I have to say that this book was excellent. Thomas Pfau should be commended for both his selection of texts and for his introduction and notes. He did an outstanding job. There were more than a few typos but that is not going to detract from the merits of the work and the overall effort.
Now, for the texts themselves. These texts run from early (1797), through the middle (1804), to the beginning of his late fully developed philosophy (1810). The essential theme here is Schelling's Philosophy of Identity. Signs are showing in the 1797 Treatise Explicatory of the Idealism in The Science of Knowledge, and are fully expounded in the 1804 System of Philosophy in General and Of the Philosophy Of Nature in Particular, and more or less applied in the Stuttgart Seminars of 1810. The Treatise is more a response to various philosophical reactions to Kant and Fichte in Germany. The System really lays out Schelling's Identity philosophy, which seeks to find unity in the identity of subjectivity/objectivity, universality/particularity, knowing/known, ideal/real etc. Schelling deals with the Absolute just as Hegel does, but focuses less on the division before process and more on the inherent unity. Schelling sees God and the Absolute as being the Identity of dichotomous aspects of being; one affirming and one affirmed; one knowing and the other known etc. While I do take some issue with Schelling's according to differentiation and distinction a simple null value in the Treatise, he seems to make a better case in the Stuttgart Seminars of 1810 where he more specifically accords to what seems to be simple nullity, the attribute of "non-being", not a "nothing" as such. Schelling's German language notions of "being" is quite complex and very difficult to translate into English. Basically, "being" is both a noun and a verb for Schelling. In English this is a bit hard to get across; although on some level we do recognize that be-ing implicitly denotes activity, we often see being as a simple static noun, i.e. a state. Be-ing is more akin to Schelling's use of the German "seyn" and (the) being is more akin to Schelling's "das seyende" -that which HAS be-ing. One is more dynamic and the other is more static. Schelling complicates the dynamics between these concepts even more by adding in the term "wesen" which is related to the English "essence" but the English still doesn't cover it's nuances in Schelling's system. This author seems to use "essence" for "wesen" in his translation though. That brings up my only real complaint, that, unlike Wirth's translation of Ages Of the World, Pfau doesn't give enough pointers as to which word Schelling is using for "being". He does do so occasionally, but not enough. One has to gather from context what German word lies behind the English. For Schelling, "Das Seyende" denotes "being" but also connotes "non-being", that is, being that is more or less temporal; at one point existing and at another point, not existing. Seyn is more properly eternally/infinitively active. Although Schelling's concept of God encompasses both "seyende" and "seyn", it also includes "wesen" as well, which holds/relates the previous two. I would prefer that translators give the definitions of the relevant German words in the introduction and leave the German words untranslated in the later works of Schelling, where he makes distinctions in his notion of being. Pfau still did a great job with this book, so I don't want to make that issue bigger than it truly is; it is simply down to my more exacting temperament.
This work also includes a nice piece on Coleridge's debt to Schelling. That is also a very nice addition to what is here.
Schelling breaks down his theosophical system very well in the Seminars. He lays out his system in several formulas for "being", e.g. a=a and a/a=b. Particularity is made manifest only after the division (/) of Ideal (a=a) and Real (a=b). Ideal holds only implicit distinction (a=a), whereas explicit division comes into play only in the "Real" (/a=b). Of course, a=a is the Absolute or God. To go over his system in depth is not necessary, suffice it to say, as is often the case when I read Schelling, I am not only intrigued but fascinated by his thought.
I wouldn't consider myself a Schellingian anymore than I would consider myself a Solovyevian or a Kierkegaardian, but like the latter two, Schelling's thought is profound enough that I will return to it again. Indeed, I will now proceed to read his Grounding of Positive Philosophy. ( )