spain was a tyrannical mess in 1808, and had been behind the times since 1660. The economy was very agricultural, and depended on regular imports of precious metals from the Americas to stay afloat. With the armament industry one of the few areas where money was generated locally, there was no reason to establish an economy that could feed, house or clothe an army, and the civilian population was reduced to subsistence farming even in times of peace. Given a choice, Spain should have stayed out of the wars of the Napoleonic period entirely. It didn't get that chance!
After the patriotic rising of 1808, Spain was left with an overblown regular army, with massive political ambitions struggling fiercely with an entrenched nobility, divided between royalist and liberal factions, who fought persistently on the political front, while trying to rid their country of a foreign invader, and another intrusive army, that of their British liberators. When Napoleon's men were driven away, then the exiled King returned, only to fiercely punish the liberal parts of those who had suffered for the royal return. The next century and beyond the fight continued to further damage the Spanish state.
The book is necessary, but hasn't got the right title.

General histories of the age focus about 80% on Napoleon, throw in some Nelson and Wellington, and round out with the other players - Russia, Austria, Prussia, etc.

This telling focuses from the outside in or from the larger view down: Napoleon's geopolitical context. Esdaile gives the international perspectives; national goals, aims, vulnerabilities, threats, and strategies; and reasonings as well as Napoleon's. In many ways, this is refreshing, but will ultimately be disappointing to Napoleon's more strident fans. Esdaile's use of context provides readers with a better understanding that doesn't usually put Napoleon in the best light.

Despite what others said, it doesn't put Britain in a very great light either, substantially dimming Britain's role. As another reviewer mentioned, this history doesn't give Britan as much weight as is standard. Russia and Austria are given equal or greater weight (I think justly) as Britain while Prussia, Spain, and Sicily are less. We aren't given extensive retellings of battles but how the battles influenced the people and events following. There is a substantial focus on the diplomatic, political, and economic backend. The book uses extensive primary material as well as secondary material, leading to further readings.

To answer the fanboy criticism of the book, this book admittedly swings to the too critical side. BUT Napoleon was a conqueror who knew his perch solely depended on bringing home victories. As even his many admirers admit, he had no ability to compromise. He was a genius who knew it, with little faith in others' abilities (I think of the SNL computer snob skits). Given those personality traits, I believe Esdaile follows a more realistic analysis of the decisions made than other historians. For fans, this is an important book to counter-balance their otherwise starry-eyed collection.

To answer criticism from the other side, the author points out several times that the eighteenth century was the "Century of War." Every Age has a standard to apply to their leaders. As Hume's caustic denunciation of Richard I showed, otherwise good historians can wrongly apply standards of their time as if these were relevant. The standards of Napoleon's day - Peter, Catherine, and Frederick - all earned their "Great's" from conquering AND being enlightened autocrats - servants with duties and responsibilities. I believe Napoleon tried to meet and exceed the standards of his age. As such, Esdaile's critical phrasing demonstrates a tendency to judge Napoleon anachronistically. I find this anachronistic moral context ironic since this book's aim is to provide context.

My only problem is that of organization: the narrative hops around in time, assuming that players and events are familiar. A Napoleon student will not have many problems, but casual readers may get lost at times. I'm familiar with the period and had to reread sections at times. Surprisingly, the paperback is good quality and lays flat.

ps: If anyone knows of any good books on the Six Days Campaign while fighting the 6th Coalition, I would be grateful. Esdaile included, everyone mentions Napoleon's manic energy and genius in his last days before Elba, but this period is covered in only a few pages.

The classic British story of the Peninsular War follows the Henry V template of a merry band of brothers winning against the odds. Charles J. Esdaile's account puts the Portuguese and the Spanish back into the picture and also reveals that the French were hampered by both the guerrilla war and the need to send massive forces back to France. The British victories were thus based on both Wellington's excellent husbanding of his forces and the French having to fight with one hand tied behind their back.

Spain meanwhile was ravaged internally by the political fights between modernizers (split in turn between pro- and anti-French wings) and conservatives (split between monarchists and nationalists). Just as today, Spain is divided into different regions with highly local power centers whose primary mission is to rule their local environment. The weakness to near absence of the central government made Spain easy to conquer but difficult to govern. While Britain managed to rule India with a few thousand troops, France sank hundred of thousands of troops into Spain's endless landscape. Just like the Americans in Afghanistan, the decentralized presence of armed forces pacified and infuriated the locals at the same time. Thomas Jefferson's phrase about holding the wolf by its neck applies: France had to hold on whether it wanted or not. France foolishly tried to conquer the whole peninsula, a task it lacked the logistics and the resources. A containment strategy based on French-oriented Eastern Spain might have been a better choice. John Moore's retreat to Corunna showed how vulnerable an overextended British army was.

While the book sometimes offers too much details about Spanish political sideshows, it remains currently the best account of the Peninsular War from a British and Spanish point of view. The French voice is not as present as I would have liked, but it is probably too much too ask from one man to overview so many different sources in different languages. The maps are not very helpful. Osprey's Peninsular War Atlas is a great complement to this book. Recommended.½

¿Fue Napoleón, como pretendía, el precursor de la unidad de Europa? Lo que está claro es que sus guerras, que suelen estudiarse como campañas separadas, sólo se entienden plenamente en una dimensión continental, que tome en cuenta tanto la forma en que se combinan entre sí como su relación con el marco de la Europa de su tiempo. Charles Esdaile nos ofrece una "historia europea" de las campañas napoleónicas en un libro innovador, que ilumina la complejidad de unos acontecimientos que cambiaron el curso de nuestra historia. Para el lector español este libro tiene el interés adicional de mostrarle la Guerra de la Independencia en un contexto internacional que le da pleno sentido

This book is kind of the inverse of the military histories of the Napoleonic Wars that are so common: the author spends very little time on the battles themselves, and spend most of the pages putting those wars in context by showing the diplomatic maneuvering that took place between the European heads of state from the First Coalition to the Seventh.