According to Ruth Anshen, this work “represents the last major thoughts of Professor Paul Johannes Tillich before his death in 1965.” (19) I consider that a bit of overstatement in view of the fact that Tillich’s last public lecture was actually “The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian.” Be that as it may, this book does present the lectures he gave at the Chicago University Law School and which he intended to deliver as the Noble Lectures at Harvard. It is preceded by the autobiographical essay which he prepared in 1952 for the first volume in The Library of Living Theology series, The Theology of Paul Tillich, as required by the structure of that series.

Chapter 1: What Am I? An Autobiographical Essay: Early Years
[While discussing his education and preparation to be both a philosopher and a theologian, Tillich affirms the impact of his own ultimate concern on his vocational choice.]

Both my doctoral dissertation and my thesis for the degree of Licentiat of Theology dealt with Schelling’s philosophy of religion. These studies seemed to foreshadow a philosopher rather than a theologian; and indeed they enabled me to become a professor of philosophy of religion and of social philosophy in the philosophical faculties of Dresden and Leipzig, [p. 35; p. 36:] a professor of pure philosophy in Frankfurt, a lecturer in the philosophical departments of Columbia and Yale, and a philosopher of history in connection with the religious-socialist movement. Nevertheless I was a theologian, because the existential question of our ultimate concern and the existential answer of the Christian message are and always have been predominant in my spiritual life. (pp. 35-36)

[When describing his “pervasive sense of joy” from the question and answer sessions he liked to offer following a public lecture, Tillich speaks of the impact of personality, both as benefit and temptation, in conveying existential truths.]

The spoken word is effective not only through the meaning of the sentences formulated but also through the immediate impact of the personality behind these sentences. This is a temptation because one can use it for methods of mere persuasion. But it is also a benefit, because it agrees with what may be called ‘existential truth’ - namely, a truth which lives in the immediate self- [p. 45; p. 46:] expression of an experience. This is not true of statements which have a merely objective character, which belong to the realm of ‘controlling knowledge,’ but it is valid of statements which concern us in our very existence and especially of theological statements which deal with that which concerns us ultimately. (46)

Chapter 2: Absolutes in Human Knowledge and the Idea of Truth
[Tillich begins this investigation with the theoretical and practical reasons why he could not endorse ‘absolute relativism.’]

But absolute relativism is also impossible practically. If I am asked to surrender totally to relativism I can say, “But I live! I know what ‘true’ and ‘false’ mean, I do something I can describe as ‘bet- [p. 65; p. 66:] ter’ than something else, I venerate something which concerns me ultimately and which for me is holy.” (pp. 65-66)

[Tillich feels he must first rescue the word ‘absolute’ before he can discuss what it means. He attempts to do so in terms of paired, perhaps even polar, opposites.]

The term ‘absolute’ has become difficult to use because many people associate it with the image of ‘an absolute thing’ often identified with God. This, of course, is not what I mean. Therefore it is useful to explain the meaning of absolutes with the help of other terms, pairs of terms like ‘the unconditional and the conditioned,’ ‘the ultimate and the preliminary,’ ‘the infinite and the finite.’ I prefer to use the term ‘ultimate’ in a [p. 66; p. 67:] phrase like ‘ultimate concern,’ the term ‘unconditional’ in reference to the unconditional character of the ethical imperative, whatever its contents may be, and the term ‘infinite’ in the religious realm. All these terms point to one thing: There is something that resists the stream of relativities. (pp. 66-67)

[At the end of this chapter, Tillich again reveals how his ultimate concern drives him toward the cognitive realm.]

Perhaps my description seems merely theoretical, and you are wondering what the moral and religious implications can be. However, you don’t need to wait for a discussion of these implications. There are some among us for whom theoretical problems are existential, are matters of ‘to be, or not to be,’ because theoria means ‘looking at’ things and being united with them in this way. My statements are primarily addressed to these. I myself belong to them. For us, the question of the cognitive encounter with reality, the question of the absolute and the relative in this encounter, is an existential concern - a concern that involves our whole existence. I should like it to be so for many, because ultimately knowing is an act of love. (83)

Chapter 3: The Absolute and the Relative Element in Moral Decisions

Chapter 4: The Holy - The Absolute and the Relative in Religion
[The intersection of religion in the wider sense as ultimate concern and in the narrower sense as a special function of human spirituality lies in the intentionality of approaching ‘the holy.’]

The encounter of man with ultimate reality, which we call the encounter with the holy, in its essence is not an encounter beside other encounters. It is [p. 127; p. 128:] within the others. It is the experience of the Absolute, of absoluteness as such. Only after this statement has been made can one speak of a particular encounter with the holy - that is, of ‘religion’ in the traditional sense of the word. In the encounter with the holy an experience of the Absolute as such is not only implied but intended, and this is decisive for the meaning of religion. It is this intention to encounter the Absolute as such which makes religion religion and at the same time transcends religion infinitely.

The religious absolute is most sharply expressed in the Great Commandment: ‘You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength.’ This is absoluteness in religious language, and it is the basis of my definition of religion as ‘the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern.’ The Great Commandment is Jewish and Christian, but there are similar expressions of absoluteness in all religions. (pp. 127-128)

[In further discussing these two concepts of religion, the wider and the narrower, Tillich says the Absolute is experienced differently in each.]

The larger concept of religion has appeared as the dimension of ultimate reality in the [p. 130; p. 131:] different realms of man’s encounter with reality. It is, to use a metaphor, the dimension of depth itself, the inexhaustible depth of being, but it appeared indirectly in these realms. What was experienced directly was knowledge, or the moral imperative, or social justice, or aesthetic expressiveness; but the holy was present in all these secular structures, although hidden in them. For this is how one experiences the holy, through secular structures. Religion in this basic and universal sense I have called ‘being grasped by an ultimate concern.’

This definition, however, is also valid for the narrower concept of religion. The difference is that here the experience of the Ultimate is direct. I have usually described it as the experience of the holy in a particular presence, place, or time, in a particular person, book, or image, in a particular ritual act, spoken word, or sacramental object. These direct experiences are found in unity with a sacred community, in the Western world usually called a church, a monastic group, or a religious movement. Such a community expresses the particular character of its experience of the holy in its special symbols of imagination and cult and in special rules that determine its ethical and social life. This is religion in the narrower, the traditional sense. (pp. 130-131)

[Tillich finishes the book with an appeal to religions in the narrower sense to understand the struggle for absolutes taking place within the secular world as a religious quest and not to spurn or condemn such as being merely secular. Note the use of ‘unconditional seriousness’ where one might expect ‘ultimate concern.’]

The struggle for the absolute in a secularized world is an inner process in the secular realms. It is not imposed by religious aspirations but is man’s reaction against being without a structure of meaning. The religions of the world must acknowledge this struggle and not destroy it by an arrogant dogmatism. They must open themselves to those who ask the question of the absolute with passion and unconditional seriousness, both inside and outside the churches.

If no human being can live without something he takes with unconditional seriousness in whatever language he expresses it, then we in our liberal humanist culture should look for this. (143) ( )