Robert Engen

This is a book less ambitious than "On Killing" by Grossman, and also differing in conclusions from "Men Against Fire" by Marshall. Dealing specifically with the Canadian army in WWII, the author amasses evidence for some challenges to the conclusions of "On Killing." Using after action reports, casualty rates, Crime statistics, specific morale reports, and a number of memoirs and reminiscences, Engen contests some widely-held conclusions about the effectiveness of Canadian Infantry in its major campaigns in WWII.
The inclusion of drafted men into the Infantry in 1944 and 45, did not lead to reduced combat effectiveness according to his research. Canadian soldiers had a very high interest in being "Kept in the Picture" by higher commands, more than other armies. Canada had a greater administrative support service component than other armies and this had a good effect on moral when the support was applied. The Canadians reacted badly to periods of inaction, and did not like fighting in swamps in cold weather (What a surprize!) something they had to do in Holland and Italy in 1944-45.
Canadian Infantry was subjected to a lot of shake-ups in platoon, section and Company make-up, and this did NOT seem to adversely affect their morale. During their time in England they trained a great deal in Company and platoon exercises, more than larger unit exercises and this seemed to breed a very self-reliant approach to combat with little or no help from Air support, tanks and artillery. So when they landed in Normandy they took more casualties than they might have had they been more integrated with those arms. But even so, they were extremely effective on any of their battlefields, reducing their SS Panzer, Panzer Grenadier and Paratroop opponents to 30% and less of their initial components in the pre Falaise periods. They faced all the high value German units in Normandy and came away with the well justified opinion that the Canadian Infantry were the superior to the best 1943 to 1945 German soldiers company to company, and higher.
The high level of company and platoon training and the fact that the Canadian NCOs were the most stable group inside the Company (longest in rank, taking proportionally fewer casualties than officers and privates), contributed greatly to the effectiveness of the Canadian Infantry, even though the men under them were not undergoing the "Band of Brothers" experience of the American Paratroops.
The appendices run heavily to statistical tables, though there is a good appendix regarding Canadian and Other Commonwealth small unit organization, which differed somewhat from the American model.
This book is not violence porn but a very interesting study of an area of concern to students of the military.… (plus d'informations)