Good insights into the decision making and policy choices made by President Bush and his Administration. I thought the author maintained a fair viewpoint, and the book was not as negative or biased as I might have guessed it would be, based on the title. ( )

Daydream Believers offers some valuable accounts of how personal relationships and bureaucratic politics can lead to policy shifts that do not make rational sense on their own merits. Thus, it offers the raw material for academic case studies examining how shared images form and adapt, all while affecting policy and acquisitions decisions in the executive branch. Scholars looking for an authoritative and complete account of policy making in the Bush Administration, however, would be better served by drawing on more impartial and nuanced histories.

Those interested in military strategy in particular will find the book to be disappointingly thin. ( )

How American foreign policy got so off-track in the 21st Century has been well covered in other books. Why it got so off-track is the subject of this book.

It stems from two huge misconceptions made by the Bush White House and the neo-cons. The first is that, on 9/11, the world did not change. It certainly changed in that America suddenly found itself more vulnerable than ever before. But the nature of power, politics and warfare did not change. The second is that, after the Cold War, America found itself as the world’s only superpower. With its superior military technology, America thought that it was now free to topple unfriendly regimes, ignore treaties and generally do whatever it wanted around the world. Now that the Soviet Union was gone as an enemy, Cold War allies no longer felt compelled to see things America’s way. An American president could deal with this new landscape in one of two ways: emphasize the military, and don’t hesitate to use American power around the world, or, emphasize diplomacy, and restructure old alliances (and create new ones) around the world.

The invasion of Iraq was supposed to be the example of Bush’s belief that, with Saddam Hussein out of the way, Iraq will suddenly turn into a democratic country, and that democracy will spread throughout the Mideast. The Pentagon cared more about the military part than about the aftermath. Turmoil in Iraq was practically guaranteed by the first two decrees issued by Paul Bremer in the early days of the occupation: disbanding the Iraqi army, and removing all Baathists from the government.

The author also looks at the Administration’s decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty with Russia, and resume deployment of Ronald Reagan’s missile defense shield, despite the fact that its operational capabilities are somewhere between questionable and non-existent.

This is a really good book, and I learned something from it. There is more than just facts and figures here; the author profiles people in the military world, some of whom do not get their names in the media. It’s worth reading. ( )

Fred Kaplan claims in this book that the problems the U.S.A. now face stem from two grave misconceptions of its policy makers. And these misconceptions include the belief that the way the world works changed after 9/11 and that America emerged from its Cold War victory stronger than before. The author also breaks down our politicians into two groups, Neoconservatives and everyone else.

In this book as an aside Kaplan also asserts that it was the current Bush administration that was responsible for the U.S.A. not following the Kyoto accord, along with other problems we now face. The author never presents us with the fact that it was Vice President Al Gore and Senator Joseph Liberman who indicated that the protocol would not be acted upon in the Senate until there was participation by the developing nations. And that the Clinton Administration never submitted the protocol to the Senate for ratification. Now it is true that the U.S.A. has not ratified this expensive protocol as of this time. But I would like to have had all of the facts presented. For a journalist Fred Kaplan is not very objective in this work.

The author shares his insight into the beliefs and motives of the advisers who are recommending policy, and these were very interesting. And it is revealing how those who are in office to serve, whether elected or appointed, seem to work on self-interest instead of the good of the country. Since the end of the cold war this sad state of affairs appears to be true for all three branches of the U.S. government. His work on the defense department seems to be very well researched and is where his writing is at its best.

His analysis seems to be correct when he shows how it appears no one in politics today has learned anything from history. What he does share with us is that there is not one individual politician that is running in this election that is seeking to take the leadership mantle of the U.S.A. that does not share the same misconceptions. That both political parties have the same worldview and none is offering a solution. On this last point I have to agree with the authors conclusions.

This book is not an easy read, the writing style seemed to change from chapter to chapter. A small book like this would normally have taken me an afternoon to read, but I spent three days reading it as I kept putting it down. With all that said and keeping the authors bias in mind I suggest anyone interested in politics or foreign policy should read this book. This book is a sound of alarm for the American people to demand the cessation of the personal agendas of those who have the ability to impact the decisions of both foreign and domestic affairs. ( )