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Chargement... Gay Rights vs. Religious Liberty?: The Unnecessary Conflictpar Andrew Koppelman
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Should religious people who conscientiously object to facilitating same-sex weddings, and who therefore decline to provide cakes, photography, or other services, be exempted from antidiscrimination laws? This issue has taken on an importance far beyond the tiny number who have made such claims. Gay rights advocates fear that exempting even a few religious dissenters would unleash a devastating wave of discrimination. Conservative Christians fear that the law will treat them like racists and drive them to the margins of American society. Both sides are mistaken. This is not a matter of abstract principle, and none of the constitutional claims work. This is an appropriate occasion for legislative negotiation. This book is a systematic accounting of the interests that must be balanced in any decent compromise, in terms that both sides can recognise and appreciate. Aucune description trouvée dans une bibliothèque |
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Google Books — Chargement... GenresClassification décimale de Melvil (CDD)323.442Social sciences Political Science Civil and political rights The state and the individual Liberty Freedom of conscienceClassification de la Bibliothèque du CongrèsÉvaluationMoyenne:
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Both gain, and both lose, and thus on the whole this seems generally tolerable.
Getting to this point, however, Koppelman expresses some troubling premises that are disappointing from someone who is generally thought of as an advocate of civil rights of gays. First, he states repeatedly that bakers and such should not be forced to “participate” in same-sex weddings, without unpacking what constitutes “participation.” By this reading, the store that rents the tux has participated, as has the rented limo. This seems a rather broad and vague standard to trigger constitutional concern.
But more troubling is the fact that Koppelman, as a straight man, seems willing to deem acceptable a greater amount of suffering by gay individuals than a member of the community probably would. Religious discrimination is a problem only if it exceeds some unspecified amount; gays should be prepared to take some as a matter of course because, well, that’s just what religions do. He is in fact far more concerned about protecting religious bakers and florists than gay customers, a stance understandable in that because he has himself never been the target of discrimination he doesn’t really understand what it does to the impacted person. He speaks in the abstract, but he doesn’t really understand. It is, in any event, disheartening to see him feel more empathy for the discriminating business than for the victim of discrimination.
Much of this makes little appearance in the final suggestion, and for that reason it can be entertained. To the extent, however, that the buildup to the conclusion is actually necessary to reach that end, then it too must fall. ( )