As it stands right now, this is easily the best examination of why the Me 262, a warplane that the German military really needed, could basically spend the whole war in development and only start making a useful contribution in the Spring of 1945. Much of this comes down to the organizational incompetence of the Nazi regime, interacting with the process of Germany being ground to powder by the Allied war effort, while Willi Messerschmitt apparently reached his plateau of engineering and business ability. I'm not going to try and summarize this book on a blow by blow basis, as Sharp traces the process of decline, but the bottom line is that one is left with the impression that there is no way the Me 262 could have been in service in useful numbers in 1943 when it might have made a difference to the German war effort. This is fine by me, as my uncle was a USAAF bomber crewmen in 1943.

I would note that before reading this book it wouldn't hurt to have read "Arming the Luftwaffe" by Daniel Uziel, as that is a good history of the collapse of the German aviation industry of World War II, and will set the context for what is a specific case study. Sharp assumes that you've pretty well saturated yourself in the history of the Luftwaffe before you've picked up this book. ( )

This is a very thorough study of the development of the Messerschmitt Me 262, the first jet fighter to reach operational status, based on the original sources. It strips away many layers of myth making to reveal a complicated story.

The aspect that stands out most is how haphazard the development of the Me 262 was. The very poor coordination between the airframe manufacturer, the engine manufacturers, the Air Ministry and in last instance Hitler, resulted in repeated delays. The chaotic nature of Nazi rule greatly added to the inefficiency as critical workers were repeatedly drafted into the Army. Germany's attempt to supplement the skilled workforce by slave labour resulted in poor build quality and maintenance difficulties, and the scarcity of crucial materials prompted undesirable compromises. Dan Sharp quotes at length from the minutes of meetings held at various levels, and they paint a picture of endless confusion.

Oddly, when presented with the opportunity to develop the world's first jet fighter, Willy Messerschmitt did not jump at it. Instead he continued to focus on his competition with Focke-Wulf to build piston-engined fighters, and devoted resources to the Me 209 (not the pre-war racer, but a new derivative of the Bf 109) to develop it as a competitor for the Ta 152. His lack of focus on the Me 262, and the influence he had within the Nazi hierarchy, disrupted attempts to develop the new type. When at last forced to focus on the Me 262, Messerschmitt and his engineers devoted an inordinate amount of resources to the development of an array of derivatives; either to keep busy (and thus stay out of the army) or with an optimistic eye on the post-war market.

Few things about the final Me 262 were as initially intended. Its tricycle landing gear, the underwing nacelles for the engines, four-cannon nose, modest wing sweep, and bomb carriers were all afterthoughts or adaptations to operational and technological evolutions. The technical aspects of its development history are accordingly complex.

As can now be expected from Dan Sharp, this book is far better quality than most "Secret Project" efforts and vastly better than some other stuff published on the German jet fighters. His translations from German still lack fluency and are sometimes confusing, but that is a small disadvantage. It is history of the type's development and production; apart from an appendix no account is given of its operational use. ( )