Read this around 2007. Still remember it pretty well. Wellington got away pretty well in Keegan’s book. ( )

The Mask of Command by military historian John Keegan is a tour de force exegesis of 2,000 years of Western Military evolution through the lives and leaderships of four primary players who ushered in critical advances in their respective war-making. The universal appeal of this book can be gauged from the fact that high-performing business students; military commanders and leaders in all fields are expected to read and imbibe it for the lessons it imparts.

Keegan's vocabulary, it must be said, is antiquated. But this is to be expected given the age of the book. However if one can surmount this stumbling block then it is easy to immerse oneself into the practicalities of leadership he explores. He follows a pattern of his own making while analyzing the abilities and lives of the below four European Military Leaders:

-Alexander the Great.
-Wellington during the Napoleonic Wars.
-General U.S. Grant during the American Civil War.
-Adolf Hitler throughout the entirety of World War One.

He focuses on:

-Their conflictual style i.e. did they command from the frontline or the rear and why.
-The technological advances they utilized and how these came about.
-Their staff and the role it played in shaping their outlook as well as executing their orders.
-Their balancing of the military/political equilibrium.

The greatest takeaways from this book for leaders, if summarized efficiently, are:

(a) Establish the parameters of your authority and enforce them equally and without hesitation.
(b) Construct a staff of high calibre and avoid yes men.
(c) Keep abreast of all technological advances and use the most practical to your advantage.
(d) Underscore and comprehend your loyalties and stick to them.
(e) Be ready for change.
(f) Do not micromanage.

As unbelievable as it might be, the entire apotheosis of Keegan's leadership theory is delivered in a summarized fashion during his analysis of Adolf Hitler. Naturally, they are in the form of don'ts rather than do's.

I thoroughly enjoyed this book. While it might take some time getting used to Keegan's prose, it packs a riveting punch and concludes with the rejoinder that in the current nuclear age we have entered the post-heroic epoch. Military balance is universal and developed/developing powers can destroy each other at the push of the button. In such an age, restraint and the avoidance of confrontation will produce a new pacifist hero in lieu of the sanguinary warmongers of the past. ( )

Keegan analyzes war generals, with a focus on Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant, and Adolf Hitler. He argues that generalship can tell us a lot about a particular era or place, especially whether generals are considered “heroes” or “anti-heroes.” He writes:

“Generalship is, in short, much more than command of armies in the field. For an army is, to resort to cliche, an expression of the society from which it issues.” The purposes for which it fights and the way it does so will therefore be determined in large measure by what a society wants from a war and how far it expects its army to go in delivering that outcome.”

“Context,” he later avers, “is all.”

This macro view of generalship is so much more illuminating than the view from the ground.

On a more specific level, Keegan notes that the hopes and requirements of the soldiers a general leads must be reflected by great generals. He writes, “The leader of men in warfare can show himself to his followers only through a mask, a mask that he must make for himself, but a mask made in such form s will mark him to men of his time and place as the leer they want and need.”

It is a pity Keegan didn’t select George Washington for one of his highlighted generals. Washington was a master of theater, and of both meeting expectations and manipulating them in his favor. (For an excellent analysis of this, see Ron Chernow’s biography of Washington.)

No matter what his subject, however, Keegan is superbly adept at exposing all facets of military affairs in depth, and providing readers with fascinating and unexpected insights. This book is no exception. ( )

readable and informative as Keegan always is. Odd to include Hitler in his set, who was out of his depth as commander and took half a world down with him, whereas the other three (Alexander, Wellington, Grant) were undefeated throughout. But the Hitler profile & analysis is the most interesting. Shows how H learned from his own frontkaempfer experience, but perhaps then learned nothing else, that he boned up on the technical details of weapons and transport and floored his own generals with displays of (essentially trivial) memory feats, how he was even more of a chateau general than the WW1 chaps, with his HQ hundreds of miles from the front (and disruptingly shifting), how he basically collapsed as soon as he met with defeat in any form. the inexplicable is how he kept all those professionals under his thumb and the front line fighting till the last bullet. Keegan doesn't engage much with that. Alex and the Duke are well described but not much new; Grant is interesting: dogged, gruff, coming from nowhere, but with well-concealed intellectual qualities that came out in his Memoirs at the end of his life. The overall analysis in the last chapter is too short and abstract to come across well. Keegan at his best when there's a whiff of gunpowder or a whirr of arrows in the air. ( )

A certain part of military life is talking other people into risking their lives to accomplish the goals, worthy or unworthy of those who pay your salary. Of course there's an ideological element in some of this, and there's group solidarity as well, but the bottom line seems to be summed up above. Mr. Keegan has done a very good job defining the role of the officer, and his prose is competent. ( )