In a telling exchange between author Hank Crumpton and a corporate CEO long after Crumpton’s clandestine days are over, Crumpton’s interlocutor asks him why Al Qaeda hates Americans.

Al Qaeda’s leaders, Crumpton replies, hate globalization. They hate the Westernization of their society. They hate the weak position they are in vis-a-vis American hegemony, and they particularly hate Muslim rulers who allow western culture to creep into and destroy the Muslim world.

It retrospect, and in the context of what we see in America today, aren’t we almost listening to verbatim what Americans hate about globalization? These are the same arguments we get from the rust-belt unemployed, from the religious right, and from the rural minority.

There is resentment and to some degree envy of those whom they perceive have taken away their money, their jobs, and their security. There is little analysis though as to why Americans gave their jobs away, or who was ultimately behind the success of China and the other tigers of Asia. And this isn’t a critique of Crumpton’s book. It is a critique of America today.

I almost feel as though the poison Osama bin Ladan spread in the Muslim world has now poisoned the American electorate to its core.

Was 9/11 a threat to American hegemony to the same degree as, say, globalization, or climate change?

By numbers of Americans directly affected you’d have to say no. You’d have to admit that America over-reacted to the external terrorist threat, or at least they over-reacted if indeed Al Qaeda was as easy to defeat as they seemed to be.

Had Al Qaeda or even ISIL been as successful at recruiting as, say, the US Marines, it would have been a whole different story.

The meat of this story is Crumpton’s assignment as leader of the counter-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan in the runup to the full invasion of Afghanistan by the American-led coalition. It is a compelling and an instructive story.

Crumpton feels he owes the success of the mission to America’s Afghan allies, to the extraordinary dedication and skill of America’s CIA operatives he sent into Afghanistan, and to no small degree their ability to apply evolving technologies to a new type of warfare.

This is a book about the critical role intelligence will play in wars to come, and I can’t fault Crumpton for his assessment, even if his cheerleading gets a little under my skin.

Crompton also makes a fair point in the change of threats between state and non-state actors. At the time of his writing — and today for that matter — there are no state actors who pose an existential threat to the US. Not China. Not Russia. Not N. Korea.

In the case of 9/11 the passengers of United Flight 93 saved people who were the target of that flight whereas the US government didn’t save anybody that day.

Non-state actors are not only threats, they are the source of resilience in the attacked party.

The role of private actors in counterintelligence was growing back then. Today, with the rise of Google, facebook, and Twitter it is a major preoccupation.

And as we have learned with the Snowden revelations, people are volunteering their intelligence as a group and as individuals to the state actors all the time.
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"The Art of Intelligence", is the story of CIA agent Henry Crumpton. Crumpton tells the story of his career as a field operator, counter-terrorism expert, and section manager. Crumpton tells how he started in Africa stations, and had subsequent various assignments of increasing responsibility in counter terrorism.

As his career advanced, Crumpton took control of overall covert operations and then led CIA efforts in Afghanistan. He also did a stint with the FBI, and ended up working as counter-terrorism expert in the State Department working under Condoleezza Rice in the Bush White House.

Not too unexpected, Crumpton had his complaints about politicians interfering in CIA work, and seemed to have criticism of architects of Iraq policy, especially Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, and Don Rumsfeld.

Some of his stories involving field operations sound vague, omitting names of personnel and locations out of a concern for security. Nonetheless, the stories he tells gives the reader a better understanding of the job of a CIA field agent. ( )

I've always enjoyed books about spy tradecraft. This is yet another of that ilk, and that part of it is probably going to be enjoyable to those that like that sort of thing.
On the other hand, there is very little here that is critical of the CIA or its operatives or its methods. Every operative is portrayed as supremely competent and heroic. Every operation in every foreign country is designed to either protect the USA from evil-doers or to bring the blessings of free-market democracy to down-trodden foreigners or both. Activities such as torture (which the author calls "enhanced interrogation") or rendition are portrayed as absolutely lawful and applied only to those that deserve it. Journalists are described in dismissive terms, almost as if a free press should be considered enemies of all that is good in the world (ie. the CIA).
There is absolutely no discussion of mistakes or errors. Military operations, such as bombings, are always described as "pin point" or "surgical". He glories in killing enemy combatants, but fails to even mention the fact that many, many innocents got killed in the process.
So, read this if you're a fan of spy tradecraft, but ignore it if you're looking for any sort of nuanced analysis of anything. In any case, be sure to pick it up in the remainder bin ... it's not worth the full price. ( )

Reading this book made me fleetingly paranoid - a lot of what goes into the everyday art of spy craft really is cloak and dagger. If you enjoy thrillers, espionage, or just want to more about the inner workings of the CIA, consider picking this up. I listened to the audiobook, it was a pleasant diversion in the car. ( )

Let's face it - intelligence and espionage gathering still has a bit of an unsavory reputation among many outsider circles. But it still must be done, otherwise one would be going into the great game of international affairs blind and with your hands tied.

Of course, due to confidentiality, there are things he leaves unsaid, but he does reveal a lot with frankness, thoughtful analysis, and candor.

The CIA was in bad shape in the early 1990s, and the embassy bombings in Africa gave it a needed shake-up. The Clinton administration, tied up with Congressional wranglings, gave them a mandate and organization, but not enough, as Clinton and Clark lamented later.

The Bush administration pre-9/11 was a complete catastrophe. They were already interested in Iraq as an ally of Al-Qaeda, which was a 'f--king stupid' question as far as the CIA was concerned. They were only begrudgingly shoved into action, and even then, Afghanistan was already secondary to Iraq.

Although the American forays into nation-building are dubious at best, the CIA remains unparalleled at intelligence and analysis, and Crumpton offers very thoughtful analyses and retellings of some major techniques.

A profoundly interesting book. ( )