Allen Buchanan

(...)

In the rest of the review, some thoughts on the book, an intermezzo on the supposed power of literature, and, as usual in my non-fiction reviews, I’ll end with a collection of interesting information tidbits I want to keep an account of.

What maybe needs addressing first is the mention of the world ‘liberal’ above. Let me quote Hopster:

“In taking this stance they rely on substantive ethical assumptions, of a broadly liberal moral outlook. This might make for some queasy among readers who do not share the same moral outlook. However, these readers can still appreciate what I take to be the book’s key contribution: to analyse and explain under which conditions a move towards more or less inclusivism is likely to occur.”

What is meant by a “broadly liberal moral outlook”? Basically just the idea that the authors think that the abolishing of slavery, advances in women’s rights, rights of disabled people, general human rights, protection against cruel punishment, animal rights, etc. are all instances of moral progress. Mind you, they don’t try to argue the philosophical foundations of such a statement, they “do not offer a normative ethical theory”. But they are not moral nihilists either: they just assume these advances as good, and it’s hard to deny these societal developments of the last 250 years have decreased human suffering. While this all may sound as truisms to many people, some conservative readers might be of the conviction our modern Western society is in a state of moral degeneration or moral regression. Buchanan and Powell spend quite a few tightly argued pages wherein they point at faults in the reasoning of such thinkers, most notably Alastair MacIntyre.

To me this approach was quite refreshing. Instead of spending too much time on trying to build up a theoretical definition of what constitutes ‘moral progress’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’, the authors start from the idea that advancements in equal rights and inclusion is moral progress. What the authors do not claim is that this progress is universal and set in stone. They very much acknowledge such progress is local and not evenly distributed across the planet, and an important part of the book is devoted to trying to understand why regressions of inclusivity occur – for instance during World War 2. “Exclusivist moral response is a conditionally expressed trait that develops only when cues that were in the past reliably correlated with outgroup predation, exploitation, competition for resources, and disease transmission are detected.” Crucial to understand demagogues is that these cues don’t need to be cues to real threats – if people believe or are made to believe threatening cues exists that belief is enough for exclusivist tendencies to gain hold again.

(...)

Full review on Weighing A Pig Doesn't Fatten It… (plus d'informations)

This is a fascinating moral argument for reforming international law, especially on matters of secession and autonomy. The author argues that states must be instruments of justice. Insofar as states fail to meet this duty, they should become liable to international intervention by (a league of) rights-respecting states. Nations or peoples oppressed by unjust states should be permitted to secede under certain conditions. Parts two and three of the book provide extended specifications and qualifications for these theses. International relations have not been discussed much in political philosophy, so as far as I know the author really breaks new ground on many fronts. The moral challenges he presents to established pre-conceptions about "national interests", "self-determination" and current international law should be read by everyone involved or interested in international affairs.

I do wonder how many readers will persevere to the second half of the book, where the real argument begins, because the author is regrettably slow in getting to the point. At just over 70 pages, the introductory chapters are much longer than they need to be. The ensuing Part One: Justice contains another 160 pages of painstaking interpretations of earlier moral theory, particularly John Rawls' works. I think these discussions are a bit out of place in this work. A far simpler conception of justice would clearly have sufficed for the main arguments concerning international law. In fact a prospective reader could easily start reading this book exactly at the halfway point, at the beginning of Part Two, and immediately be up to speed on the main argument.… (plus d'informations)