If this book is expected to be about the Indian saver's well-being, it is a bit of a disappointment, as it seems to be mainly about delinquent borrowers. The author's main point seems to be that defaulting loan accounts should be put on the NAP list the fay after the default, and "regulatory forbearance" is not a good strategy for the long-term health of the financial sector. Similarly there should be strict curbs on the amount of public debt that the government is allowed. Surprisingly, the author does not talk about the elephant in the room, demonetization, and the effect it may have had on enterprises; nor does he in any manner disclose the nature of his differences with Raghuram Rajan, the previous head of the RBI. Frankly, pulling the plug on borrowers on the next day of a default looks like a pretty draconian, and impractical rule; and I say his as a person who was posted to just such a delinquent public sector corporation, and re-negotiated with the bankers and started the process of turning it around. Disappointingly, there is not much about how companies and promoters land up in such a soup: there is just a short paragraph in the last chapter which hints at the reasons and motivations, and it is clear that the author does not lend much credence to factors outside of the promoters' control. A few case studies would have helped, but the author is more interested in the aftermath of a default in repayments (he has a time-line of such a process without naming any names), and not so much in how to avoid such management or strategic failures. A major problem with this book is the obscure style (common among financial experts), and the bristling thickets of acronyms and abbreviations, among which the reader gets lost. ( )