Since Fidel Castro came to power and established a communist government in Cuba, the "Cuban threat" has been a concern of US policy makers. But, according to Carla Robbins, that concern and the policy resulting from it has often been flawed by prejudice and hostility, and by the failure of Americans to understand Cuban objectives and policies. This book attempts to explain the foreign policies of Castro's Cuba. It also seeks to identify some of the myths and assumptions that have influenced American policy toward Cuba, and to suggest policy alternatives for the future.

Robbins traces the evolution of Cuban foreign policy from Castro's attempts to export revolution to other Latin American states during the 1960's, through the resulting Cuban isolation and frustration of the 1970's, and finally, to the far-ranging activities of thousands of Cuban troops and civilian advisors in Africa and the Caribbean in the 1980's. She shows that the Cubans have learned from both failure and success, and that their foreign policy has moved from reckless adventurism to careful pragmatism. While Cuba remains committed to armed struggle against the existing economic and social order, Cuban policy has been moderated by US hostility, Soviet restraint, and Third World suspicion.

Hostility between Cuba and the United States came easily for both nations: Cuban nationalism resented the long history of US intervention in Cuban' affairs, and the United States was incensed at Cuba's drift toward communism which was seen as a breach of the Monroe Doctrine. The Bay of Pigs invasion, the 1962 missile crisis, and US sponsored economic and political isolation of Cuba followed. Robbins traces the growth of this hostility, claims that despite hostility, a break in US-Cuban relations was not "inevitable" and argues that irrational obsession on both sides obstructed accommodation.

In contrast to the growth of US-Cuban hostility, the alliance between Cuba and the Soviet Union was a less likely development. The Soviets were surprised by the Cuban revolution, viewed the Caribbean as a US sphere of influence, and initially suspected that Soviet support of Cuba might alienate other Latin states and provoke US military intervention. Robbins believes that Castro's 1961 public avowal of socialism was intended to force the Soviet Union to support the Cuban revolution openly or risk charges of ideological hypocrisy from China. and the Third World. This strategy worked and by 1962 Moscow committed itself fully to the defense of Cuba and had preparations underway for the deployment of offensive Soviet missiles on the island. But relations between these two socialist states were frequently strained: the Cubans were resentful and uneasy about being excluded from the US-Soviet negotiations to resolve the missile crisis; and the Soviets felt compelled to use economic blackmail to restrain risky Cuban policies that threatened to embroil the super powers in conflict. Castro sought to maintain some independence from the Soviets, while continuing to enjoy their military protection, through an active role in the Nonaligned Movement. In Robbins' view, this Cuban strategy helps explain Castro's initial commitment of troops and advisers in Africa.

Carla Robbins' analysis of relationships between Cuba and its friends and enemies is an important and useful book. Her most valuable contribution is a convincing description of the myths that haunt US policy toward Cuba: that Cuba is a Soviet pawn; that Cubans are everywhere; that Cubans are always subversive; that Cubans always win; that Cubans are international outlaws; that Cuba’s friend is our enemy; that Cuba’s enemy is our friend; that everyone agrees with the US view of Cuba. While debunking these myths Robbins remains objective. She concludes that "the real Cuban threat may be the reaction that forces the United States into untenable alliances with right-wing regimes, involves the United States in unpopular and often illegal overseas entanglements, alienates many of its citizens, and undercuts its prestige and influence abroad. “The real Cuban threat,” says Robbins, "may well come from within the United States." That thesis clearly deserves thoughtful consideration