This book has the distinction of being one of the more thought provoking works of Aristotle for me; it isn't that I necessarily agree with Aristotle in all of the points he makes, but his train of thought was quite engaging. That is the main reason why I give this book I higher review.
The Greek word ψυχή is an interesting term when it is seen in the light of the history of philosophy and theology. Historically, in philosophy and theology, the word carried more or less the meaning soul and/or life, and, by implication, mind. And it often was tied to metaphysical speculation. Our current use of the word psyche, which is just the transliteration of the Greek word, differs somewhat from the ancient Greek use of the word. After a hundred plus years of psychiatric thought, the word "psyche" simply refers to the physical/electrochemical makeup of the mind and means little else; although, one has to take into account Jung, who did hold to a more metaphysical understanding of the word psyche (e.g. archetypes, collective unconscious, etc).
Aristotle was certainly going in the direction of a more physical understanding of the term psyche/soul. He saw the soul as being intimately associated with bodily existence and experience. He seemingly sees the word as almost a cognate of the Greek term bios, although he spends much time differentiating the senses of soul as it relates to human and animal life. Early on in this work, he refutes the notion of the soul having parts or of it being in any way a composite. This is interesting because Aristotle, also, contradictorily, sees mind, or nous, as being within the soul. It seems implied that he saw nous and psyche as being distinct, yet he doesn't see this as being indicative of partitioning or of composition. He doesn't discuss how this is to be reconciled. He also doesn't discuss how "will" (Greek thelema) relates to soul/psyche, although he does discuss bodily motion. It seems clear to me that both nous and thelema are highly relevant when it comes to any discussion of the soul, but Aristotle doesn't discuss these adequately; he does, unfortunately, discuss issues regarding perception and sensuality that are not, seemingly, altogether relevant as far as I can tell; but it does indicate that Aristotle saw the soul as being less metaphysical and more physical. This does show a differing interpretation of soul/psyche when compared to Plato and the New Testament, where the soul is unquestionably more of a metaphysical concept (see e.g. the Phaedrus and Matthew 16:26, respectively).
As one of the earlier Greek philosophical works dedicated to investigating the concept of psyche/soul, this treatise is certainly essential reading and I recommend it.
The short treatise here that discusses memory and recollection is also interesting in showcasing the nuanced thinking of Aristotle. Memory (mnemon) and recollection (anamnesis) are plainly distinguished in this work. Memory is simply the impression that is made on the mind by any stimulus, whereas, recollection, as the name implies, requires a series of interrelated concepts. Although short, I thought the work and discussion intriguing.
I definitely recommend this as a good introduction to Aristotle. It isn't quite as dry and pedantic as some of his other works. It is also relatively short, so it can be read fairly quickly. ( )

We see here how good of a categorizer Aristotle is, as he applies himself to the various functions of the soul (a.k.a. mind). ( )