Susan E. Babbitt

Susan E. Babbitt transforms what clearly must have been a challenging philosophy doctoral dissertation into a book of broad scope and crisp insight. The crux of the matter here is the basis for a transformative rationality. As radical feminist political theory meets traditional meta-ethical ontologies on the battleground of theories of the self, personal integrity, and individual rational choice, everything is up for grabs. Babbitt is strident in her oppositions (philosophers she disagrees with tend to be described as both “wrong and misguided”) and just as fiercely determined to lay out a positive position that makes a space for radical critique of existing societal norms whilst preserving a focus on the act of becoming, the embracing of impossible, unjustifiable (in current terms) expectations that re-create the moral ground on which actions are judged. So, ambitious. And successful, in part, I think, at least enough to cause this reader to seek out her later writings.

A powerful literary example drives much of the first half of Impossible Dreams – the dramatic infanticide perpetrated by Sethe in Toni Morrison’s Beloved. Babbitt explores this scene in detail, puzzling out what makes it a belligerent act of personal integrity rather than a “crazy” action. This is certainly rich ground to work. But at times it seems as though Babbitt forgets that the Sethe example comes from a well-crafted fictional base. She almost treats it as direct, historical fact. In fact, Morrison’s novel is so rich that it may be too complex for this philosophical thesis.

Babbitt makes good use of the most prominent moral philosophers of the early ‘90’s (when this text was drafted). She is not slow to point out their errors, as she sees them. The same holds true for feminist philosophers who, too often she thinks, disparage essentialism when something like an essentialist perspective may be necessary for the kind of bootstrapping critique that may be required for radical transformation of society.

In the final chapter, Babbitt argues against Martha Nussbaum’s neo-Aristotelian moral particularism as presented in Love’s Knowledge. Babbitt argues that Nussbaum’s brand of improvisationalist moral perception is simply too embedded in discredited racist, misogynist social norms to ever affect anything like the radical action that may be required. Babbitt opts instead for the radical critiquing made available by consequentialist moral theories (here represented by R.M. Hare). But this move is neither perceptive nor original. No one could be surprised to find that neo-Aristotelian particularism might run in tandem with a small ‘c’ moral conservatism. And for 200 hundred years, consequentialist theories, whether rooted in Bentham or Mill, have provided a basis for radical critiques of society. And so this final chapter looks like a red herring.

Nevertheless, there is much to ponder here. I will definitely be looking for further engagement with Babbitt’s thinking.… (plus d'informations)