This seems like two books. The last part, describing the battle of Brandy Station is handled with Wittenberg's usual excellent coverage of movements and personal accounts, from BOTH sides.

The first part, however, is an extended apologia for the Union cavalry, circa spring of 1863. I know that subject is in the title of the book, but Wittenberg beats it to the ground, with example after example of Union trooper triumphs, even when they have been foolishly placed in dire circumstances by their commanders' blunders. And the Confederates only appear in quotations attesting to the valor and effectiveness of the Yankee cavalry troops. It just got old after awhile. Especially references to how exhausted the courageous Union troopers are after 36, count 'em, 36 hours in the saddle. Stuart's and Forrest's men, who went on raids that lasted nine or ten days nonstop, would split their sides laughing to read that.

At the command level, Wittenberg does a good job describing how the cavalry command was restructured and giving credit to those who accomplished it. But again he goes too far, even going to great lengths to try to prove that Stoneman's Raid before Chancellorsville was a smashing success!

This is an important treatise on the evolution of the Union cavalry, and they did mature during this period. I just wish Wittenberg had not been quite so heavy handed in making his case for them. ( )

At times brilliant and other times mediocre, this study of the evolution of the Union Cavalry Corps in the first half of 1863 is a fine addition to the growing body of cavalry-oriented literature that tries to explain the puzzling weakness of Union cavalry in the first war years.

Wittenberg sees the Chancellorsville campaign and its sandwiching battles of Kelly's Ford and Brandy Station as the turning point of the Union cavalry. He argues that organizational change (creation of a dedicated cavalry corps), training by George Stoneman, and William Averell, and a newly found spirit of giving cavalry combat missions at army command level (Alfred Pleasonton, Joe Hooker) as the principal reasons for the emergence.

While these are all worthy reasons, the actual performance of the Union cavalry in the battles up to Gettysburg showed a continuing stream of failures and missed chances. The key difference to earlier events, however, was that now these failures were the sole responsibility of the cavalry corps and, especially if not mostly, its leadership. At last, the pruning of inept and over-cautious leadership (which started in the infantry in 1861) could begin in the cavalry branch too. Only after the battle of Brandy Station and its resulting purge was the Union cavalry directed by aggressive and (mostly) capable generals. Thus, the turning point is less the extended Chancellorsville campaign but the changes undertaken at its end.

The book presents a good narrative on a strategic level. The battle descriptions lack clarity. Rapid movements and the flow of cavalry engagements are difficult to render in text and need visual support the included maps do not provide. Maps appear much too late in the text (eg the map on Brandy Station is found on the tenth page of an eleven page battle description) and cover brigades whereas the narrative focusses on regiments. As brigades had mostly three to six regiments, the largely empty maps could easily have been enriched by regimental positions and tracings of the attack and retreat paths. The conclusion deals with the careers of individual cavalry officers and neglects to summarize the findings of the study. Overall, a mixed recommendation: great topic, flawed execution. ( )