This is in reference to Shmuel L. Gordon's essay on the IAF. I hope to review the rest of the book at some time in the future.

Gordon's chapter is a defense of the IAF against charges of unpreparedness or failure during the first days of the war. He argues that through its experience with Egyptian SAMs during the war of attrition, the IAF had learned more than any other service that a new conflict would not be like 1967. They had procedures to reduce the SAM threat, but they relied on a full 48 hours of early warning to attack air defense sites and gain air superiority. Instead of this luxury, the desperate situation in the Golan forced the IAF to conduct anti-armor missions without eliminating ground defenses. Gordon blames this result on a few factors; mainly, miscommunication and misunderstanding between civilian and military leadership. He also dings the reliance on Army intelligence for tactical intelligence.

Gordon's account has an air of plausibility and may well be true, but it is woefully undercited. Most references are from memoirs written years after the fact, and not a single archival source is to be found. I guess this is just part of the game in Middle East history, but it's still frustrating. Still, it's short and worth a read. ( )