When a book about Chinese history devotes a mere 122 pages for covering the period from 1100 B.C to roughly 1500 A.D, it can only be called incomplete. Seminal periods of Chinese history, such as the epic struggles between Han Gaozu and Xiang Yu or the Romance of the Three Kingdoms do not even merit a mention. The period after the 1500s, which is also the time after which the West started to build relations with China, is unusually verbose, with some sections, such as the back and forth treaties between the Russians and the Chinese around Siberia and the Russian Far-East, filled with painstaking detail. By focusing on only those periods for which there are Western sources, any history of China would be incomplete. The author should have balanced coverage between the ancient, medieval and the modern. That said, however, the more recent details, such as the history of the Communist party and its actions post-revolution are covered well. The author has made a good effort of putting into perspective China's relations with much of the world and his analysis of China's present relations as reflecting age-old traditions (despite the Chinese Communist Party's claim to be a break from the past). That the Chinese Communists are nothing new except another 'dynasty' is also a point well-made. On the whole, the book is informative, but a more balanced coverage of the ancient, medieval and modern period would make it better. ( )

Handy overview of the history of Chinese relations with the outside world. The first half of the book covers the period from 1100 BCE to 1912 CE, at a rather brisk pace; the second half takes us up to 2007 in rather more detail.

What particularly struck me from Gelber's analysis of Chinese relations with Europe and the US is how much we have always been influenced by the Chinese view of their own importance. Western leaders sent their ambassadors to the Chinese court, where they might be received as tribute-bearing barbarians if they agreed to kowtow to the emperor (Gelber draws clear parallels here between Lord George Macartney in 1794 and Nixon in 1972); Western businessmen have always talked about the vast, untapped potential of the Chinese market, but in practice, in the 18th and 19th centuries as much as in the 20th and 21st, foreign exporters and investors have seen the bulk of their profits disappear into the pockets of corrupt officials, whilst the Chinese happily provide all the products we can buy (silks and porcelains then, cheap manufactured goods now). Yet Gelber argues that China, although too big to ignore, has never really been able to overcome its own internal problems enough to be a major force in international affairs, beyond securing its own borders (and even that it has only done with intermittent success).

In a final chapter, Gelber speculates about what might happen next, but without coming to any firm conclusions. There are simply too many factors that could come into play in unpredictable combinations. But his picture of modern China is not an optimistic one. He warns that the "economic miracle" is largely superficial and is based on shaky foundations. The one outcome he seems to rule out is the comfortable received wisdom that increased prosperity will lead to democratisation and the adoption of Western liberal values. Rather he sees corruption, pollution, population pressure, collapse of the traditional roots of authority in the Party and the family, the rise of regional and religious conflicts, and xenophobia (especially Sino-Japanese rivalry), all undermining China's future. ( )