Interesting, although a difficult read. In a way the Muslim conquest of Spain was similar to the various invasions that ended the Roman empire; tribal groups invaded and established a thin veneer of control over the existing population. Ironically, Spain at the time was ruled by descendants of the Visigoths, who were as alien to the original inhabitants as the Muslims were. Author Hugh Kennedy notes that sometimes the rapidity of the conquest is attributed to disorganization and corruption in the Visigoth rule; however he counters that the Visigoth army seems to have been well organized and that the Visigoths had established effective central rule; it was paradoxically because of this that the Muslims were able to win. If Visigoth rule had been ineffective, defeat of their army wouldn’t have mattered very much and there would have been plenty of local powers able and willing to fight back. Instead once the main Visigoth army was defeated there was no further resistance and the whole country collapsed.


Well, no, not the whole country. That’s one of the mysteries of the Muslims and al-Andalus; they never extended their rule over the whole of the Iberian Peninsula, leaving roughly the northern third unconquered. After the quick defeat of the Visigoths and occupation of territory by settlers from the Maghreb, subsequent Muslim leaders lead or organized raids into Christian lands, being more intent on returning with booty than conquest; no one seemed interested in permanent settlement. One of the factors here was the Muslim governments never developed a financial system that provided adequate money for defense; to some extent they were handicapped by Koranic sanctions limiting taxation. That left raids and booty as about the only way military forces could be paid; thus, ironically, it wasn’t in the Muslim governments interest to conquer the whole of the peninsula since it would leave nowhere to raid. It’s sometimes contended that the Battle of Tours (732 CE) was one of the most important in world history; supposedly Charles Martel’s victory over ‘Abd-al-Rahmân prevented a Muslim conquest of France; however the history of adjacent Spain suggests all that was intended was another grand raid and a Christian defeat at Tours only would have resulted in a Muslim withdrawal with whatever loot they had picked up.


A repeating pattern developed in al-Andalus; someone or some group from outside the area would decide the people or their leaders had become to secular and would show up to lead them back to orthodox Islam (often the reason was un-Islamic taxation). Thus the original conquest government was replaced by Umayyads from Syria; the Umayyad caliphate of Cordova eventually collapsed into independent local kingdoms; then Almoravids showed up from Morocco to reestablish central authority and Islam; then their rule collapsed again into independent kingdoms; then Almohads showed up from Morocco to reestablish central authority and Islam, then things began to collapse again. All these were outsiders, imposed on the native population, often only by foreign soldiers. In the meantime, the Christian states to the north and east were always nibbling away at Muslim territory; although there were reverses the Christians usually came to stay rather than to raid and return. Eventually the last remaining territory, the kingdom of Granada, fell and the inhabitants were given the choice of conversion or exile.


This was quite a hard read. Kennedy only provides two maps and those are just of the basic geographic layout of Iberia and Morocco; it’s very hard to keep track of who’s doing what where and when; some maps showing areas held by the various powers at various times would have been hugely helpful. There’s also the problem of names; it’s hard to keep track of who’s who; I was tempted to set up a spreadsheet to help me keep track. There are some handy genealogical tables provided in the endpapers; these illustrate another peculiarity of Muslim rule. Rulers were supposed to come from a ruling family, often putative descendants of Muhammed or some early caliph, but strict patrilineal descent wasn’t necessary. Thus rule might go to a brother, then to an uncle, then to a son, then to a nephew. In a lot of cases the ruler was only a titular figure that met the descent requirements and actual power was held by somebody else.


No illustrations other than the maps mentioned; a pretty extensive bibliography but mostly in Spanish or Arabic. Interesting but I probably picked up only a fraction of what was going on. ( )