Thomas E. Ricks book, "The Generals" offers an interesting critique of Army and Marine Corps leadership from the days of World War II to today. He's generally critical in the way recent and current military Generals are assigned and rotated through their assignments compared to his baseline assessment using George Marshall's leadership in the 1940's. Ricks points out that under Marshall, Generals were quickly assessed in the performance of their assignments, and quickly relieved if they were not producing the desired results. Ricks contrasts that leadership style with more recent times, when Generals are rarely recalled or reassigned, but rather allowed to fill their time in their assignments, regardless of results. He reviews the performance of countless Generals in his book, from MacArthur and Eisenhower and Patton in WWII, through the Korean War, Vietnam War, Cold War, peacetime, and right up through the Gulf War, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Ricks describes many outstanding leaders, but criticizes many others. His criticism isn't limited to the Generals performing their duty, but includes the highest levels at the Pentagon, to the Defense Secretary, and up to the President. He makes some good points, but I wonder if the Cadets and Midshipmen at West Point and Annapolis, and the current crop of Junior Officers in today's military will take the best of Ricks criticisms to heart, and find ways to ensure our best leaders and most capable performers end up in the highest ranks of the military in the future.
There's hope, I think, given that there is some recognition of these problems recently. For example, in a speech delivered at West Point by then outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in February, 2011, he asked Cadets to consider how the Army could break up the institutional concrete, its bureaucratic rigidity in its assignment and promotion process, in order to retain, challenge, and inspire its best, brightest, and most battle-tested young officers to lead the service in the future (ref: http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539). Other related books include Mark Moyar's 2009 book "A Question of Command" which makes the point that senior commanders should make leadership selection and DESELECTION one of their top priorities; and Tim Kane's more recent book "Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Military Mismanages Great Leaders". ( )

I found The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today by Thomas Ricks an informative read. However, based on my reading background and personal intersects with senior officers during my junior officer military experience, the author's conclusions seem to be pretty broad strokes that may not apply to all parties discussed in the book.

Given environment and background of WWII, I feel that George Marshall was a true American hero. While not perfect, his efforts and influences played major roles in preparation for and execution of US Army operations during the war. I found I could agree with many of the author's conclusions regarding Marshall and WWII generalship.

I have read a fair number of historical and biographical books on general officers. My focus has been on American generals in WWII. In the book I found the historical background of how military events and generalship unfolded after WWII and thru Vietnam very educating. I had not studied the era from post-WWII to Vietnam in much detail previously.

I served as a junior officer in the US Army getting out in the early 90's. Some of the recent and current Army generals are people I either served under when they were field grade officers or went to school with. As I started to read about generals in the early 80s thru today, I felt I had some personal knowledge on the topic. A lot of my viewpoint has come from personally observing their actions, talking with peers and seniors in the Army and staying current on articles and stories in the media.

Ricks seems to draw a conclusion that turning out a general with less than exceptional performance through retirement or assignment rotation is flawed. Some generals could or should be fired for poor performance. How a general’s assignment is terminated I think should be a case by case situation.

There are a few current or recently retired 3 and 4 star generals that I served under as a junior combat arms officer (either at company level or in staff assignments). At the time they were lieutenant colonels or colonels. I recall many decisions they made. Then later I read about their assignments and decisions as general officers. Many maintained their professional decorum and strong decision making abilities. Their leaderships skilled were parlayed into upper ranks with earned much respect.

If Rick's book was read without related background and understanding, a lay reader might conclude that all current generals are a poor lot and the current senior leadership development mechanisms in the Army should be tossed. A conclusion I can't agree with. I get the impression Ricks’ comments about current general officer performance seems to be tainted by more colorful newspaper and magazine articles than reality. I am cautious about the level of critical analysis actually done. Describing details of a half dozen senior generals and then saying those findings apply to most or all generals seems misleading.

General officer development, promotion and assignment is a tough job. Not a perfect record, but a respectable one. Some of my peers and former bosses deserve more respect. Toss the bad apples by appropriate means, but don't conclude all or most generals are bad apples. ( )

If there's one book that I find myself recommending more than most lately, it's Thomas Ricks' survey and analysis of US generals from World War II to the present. With an eye to examining why history has been so kind to the men who led the US Army during that war, but less so to those who followed, The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today is as much a book about leadership and organizational behavior as it is about the commanders of the US military during war time. Ricks sets out to examine the gap between performance and accountability among the upper echelons of the US Army, and answer the question about why it has grown in the seven decades since World War II.

The Generals is 450 pages long and divided into five sections examining World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam, the Interwar Era, and the recent wars in the Middle East (Gulf I and II and Afghanistan). Within each, Ricks further organizes around the generals of the era, starting with General George Marshall, the unsung father of the modern US Army (and something of the Platonic ideal general, to hear Ricks conception). Marshall is both willing to relieve generals who are flawed, underperform, or just straight-up can't cut it, but is something of a savvy manager of these generals, moving them to other posts out of the way of the action rather than drumming them out of the service.

To demonstrate this, Ricks' runs through a series of the biggest names in US military history, using them to demonstrate his point. Here you find MacArthur, Eisenhower and Patton, as well as less popular names like Mark Clark and Terry de la Mesa Allen. The effect is that The Generals reads a bit like an overview , and with as many events and personalities as Ricks is covering, I suppose that's the most that can expected. At times, his evidence comes off more conclusive than evidentiary, and the level of detail increases the closer Ricks' narrative comes to the present with the Gulf Wars and Afghanistan War. As such, the book is probably better as an examination of leadership, especially for the lay reader, than as an in-depth contribution to the academic examination of history (though Ricks certainly takes time to recognize, mention, and even argue with others in the field that have intersected with his work).

For me, one of those lay readers more in the 'history buff' category than the academic, it's a fun and thought provoking read. It challenges our concepts about what drives change and success, with lessons for organizations beyond the scope of Ricks' subjects. Ricks grasps the nuances of his subject, if not always the depth of knowledge that a master of the field might display, and knows how to highlight points that matter without becoming distracted by minutia or allowing his argument to become weighed down by the mass of history he is examining.

In spite of its 450 pages, The Generals is a fast read, which is a tribute to Ricks' ability to tell the story and it's worth the time to read for anyone interested in the period, the US military, or American history.
( )

Excellent book, extremely interesting. Audiobook narrator was excellent. This is not actually a war story - it's a review and comparison of military generals (generalists) in the recent wars of the1900s The only kind of disappointing aspect of the book, and somewhat obvious - a "slant" if you will - is that the author seems to really REALLY like General Marshal and his military tactics. No other general measures up! So I guess it's a book about how great Marshall was and how no other general will be as good as he was. On well, I loved this book and I think anyone who loves war books will too. Recommend ( )

This is not a book about military generals, it's a book about US Army generals, operational ones...mostly of the three and four star variety. He pans some, writes accolades about some. Generally, Ricks's not enamored with the state of the US Army's leadership since Marshall. His primary thrust is that more of them should be fired for bad performance. Though it must be painful to read for some of these guys, it's a good explanation of the giant US Army bureaucracy today. ( )