Booth’s work is unabashedly a work of critical security studies. Thus, it’s influences are marxism, the Frankfurt school of theorizing, and other works of critical security studies. Judged on its own criteria, I would have to say this is probably one of the better works on critical security studies -- and a book that is highly accessible to outsiders. Perhaps most importantly, the book argues that critical security scholars cannot simply ignore realism, but must grapple with realism in the most serious way. I found this advice sensible not only for critical security scholars, but IR scholars of all theoretical inclinations.

The key motivation to Booth’s theory of world security is that current world politics (under the pernicious influence of realist thinking) is approaching a new “crisis” along the lines of E.H. Carr’s twenty year crisis, where the looming threats of nuclear holocaust, environmental chaos, and global population overload will not only make the world un-liveable for those who already find the world un-liveable, but also threaten the privileged minority of the developed world. While the logic of national and state orthodoxies encourage policy-makers to see security as something that must be accomplished against others, it’s becoming increasingly clear that these looming problems can only be solved through collective action. For this reason, a new kind of security needs to be formed that includes the idea of emancipation, and is inculcated in cosmopolitan communities—thus, the key concepts of security, emancipation, and community, must replace old logics of statism, strategy, and the status quo.

Because of enormity of the task, for Booth the role of theory is to help conceptualize how this great challenge can be accomplished. Thus, perlenfischerei or pearl fishing is an important part of the theorist’s task (in some way, a kind of bricologue?)—to look through the history of ideas, genealogies, and categories of thinkers for ideas that seem rich with possibilities. A kind of intellectual plundering, if you will (3). As Booth’s definition of World Security demonstrates (4), security is an instrumental value. There is nothing good about security in-and-of itself, but rather it is only good in so far as it allows people to lead lives of dignity and meaning. What is interesting about Booth’s definition of world security is that it securitizes both individuals and “groups.” Thus, Booth realizes that in order for humanity to have security, the security of the important “units” and humanity must be the same. The question is whether this requires a world-wide “state” or whether a global society of diverse communities that nonetheless share similar values of common security can exist. As Booth states, the idea of a universal community, committed to egalitarianism is the one thought that pervades the book.

The main goals of the book are de-bunking realism (a theory about power, by the powerful, for the powerful), but also, capturing the realist discourse away from realism. Thus, Booth’s conception of “emancipatory realism”—a way of combining critical security studies (CSS) of radical theory as a way of decolonizing the mind, but also signifying practicality (praxis) on the part of those interested in world security. The book forms a complicated relationship with realism. As Booth states, all serious students of CSS need to be serious students of realism—especially because of its influence within security studies and world politics, but also because certain parts of realism are highly amenable to the eventual formation of world security. All good realists, Booth states (for example Morgenthau) often find themselves wandering in the direction of a global state or world community because they understand the dangerous (mechanical) trap of statism. The realist mechanical trap (states are fearful and thus arm, other states are fearful other states’ arming and thus arm, etc, etc) needs critical security theory to imagine it out of its trap.

Part of the problem of Booth’s emancipatory conception of security has to do with group identity formation. As noted by many (including Buzan) identity makes the most sense when it is effectively linked to the local. Even cosmic securitizations based on global competition are usually empowered by clear links between the global and the local insecurities and slights—probably with an emphasis on the local. Though Booth says that it is absolutely necessary to resist moves toward mono-factoral labeling of groups, how is this possible, especially in instances of resource scarcity and intense fear of persecution? For those in the poor world, no threat is more immediate than the ones they face everyday. For the rich, complacency is conditioned by an abundance of freedom and threats that seem overly vague (climate change will happen sometime and may or may not put Florida underwater). I think Booth is right to point to class as a major limitation on cosmopolitan norm-pioneering. Because a great deal of humanity is not well-educated and does not have the requisite amount of free time or political power, they lack the capabilities to push for a world security that bridges state boundaries. For this reason, the best norm-pioneering efforts have been those that have targeted the new global uber-class (Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, George Soros).

Booth finds extreme cause with Buzan and Weaver’s conception of “securitization”. At the root of Booth’s criticism is Buzan et al’s separation of security from politics (and relegation of politics to “mere politics”), their privilege of the de-securitization of phenomena to the realm of politics, and their reluctance to indulge in progressive securitizing (because the authors refuse to securitize Booth considers them default conservatives). Booth thinks that the Copenhagen school relegates the language of security to the discourse of elites, and thus, fails to realize how security is actually a problem of the silent masses. His claim, however, that securitization studies suffers from elitism seems to be misguided: securitization studies doesn’t suffer from elitism; securitization is a language of elites. The problem is that securitization studies is a tool for examining this discourse and its relation to audiences without any kind of critical praxis—one that would put the language of security into the hands of the disempowered. One could use securitization studies to point unequal roles in who “speaks security”; a critical securitization studies could also look at successful ways of either promoting non-elites as effective speakers of security, or as establishing the disenfranchised as meaningful referent objects of security. This would be the equivalent of a securitization praxis. But is this the same thing as elitism? For Booth, it is the responsibility of CSS to link scholarship with the practice of emancipating the powerless—thus not only identifying problems, but speaking for victims, and creating audiences that will listen.

Booth’s description of the new twenty years crisis, or the great reckoning, is based on a similar analysis of events as Homer-Dixon: the current problems facing mankind will be synergistic in their impact. The six issue areas that Booth identifies are: security dilemmas and strategic challenges, globalization threats, population stress, environmental chaos, governance overload, and the rise of unreason. Booth also predicts that as things gets worse, the world will become primed for the resurgence of fascism. What’s interesting, though, is that Booth identifies unfocused individual action as the first step toward a change to emancipatory realism.

I should note that I read this book, side-by-side with John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, a key work of “offensive realism” (one that Booth would probably find more offensive than realistic). The books are important for different reasons and are as different as hip hop and opera. But as part of a class discussion, I did have to find connections between these two works. In terms of synthesizing Mearsheimer and Booth, their books draw on a common theme of tragedy—they both understand that statism, zero-sum competition, and the security dilemma continue to threaten humanity. However, they fundamentally disagree with what’s at stake (another bloody century in Mearsheimer’s estimates or a catastrophic century); their theoretical approaches also take different stances on agency and human autonomy. For Mearsheimer system structure continues to produce largely mechanical reactions on the part of state leaders; for Booth hope lies in decolonizing the mind and creating spaces for cosmopolitan world security.

Which is right, which is wrong? For future IR scholars and theorists, both these books need to be read and discussed -- perhaps on their own terms -- before being compared to other works. This much should be said for Booth’s book: If every serious critical security scholar should be a student of realism, I think that realists should at least be familiar with the work of critical security scholars like Booth. ( )