What, if anything, is the cause of the existence of the law-governed universe in which we live? Most of us in the contemporary western world suppose that there are only two possible answers to that question: either an omnipotent and perfectly good God caused it; or it did not have a cause, and it is just a brute fact that the universe exists and has the laws of nature that it has. In his new book Philip Goff seeks to persuade us that there is a third possibility, or rather that there are three very similar possibilities. Why? is designed to appeal both to a wide audience who know little about philosophy or physics and to academics who know the relevant technical terms and literature. It does this well by dividing most of the chapters into a more accessible first section, followed by a “digging deeper” second section. Most readers should be able to grasp his main points by reading, at any rate initially, only the first part of each chapter. It is an exciting and challenging book.

Goff’s reason for rejecting the “brute fact” answer is based on the work of various scientists – beginning with Robert Dicke in the 1960s – showing that the laws of nature are “fine-tuned”, in form and constancy, for the evolution of life. By the form of physical laws I mean the kinds of force that act between chunks of matter; in our universe there are certainly forces of four kinds (the gravitational force, the electromagnetic force, the strong force and the weak force), and probably a fifth kind (dark energy), and these forces are subject to the constraints of quantum theory. By the constancy of physical laws I mean the exact strength of these forces. (For example, the force of gravity between two masses, M and m, at a distance r from each other is GMm/r2: G is the gravitational constant, which measures the strength of this force; in one well-used system of measurement G is 6.67 x 10-11) Subsequent discoveries have shown that the values of the constants of the physical laws and the values of the density and acceleration of the mass of the universe at the time of the initial Big Bang, 13.5 billion years ago, had to lie within very narrow values if the evolution of the universe from the Big Bang was to produce life.

The gravitational force is the weakest of the four forces; the strong force (which holds the protons and neutrons together in the nucleus of an atom) is some 1040 times stronger than it. But if, given the strength of the Big Bang, the gravitational constant had been much larger, all matter would be crushed together so tightly that living beings could never have evolved; if, given the strength of the Big Bang, the gravitational constant had been much smaller, chunks of matter would have flown apart from each other so quickly that atoms could not combine so as to form any solid objects. So, if living beings were to evolve, given the strength of the Big Bang, the gravitational force had to lie within a tiny proportion (1 in 1040) of the total range of the four forces.

There are similar restrictions on the values (relative to each other) of the constants involved in the other three agreed forces and in the values of the density and acceleration of the matter of the universe at the Big Bang, as well as a much narrower restriction on the constant involved in dark energy (if there really is such a force). The result of these restrictions is that it is extremely improbable (a probability of the order of one in at least a trillion trillion trillion trillion) that life, let alone intelligent life, would evolve anywhere in the universe unless the universe were fine-tuned for this.

Life, and especially intelligent life such as human life, Goff reasonably urges, is a very good thing, such as a designer might choose to cause; and it is this apparent design of the universe that persuades him that it is extremely unlikely that the universe is just a brute fact. He also rejects the idea that the universe was created and is sustained by an omnipotent and perfectly good God, on the grounds that such a God would not allow the great amount of suffering that there is in the world. Hence his third possible answer, consisting of three similar hypotheses, any one of which he thinks might well be true.

The first of Goff’s alternatives to the “omni-God” and “brute fact” arguments is a “limited god” hypothesis: that a perfectly good and powerful, but not omnipotent, divine being caused the constants of the physical laws of nature, and the density and acceleration of the matter-energy of the Big Bang, to have the particular values that they have, and so to lead to the evolution of life including human life; but this divine being did not have the power to prevent the operation of those physical laws from causing much suffering.

The second alternative is that there are teleological laws that aimto make the universe better by producing such life. Normal physical laws of nature are ones that determine how present states of affairs are caused by particular past states in accord with some precise mathematical formula; teleological laws, by contrast, are laws in which present states of affairs aim at particular future states, and so have purposes. Aristotle explained most events in terms of individual organisms and other entities aiming to fulfil purposes. Thus, Aristotle would hold, the purpose of rain is to water the ground. Goff’s second hypothesis supposes that the teleological laws aiming at producing life are not able to prevent the physical laws from causing much suffering.

The third alternative, which is Goff’s preferred hypothesis, is that the universe itself is conscious and aims at its overall goodness, and so at the evolution of life and thereby human life; it determines the constants but not the form of the ordinary physical laws, and does not have the power to prevent these laws from causing much suffering. He calls this third hypothesis “cosmopsychism” because it is an extreme version of panpsychism. Panpsychism holds that everything in the universe is to some extent conscious – even fundamental particles have a primitive kind of consciousness, but only integrated systems of particles, such as exist in the human brain, are fully conscious. Cosmopsychism then holds that the universe itself, as a well-integrated system, is sensitive to the moral values that would be possessed by different future states of affairs, and seeks to bring about better such states.

All three alternative hypotheses are complicated and ad hoc. The problem is that they do not explain why there are physical laws of nature at all; why they are of the particular forms that they are (that is, why there is the strong force, the weak force, electromagnetism and gravity, and why there are not instead forces of quite different kinds); and why these forces operate within the framework of quantum theory. If any one of these forces did not exist, or if there were different forces, or if these forces were not constrained by quantum relations (which ensure the stability of atoms), it would be extremely improbable that life would emerge regardless of what constraints a conscious and benevolent universe might set. So if Goff is to explain the apparent design of the universe, he needs also to explain why there are physical laws of such a kind that fine-tuning their constants will lead to the evolution of life.

For this reason, although Goff regards the form of those laws (the four or probably five forces) and the operation of quantum theory as the framework within which the benevolent forces are constrained to work, he cannot consistently do this, since it involves the claim that the universe shows apparent design of a kind not caused by the designers which he postulates. He claims a limited God or conscious universe created the constants that govern the laws. But who made the laws – and why? He must attribute this framework itself, as well as the fine-tuning of constants, to the work of the limited god or teleological laws or cosmic consciousness. In that case suffering must be due to the fact that, for some unexplained reason, no law of any form that can produce life can produce life without suffering. It seems a strange brute fact that a force as powerful as the limited God or teleological laws or cosmic consciousness is unable to remove this gremlin in the works. Goff’s third answer in any of its forms seems insufficient, and he might benefit from looking again at the hypothesis of an omnipotent and perfectly good God.

This hypothesis is by far the simplest explanation of the existence of a basically good universe. It postulates only one entity, God, defined by the one property of being essentially everlastingly omnipotent, which is a simple property because it is analysable in terms of two familiar properties – life and power – having degrees to which there are zero limits. The one defining property entails God’s other traditional properties, including perfect goodness. For, being omnipotent, God will know of all the possible actions he could do, which are good and which are bad. Seeing an action to be good entails having some inclination to do it. Humans are complicated beings who have bad desires as well as good ones, and so have to choose between good and bad. But God, not having bad desires, will always do what is good. However, it needs to be shown that a perfectly good God might allow the kinds and amount of suffering that exist. To show this is to produce a “theodicy”. Goff’s discussion of theodicy consists of eight pages devoted almost entirely to the refutation of one chapter of my book The Existence of God (1979, second edition 2004), where I presented some but not all of my theodicy. All I can do here is to make a few points about that theodicy which might begin to convince the reader that Goff has not succeeded in refuting it.

First, the theodicy does not argue that a world with suffering would be better than a world without suffering; only that it would not be worse. But it does argue that it is a great good for us that we can make large differences to the world, whether for good or evil; if we had only the freedom to choose between alternative good actions, it would not have been possible for God to entrust us with the great responsibility for taking care of ourselves and the environment, which it is so good for us to have. Further, since every good choice of a kind makes it easier to make another good choice of that kind, and analogously with bad choices, this freedom of choice allows us by frequent good choices to make ourselves saints; or by frequent bad choices to make ourselves amoral people. One way to make ourselves saints is to endure suffering with patience and without bitterness. And if we did not have the choice of ultimately rejecting God, so in the end God would make all of us good against our will, the lesser choices we do have would lose a considerable amount of their significance.

Our greatest earthly benefactors, our nurturing parents and a reasonably just state, sometimes impose significant suffering on us if doing so is necessary for a good cause. Parents are often justified in sending their children to a neighbourhood school that they do not wish to attend in order to cement community relations. And the state is surely justified in imposing conscription to save the country from a tyrannous aggressor, thereby making it moderately probable that conscripted soldiers would be killed or badly wounded. But God is so much more our benefactor than are our parents and the state – he has given our parents and the state the powers they have and provided the laws of nature that allow us to live. Hence God has the right to impose a lot more suffering on us than human parents and states have, if doing so is the only logically possible way in which God can provide us with some great good.

The author is surely right that no committee would be justified in approving a plan “to simulate a universe just like ours, complete with” all its evil. But this is because the committee’s existence and its ability to initiate the creation of such a world would be due to God causing its existence and the laws of nature that determine its abilities, so only God would have that right. Further, a good God will surely compensate us in a life after death for any suffering that we need to suffer for the sake of good to ourselves or others. Philip Goff seems to assume that our earthly life is the only life we will have. But the claims of a religion must be taken together as a whole, and most theistic religions, including Christianity, claim that our earthly life is but the beginning of our total life.

Richard Swinburne is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy of Religion at the University of Oxford.