Maybe read half - at work- just because an interesting topic. We learn a lot about the author's core thesis / point: that while the Russians made impressive attacks - with incredible bravery and risk- their whole vaunted winter offensive was a dud in the end. Yes, the Germans were pressed- even crazed- at the attacks- but hey held on and one has the impression of giving 10 to 1 losses to the Russians for every attack. Leading to the question of: Hitler's halt order (give up no more ground or else). Was this responsible for the Germans holding on? Some say yes- but the author says no. and that Hitler drew the wrong conclusions, thinking his Halt order did save the day. ( )

David Stahel is back with another slab of hell on the Eastern Front, this time to make the argument that, as bad as it was, the collapse of Operation Typhoon was not quite the disaster that the Germans deserved to experience. That this was the case is a commentary on the limitations of Soviet military of the time and how the professional leaders of the Red Army had their own delusional maximum leader to cope with.

Apart from that it occurs to me, seeing as this is the fifth book in this epic, Stahel might have done a little recapitulation of the themes of his earlier books, which dwelt on personal and professional failings of the German officer corps. Seeing as this is more of a popular book, not everyone is familiar with the erosion of reputations that have occurred in the cases of men such as Guderian and Halder since the end of the Cold War, and the fading of the polite lie of a German army that did not share in the criminality of the Third Reich. ( )

This work is massive in scope, involving vast geographic areas and millions of men. It does not discuss the retreat from Moscow at the individual soldier’s level, but at the corps and army level. We are treated to the workings of the very highest-ranking German generals on the Eastern Front. David Stahel, the author, is a professional historian, teaching both at the University of New South Wales and the Australian Defence Force Academy. This is the latest in a number of books he has written about the German Army on the Eastern Front during World ll. His purpose in writing this book is to show that the German retreat from Moscow was a victory “tactically, operationally, and even strategically”, and not a defeat as is often claimed by other historians.
Retreat From Moscow is also a very detailed telling of the German high command’s three-way battle with the Communists, Hitler, and the Russian winter. It is packed with historical facts of which most people are generally unaware. Which German general on the Eastern Front could mostly be likened to U.S. General Omar Bradley, the “soldier’s general”? Which side’s generals were most afraid to contradict their ruler? What motivated Hitler to give the Halt Order, thus preventing his armies from making orderly and life saving retreats in the face of vastly superior numbers? Why did the Communists throw wave after wave of mass attacks against well-entrenched National Socialist armies? These and many other questions are answered here.
The author’s treatment of the Wehrmacht Generals is uneven. At times it seems as if the author has taken a break from writing and then come back in a different frame of mind. This is particularly true in his treatment of Field Marshal Kluge, the commander of Army Group Center. Stahel shows a particular animus towards General Heinz Guderian, but does not tell the reader why. This may have been developed in one of the author’s earlier works. There is an impression that perhaps things were said in Mr. Stahel’s earlier books that should have been repeated for clarity’s sake in this volume. Stahel blames Guderian for the German army’s failure to be prepared for winter warfare. This hardly seems fair, though, because Guderian was a blitzkrieg general who had no expectation of having to fight winter warfare. The author also appears ambivalent in his attitude toward the opposing forces. He illustrates some of the German’s inexcusable treatment of Russian civilians, but insinuates that reports of Russian brutality toward German prisoners were mere rumors. He never calls the Soviets “Communists”, but usually refers to the Germans as “Nazis.” The writer does show human understanding for the suffering of the Wermacht troops in the field, but very little for the generals. One might expect a professional historian to show a bit more detachment than our author does, but there may be a good explanation for this. He is an academic, after all, writing in an environment not known for its tolerance of deviation from expected viewpoints.
On the whole, this is a very good book, especially for professional historians and serious students of history. For casual readers, it could be one or two hundred pages shorter. It is to be heartily recommended, but not in its e-book version. Professor Stahel makes generous use of maps and footnotes, which can be extremely difficult to utilize in an e-book edition.
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