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"Clash of Titans covers every aspect of the sea war, including the contributions of the lesser naval powers, France, Italy and the Soviet Union, as Walter J. Boyne evaluates strategies, analyzes major battles and examines the leading personalities on both sides." "Both Germany and Japan, says Boyne, had their best chances at victory early in the war: Germany's U-boat fleet, small in number at the beginning of the war, threatened to starve England of food and fuel. The Japanese navy, highly trained and with the best torpedoes, optical instruments and pyrotechnics in the world, humiliated the U.S. Navy in one defeat after another. Yet, as time passed, the two great democracies, Britain and the United States, resilient and possessed of the productive power to create huge, technologically advanced navies, prevailed." "Clash of Titans recounts all of the famous sea battles of World War II, weaving them together into a narrative that illuminates the strengths and weaknesses of each navy. The German submarine force, despite hard living conditions and high casualty rates, fought well to the end. The Italian Navy, despite several defeats, remained a threat until the surrender and was chiefly responsible for sustaining Axis forces in North Africa. The Japanese navy, which excelled in night fighting, was distinguished by brilliant commanders. The British navy demonstrated its pluck in a dozen hard engagements, from its slashing attack on the Italian fleet at Cape Matapan to its defeat of the Bismark. But it was the American navy that made the most dramatic comeback, recoiling from the terrible defeat at Pearl Harbor to win a decisive victory at Midway only six months later."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved… (plus d'informations)
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The ships! The men! The... errors?
This is just what it sounds like: An overview of naval conflict in World War II. It covers all major navies -- Britain, United States, Japan, Germany, Italy, France -- and all oceans. It's about as comprehensive as a single medium-sized volume can be.
But I was constantly nagged by small errors and oversimplifications, such as Boyne's total condemnation of German Admiral Erich Raeder's use of his surface ships in commerce-raiding. Boyne thinks this a total waste -- yet the Graf Spee, for instance, although she was lost, knocked out many times her own tonnage. She was lost -- but she definitely paid for herself. And by keeping his raiders in existence, Raeder forced the British to keep a lot of heavy ships in commission, depriving them of the men that could man convoy escorts. For example, if the men who served on the five otherwise-useless Royal Sovereign class of battleships had been reassigned to destroyer work, the British could have manned several dozen more destroyers and probably saved many convoy ships.
Take as a specific case the hunting of the Bismarck. On p. 34, Boyne claimed that the Royal Navy sent "six battleships, four battle cruisers, two aircraft carriers" and some lesser ships to hunt the German battleship. The number of carriers is right. I believe the number of battleships is wrong but am not dead sure. But I can prove that the number of battlecruisers is wrong, because the British only had three! -- the Hood, Renown, and Repulse.
On p. 59 he describes the battle between the Bismarck and the Hood and Prince of Wales, condemning the way Admiral Holland fought the British ships. Certainly Holland's tactics proved disastrous. But he ignores the fact that Holland was supposed to intercept, and do so secretly -- and that Holland had been on course to cross the Bismarck's T when the Bismarck managed to escape surveillance and messed up the whole plan; Holland had nothing to do then except fight as best he could. It cost him his life, and the biggest ship in the Royal Navy, but there was a reason that Boyne ignores.
As for the destruction of the Hood herself, Boyne describes exactly how she was destroyed. Problem is, we really don't know. All we really know is that the was there, then she had broken in half due to an explosion, and only three men were recovered. It's clear that a magazine exploded -- but which one, and why? I've seen at least three other possible explanations; how does Boyne know with certainty?
And, at the end, Boyne says that the Rodney was Admiral Tovey's command ship (p. 67). No, Tovey was in the King George V; she and the Rodney were both there at the end, and the Rodney had heavier artillery, but Tovey's ship was much more modern and intended to be a flagship.
Few of these errors are really egregious. You have to really know your naval history (or have a trick memory like mine) to realize all the places where Boyne makes minor errors. If all you want is an overview, this book should be fine. But if you need to write a research paper or something... cite something else, OK? ( )
Informations provenant du Partage des connaissances anglais.Modifiez pour passer à votre langue.
Preface Some historians view World War I and World War II as a single war extending from 1914 to 1945, separated only by an armistice in which the contributors gathered strength to renew the contest.
World War II at sea opened with a sudden fury in September 1939 as German surface ships and submarines began a systematic attack that almost brought Great Britain to her knees.
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Informations provenant du Partage des connaissances anglais.Modifiez pour passer à votre langue.
"Clash of Titans covers every aspect of the sea war, including the contributions of the lesser naval powers, France, Italy and the Soviet Union, as Walter J. Boyne evaluates strategies, analyzes major battles and examines the leading personalities on both sides." "Both Germany and Japan, says Boyne, had their best chances at victory early in the war: Germany's U-boat fleet, small in number at the beginning of the war, threatened to starve England of food and fuel. The Japanese navy, highly trained and with the best torpedoes, optical instruments and pyrotechnics in the world, humiliated the U.S. Navy in one defeat after another. Yet, as time passed, the two great democracies, Britain and the United States, resilient and possessed of the productive power to create huge, technologically advanced navies, prevailed." "Clash of Titans recounts all of the famous sea battles of World War II, weaving them together into a narrative that illuminates the strengths and weaknesses of each navy. The German submarine force, despite hard living conditions and high casualty rates, fought well to the end. The Italian Navy, despite several defeats, remained a threat until the surrender and was chiefly responsible for sustaining Axis forces in North Africa. The Japanese navy, which excelled in night fighting, was distinguished by brilliant commanders. The British navy demonstrated its pluck in a dozen hard engagements, from its slashing attack on the Italian fleet at Cape Matapan to its defeat of the Bismark. But it was the American navy that made the most dramatic comeback, recoiling from the terrible defeat at Pearl Harbor to win a decisive victory at Midway only six months later."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved
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1
This is just what it sounds like: An overview of naval conflict in World War II. It covers all major navies -- Britain, United States, Japan, Germany, Italy, France -- and all oceans. It's about as comprehensive as a single medium-sized volume can be.
But I was constantly nagged by small errors and oversimplifications, such as Boyne's total condemnation of German Admiral Erich Raeder's use of his surface ships in commerce-raiding. Boyne thinks this a total waste -- yet the Graf Spee, for instance, although she was lost, knocked out many times her own tonnage. She was lost -- but she definitely paid for herself. And by keeping his raiders in existence, Raeder forced the British to keep a lot of heavy ships in commission, depriving them of the men that could man convoy escorts. For example, if the men who served on the five otherwise-useless Royal Sovereign class of battleships had been reassigned to destroyer work, the British could have manned several dozen more destroyers and probably saved many convoy ships.
Take as a specific case the hunting of the Bismarck. On p. 34, Boyne claimed that the Royal Navy sent "six battleships, four battle cruisers, two aircraft carriers" and some lesser ships to hunt the German battleship. The number of carriers is right. I believe the number of battleships is wrong but am not dead sure. But I can prove that the number of battlecruisers is wrong, because the British only had three! -- the Hood, Renown, and Repulse.
On p. 59 he describes the battle between the Bismarck and the Hood and Prince of Wales, condemning the way Admiral Holland fought the British ships. Certainly Holland's tactics proved disastrous. But he ignores the fact that Holland was supposed to intercept, and do so secretly -- and that Holland had been on course to cross the Bismarck's T when the Bismarck managed to escape surveillance and messed up the whole plan; Holland had nothing to do then except fight as best he could. It cost him his life, and the biggest ship in the Royal Navy, but there was a reason that Boyne ignores.
As for the destruction of the Hood herself, Boyne describes exactly how she was destroyed. Problem is, we really don't know. All we really know is that the was there, then she had broken in half due to an explosion, and only three men were recovered. It's clear that a magazine exploded -- but which one, and why? I've seen at least three other possible explanations; how does Boyne know with certainty?
And, at the end, Boyne says that the Rodney was Admiral Tovey's command ship (p. 67). No, Tovey was in the King George V; she and the Rodney were both there at the end, and the Rodney had heavier artillery, but Tovey's ship was much more modern and intended to be a flagship.
Few of these errors are really egregious. You have to really know your naval history (or have a trick memory like mine) to realize all the places where Boyne makes minor errors. If all you want is an overview, this book should be fine. But if you need to write a research paper or something... cite something else, OK? (