While Neiberg wrote this book as a case study of how governments behave in the case of shock and emergency, with the working assumption that he would find circumstances of ruthlessly carrying through on a course of expediency, with the period expectation that the ends would justify the means, that is not what his conclusions wound up being. The more Neiberg considered the evidence, the more he found a situation of FDR's administration desperately casting around, in the case of the Vichy government, for a policy that kept the remaining French resources out of German reach, while at the same time maintaining a semblance of respectability. What this practically meant is according recognition to Petain for too long, and then cycling through a range of possible partners in a determined effort to avoid dealing with Charles de Gaulle; at least until there was no other option. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in particular, does not come out of this study looking especially sensible or realistic. This is really not news, but what Neiberg does really well is put the contingency back in the story, so, if you have no familiarity with this tawdry tale, this is a book well worth reading. ( )

Ok- only read first 100 pages, so an unfair review. Just didn't work for me - i suppose i was already familiar enough with the author's version of the story to not be learning anything. The Casablanca chapter headings didn't help. ( )

Now that we know how history turned out, it's hard to remember that nothing was obvious at the time, during those critical years before the tide had turned and Naziism seemed doomed to defeat. This book is a well-written summary of American policy at the time. Mostly we backed the wrong people!

During the Summer of 1940, right after Germany's unexpected success in its invasion of France, most Americans assumed that all of Europe including Britain would eventually fall to the Third Reich. In that context it made sense for the US to officially recognize the Vichy government as the true French government, despite the efforts of the Resistance.

This is a useful and readable account of a period of history where American policymakers made mistakes that ultimately were ignored because of how it all ended. I found it a useful reminder that leadership can fail even when the result succeeds. ( )