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Russian Security and Air Power, 1992-2002

par Marcel De Haas

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This new book analyzes the security policy of the Russian Federation, internally as well as externally, on all levels of strategy. It describes military and political decision-making from Moscow's grand strategy to the use of a single fighter aircraft in Chechnya. In this analysis, Russia's air forces are used as a model for all services of the armed forces. The Chechen conflicts and NATO's security policy have been dominant factors in the development of Russia's security policy during the period 1992-2002. The use of air power in the Chechen conflicts is used here as a case study for testing political and military-strategic objectives. With regard to NATO's security policy, this study shows that the eastward enlargement of this alliance, as well as its use of force in Bosnia and Kosovo, have caused an increase in anti-Western tendencies in Russian security thinking.… (plus d'informations)
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This was truly detailed academic work on modern Russian security and application of the same when it comes to Russian air power. Author truly took time and went through the both Western and Russian sources and collected plethora of information.

We are given a great view of Russia's politicians and government that suddenly found itself without firm ground when Soviet Union fell down. In the whole fuss of the situation new state had to find its place again, especially considering the situation with former Soviet republics that were seen as a ripe and low fruits to pick by ever expanding NATO alliance. First thing that Russian government had to do was to define security documents, strategy if you like, on all levels in order to have any kind of persistent and consistent internal and foreign policy and goals.

And this is where author shows not a little bias. In the start Russian security model was oriented towards the internal issues, with all of the struggles and [this surprised me a lot have to say] Yeltsin's decision to start the First Chechen War [I mean this man is glorified as a democratic saint by the West, and now after learning that he literary used tanks against his opposition he was also a man that started the Chechen wars.....strange world isn't it]. After this war was over in 1996 Russian security model suddenly started including West as a possible threat.

For the author this looks like going back to old Soviet policy instead of concentrating on internal issues.

For me this looks like a very bad conclusion by a person well versed into the military and security policies. Because lets look at the events - Russia was in turmoil during the entire 1990's and part of this turmoil was presence of parties (like Arab militants) in strategic areas - foreign elements and let us not fool ourselves that anything happens spontaneous in politics (AQ traces its roots all the way back to Afghanistan wars, and forces to be that controll(ed) AQ did not change their policy for a iota).

And while this turmoil was going on, suddenly Russia finds NATO advisers organizing exercises and building bases in all bordering former Soviet republics getting ever near to the [now very much exposed] Moscow military district. And again all of this happens with Russia being sent to the back as unimportant when it comes to new military events (executed during peacetime but military in nature) in its own back yard so to say. For me constant ignoring of Russian Federation, pushing the way ever near to the very borders of Russia and establishing various bases and making military alliances along the way would definitely present itself as a threat.

Even after 9/11 and what seems to be finding common ground between Russia and the West, West again ended up with total ignoring Russian participation in any type of dialogue and just moving on with the goals set by NATO ever-expanding alliance (today was a news that NATO aims to strengthen alliance with the Asian state! NATO strengthening its alliance in Asia? Must not be true, right?).

For me it is fairly normal that (hawks or no hawks) any state would react to these type of events with alarm and immediately identify threat vector.

Also comments on how Russian foreign policy/diplomacy is dual (in a way that they combine power play with international cooperation) is also rather silly statement. Show me any country in the world that does not this, at least in their immediate neighborhood (EU countries are exemption because they literary do not exist, they are now part of EU with their militaries and economy bound in a way they might not appreciate but that is their choice; so in this case we can only talk about EU as union, not every EU member as individual political entity).

No country has diplomats playing openly and fair - that is the point of diplomacy. Only way some country would say what it is thinking is when they feel safe and that is usually when they are on their own turf. And I wont go into the talks about Putin. For some reason West has a complex when it comes to this man and just cannot talk about him without showing him in some despot/tyrant light. Where it not for the pandemic I would be ready to agree with some of the author's remarks but after two years of despotism from city to state levels worldwide I would say that West is not the right entity to condemn anyone when it comes to dictatorship and state exercising violence over its people for not complying to the mainstream (and yes Canada ..... yes).

As I said this was part of the book that I had issues with because it was so obviously biased. To call it anything else would mean that author is ignorant and naive and this is definitely not a case. But again this seems to be prism through which Russian Federation is perceived by almost entire West it seems from 1992 so I do not deduct any stars. Things are a they are, bias takes sometimes centuries to disappear.

Second part of the book shows how ever changing security policies and security infrastructure of Russian Federation affected the use of the military, internal security troops and [which is focus of the book] air power.

These chapters are expertly done with lots of details and background on the wars and conflicts. Author manages to show how every conflict has a very complex logistical an command and control issues that need to be aligned and tuned up to be effective.

Level of details and references is superb. Author truly wrote a masterpiece that is very much academic work and it might take some to go through it (it is definitely not a light literature).

Excellent, highly recommended. ( )
  Zare | Jan 23, 2024 |
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This new book analyzes the security policy of the Russian Federation, internally as well as externally, on all levels of strategy. It describes military and political decision-making from Moscow's grand strategy to the use of a single fighter aircraft in Chechnya. In this analysis, Russia's air forces are used as a model for all services of the armed forces. The Chechen conflicts and NATO's security policy have been dominant factors in the development of Russia's security policy during the period 1992-2002. The use of air power in the Chechen conflicts is used here as a case study for testing political and military-strategic objectives. With regard to NATO's security policy, this study shows that the eastward enlargement of this alliance, as well as its use of force in Bosnia and Kosovo, have caused an increase in anti-Western tendencies in Russian security thinking.

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