The second book of a trilogy. All three are exceptionally well written. The style is easy to read, well researched and makes excellent use of contemporary reports, personal letters and official material.

McManus gives a vivid account of the fighting but also provides descriptions of the logistics effort that only the American economy could sustain. His pen portraits of the main commanders and their various intra and inter-service machinations was something that is not usually covered.

These books provide an understanding of the US Army contribution in many unknown locations that hardly ever feature in the Pacific narrative. ( )

The second volume in a trilogy, "Island Infernos" continues the authors coverage of WW I in the Pacific, focusing on

Finished John McManus ' Island Infernos: The US Army's Pacific War 1944.

A thorough review and evaluation of the role of the US Army in the Pacific. When we think of the Army in World War II we generally have imagery of the ETO, just as the imagery of the Navy is in the Pacific Theater.

When the Army is thought of in the Pacific we often think of General Douglas MacArthur and the SWPA but McManus goes far beyond.

He does spend considerable time on MacArthur DVD his primary subordinates. Willoughby his Chief of Intelligence, General Sutherland his Chief of Staff, Kenney on charge of MacArthur's Air Force, General Robert Eichelberger and General Walter Krueger. The book also goes into great detail of the Naval Forces that were under our cooperated with MacArthur notably William Halsey.

McManus also spends significant time on the CBI Theater, Joseph Stillwell and units under his command such as Merrill's Marauders and the delicate relationship between the Allies and China under Chiang Kai Shek and between Stillwell and Chiang

McManus also goes into great detail on the Army units under Admiral Chester Nimitz in the POA and the working relationship between Marine and Army units at both the operational level and the combative relationship that sometimes existed at higher levels between Marine Lieutenant General Holland Smith and subordinate Army Commanders such as Major General Ralph Smith. Holland Smith's tendency to disparage and understate the effectiveness of Army Units often giving the Marines lions have of the credit for success and the Army units the greatest amount of blame for failures often charactizing them as poorly led and lacking aggressiveness.

Actions in Saipan,Tinian, the Philippines, Hollandia and Palau and the Battle of the Philippines Sea the are among the many actions and campaigns covered.

A solid 4 to 4.5 on the complicated nature of the Army's under documented role in the Pacific Theater. ( )