Philosophy, its Competitors, and Authority

This is a rather rarely read book by Kant. Who reads it? First, I believe it is read by those who think it a testament in the history of the struggle for intellectual freedom. Next, most people who bother to read this book today come at it from a theological background. They are interested in the contentious relationship between theology and philosophy. The last reason people might pick up this edition is that it is a bilingual edition and thus they hope they can use it as an aid in learning, or translating, the German language. The Table of Contents of this edition is as follows:

Translator's Introduction, vii;
Errata, xxxv;

Preface, 9;

First Part. The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Theology Faculty

Introduction, 23;
I. On the Relation of the Faculties
First Section. The Concept and Division of the Higher Faculties, 31;
A. The Distinctive Characteristic of the Theology Faculty, 35;
B. The Distinctive Characteristic of the Faculty of Law, 37;
C. The Distinctive Characteristic of the Faculty of Medicine, 41;
Second Section. The Concept and Division of the Lower Faculty, 43;
Third Section. On the Illegal Conflict of the Higher Faculties with the Lower Faculty, 47;
Fourth Section. On the Legal Conflict of the Higher Faculties with the Lower Faculty, 53;
Outcome, 59;

II. Appendix: The Conflict between the Theology and Philosophy Faculties, as an Example Clarifying the Conflict of the Faculties
1. The Subject Matter of the Conflict, 61;
2. Philosophical Principles of Scriptural Exegesis for Settling the Conflict, 65;
3. Objections concerning the Principles of Scriptural Exegesis, along with Replies to Them, 79;
General Remark: On Religious Sects, 85;
Conclusion of Peace and Settlement of the Conflict of the Faculties, 111;
Appendix: Historical Questions about the Bible, Concerning the Practical Use and Probable Duration of This Sacred Book, 125;
Appendix: On a Pure Mysticism in Religion, 127;

Second Part. The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Faculty of Law

An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?, 141;
Conclusion, 169;

Third Part. The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Faculty of Medicine

On the Power of the Mind to Master Its Morbid Feelings by Sheer Resolution, 175;
The Principle of the Regimen, 181;
Conclusion, 205;
Postscript, 209;

Translator's Notes, 215;

Mary J. Gregor authors the Translators Introduction and she is listed as the translator of this book. However, this is not exactly right. In the Bibliographical note we learn that the "translation of Part II of 'The Conflict of the Faculties' is by Robert E. Anchor and is reprinted from the collection "Kant: On History",edited by Lewis W. Beck (p. xxx)."

The books title, the "Conflict of the Faculties", refers to the University Faculties of Theology, Law, Medicine, and lastly, Philosophy. Philosophy is referred throughout as the "lower faculty" while the other three are the "higher faculties". What is the basis of this peculiar ranking? Kant tells us that, "a faculty is considered higher only if its teachings - both as to their content and the way they are expounded to the public - interest the government itself, while the faculty whose function is only to look after the interests of science is called lower because it may use its own judgement about what it teaches" (pp. 25-27). So, that is why those three faculties are considered 'higher': they are rightly chained by Authority! And they are 'rightly' so chained because their sayings and doings affect society. In the Preface we learned that Kant is pleased to consider this book a belated answer to an Edict sent to him (to Philosophy!, I might add) by a creature of the King. So you see, it seems that Kant's defense of philosophy basically is that philosophy is entirely irrelevant to what ordinary people believe, say and do.

This extraordinary defense of Philosophy in the Introduction ends thusly:
"The reason why this faculty, despite its great prerogative (freedom), is called the lower faculty lies in human nature; for a man who can give commands, even though he is someone else's humble servant, is considered more distinguished than a free man who has no one under his command. (p. 29)"

This, however, is not exactly the same as the point we thought Kant had made earlier. There he basically argued that only the faculty that was irrelevant to the behavior of society was Free, while the rest were rightfully chained to Authority. In other words, one could infer from this that the inferior position of philosophy vis-à-vis the other faculties is merely an artifact of Civil Society (Nomos); that is to say, it is but fashion. Now, at the end of this Introduction, he finds the roots of this lower ranking to be in human nature itself. That, unfortunately for philosophy, is not merely fashion. I suspect that here we are meant to understand that under any Authority (I mean to say under any possible Religion, any possible Politics) philosophy would still be the powerless 'faculty' and, perhaps for some even more worrisome, that there will always be an extra-philosophical (or non-philosophical) Authority judging philosophy.

If one includes the Preface, Part One (the part specifically concerning theology) takes up more than half the book. Why is so much attention paid to Theology? Because, as Kant indicates, it was thanks to Theology, in a conflict with Philosophy over Biblical Interpretation, that the hounds of the State were released against Philosophy. One might assume that Kant intends to return the favor by warning Authority that the other faculties can, and at times have, overstepped their legitimate bounds.

"So the biblical theologian (as a member of a higher faculty) draws his teaching not from reason but from the Bible; the professor of law gets his, not from the natural law, but from the law of the land; and the professor of medicine does not draw his method of therapy as practiced on the public from the physiology of the human body but from medical regulations. As soon as one of these faculties presumes to mix with its teachings something it treats as derived from reason, it offends against the authority of the government that issues orders through it and encroaches on the territory of the philosophy faculty... (p. 35)"

The "higher faculties" are regulated by the State (or whatever Powers be), answer to it, and therefore cannot be (primarily) concerned with Reason. (As an aside we should note that Kant is merely being polite -or prudent- when he says here that the "biblical theologian" teaches from the Bible; theology was also quite 'regulated' by the State in Frederick William II's Prussia.) So again, we see that the freedom of thought that philosophy enjoys comes at a price: practical irrelevancy. But we should also note that for Kant there are only two competent Judges of the Higher Faculties: Philosophy and Authority. It seems that Kant is here proposing a détente between these two 'powers'. But don't these two very different Judges ever come into conflict? No. Kant (in the theological section of this book) seems to intend for us to believe that Philosophy is a Judge without any practical Jurisdiction. And the State has no Authority over (because it has no vital, that is to say, practical interest in) mere Reason Itself. ...How could there ever be a conflict?

Kant strives to demonstrate this throughout Part One of this text. One does wonder how successful this argument was or could ever be... And how well received his subtle contention that mere Authority (and again, here he seems to mean any political or religious Authority) is never entirely guided by Reason. Authority herself, unlike Philosophy, therefore seems to be an admixture of nature and fashion.
I leave the niceties of the argument over biblical interpretation to those more knowledgeable of biblical criticism in the Eighteenth Century.

Now I would like to continue with a consideration of the discussion of Law that makes up Part Two. It poses the question: "Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" But first, I want to note that there is a different translation of Part Two (in "Kant's Political Writing", Hans Reiss, ed., H.B. Nisbet translator, 1970) that I will also refer to. Those who bought the present book as an exercise in translation might find a comparison of this translation by Robert E. Anchor with the Nisbet translation beneficial. Overall, I found the Nisbet translation more readable and will often make use of it below.

Question: "how is a history a priori possible? Answer: if the diviner himself creates and contrives the events which he announces in advance. (pp. 141-143)" So, one does not merely predict the future, one makes it too. Or, more clearly, the 'making' is the prediction. Now, Kant sees three possibilities regarding a predictable human History: "The human race exists in continual retrogression toward wickedness, or in perpetual progression toward improvement in its moral destination, or in eternal stagnation in its present stage of moral worth among creatures (a stagnation with which eternal rotation in orbit around the same point is one and the same.) (p. 145)" Kant at this point seems, perhaps a bit more than ever so slightly, to consider the last possibility of an eternal cycle the most likely. The first possibility is dismissed because, if true, humanity likely would have long ago destroyed itself. The second is 'untenable' because of the admixture of good and evil in each individual. But the third possibility, "which may well have the majority of voices on its side..." (p. 147), is really rather dispiriting...

"[I]n the final analysis, man requires coherency according to natural laws, but with respect to his future free actions he must dispense with this guidance or direction." (p. 151)

However, whether one is in a cycle of decline or progression one cannot know that a change of direction is not around the corner (see p. 149). Prophesy may be impossible, but there is no need to ever despair. So, therefore one should perhaps not shy away from practical activity because this "would concern an event he himself could produce" (p. 151). But is this still the case even given the fact that the following statement is true of Humanity?:

"with the mixture of good and evil in his predisposition, the proportion of which he is incognizant, he himself does not know what effect he might expect from it. (p. 151)"

Now, it would seem that our ability to predict the future cannot be simply based on human nature thanks to this admixture making prediction unlikely, if not impossible. We began this second essay with an exceedingly modern gesture: one can know what one makes. Of course, this tacitly assumes that one has real knowledge of oneself, and also ones materials, others, and circumstance. But if we now concede that the human maker does not entirely know himself (remember, we do not know the proportion of the admixture of good and evil) then all his making must be suspect (that is, in a certain sense even the intended results are 'unknown' or 'unpredictable') too. What now? Well, we might still know our circumstances...

"But from a given cause an event as an effect can be predicted [only] if the circumstances prevail which contribute to it." (p. 151) Perhaps. But now, you see, the future is no longer entirely in our hands; and we are thus, but (hopefully) only partly, hostages to fate. This event "might then serve to prove the existence of a tendency within the human race as a whole, considered not as a series of individuals (for this would result in interminable enumerations and calculations) but as a body distributed over the earth in states and national groups. (This last quote is from the Nisbet translation of this essay, cited above, p.181. I found the translation by Anchor somewhat obscure at this point.)"

But what 'event' are we now speaking of? Of course, it is the French Revolution! Is Kant now going to speak of heroic individuals overthrowing merciless tyranny and thus of Man making History? "No, nothing of the sort. It is simply the mode of thinking of the spectators which reveals itself publicly in this game of great revolutions, and manifests such a universal yet disinterested sympathy for the players on one side against those on the other, even at the risk that this partiality could become very disadvantageous for them if discovered (p. 153)." One might say that the Universality of the anonymous Public here constitutes for Kant an almost Kojèvean 'third' that judges between the Revolution and Ancien Régime in a disinterested manner. This universal reaction points to our common moral character, "or at least the makings of one. (Nisbet, 182)"

Now, Kant argues that even if this Revolution ultimately fails, and in so horrifically bloody a manner that none dare attempt it again, we have still learned something: that this sympathy that borders on enthusiasm, "can have no other cause than a moral predisposition in the human race. (p. 153)" What this predisposition affirms is the right of a people to self-government, that their constitution will eschew offensive war, and that this government must be a Republic, or at least have a republican constitution. He goes on to say of this popular enthusiasm that "(although not to be wholly esteemed, since passion as such deserves censure), [...] genuine enthusiasm always moves only toward what is ideal and, indeed, toward what is purely moral..." (p. 155) Apparently, this 'genuine enthusiasm' can be known by its disinterestedness: "the external public of onlookers sympathized with their exaltation, without the slightest interest of actively participating in their affairs. (Nisbet, 183)"

The public hasn't the "slightest interest of actively participating" in Revolution. A remarkable observation! - Or perhaps it is a promise? ...Or a covert threat? In any case, the present dearth of European Monarchs does make one wonder exactly how accurate this particular observation was... Nor should we be surprised at this enthusiasm of the people. Kant indicates that it is not Revolution per se that interests this remarkably self-controlled public but rather Universalism Itself! He says, by way of clarification, "non singulorum, sed universorum'. Now, Kant goes on to argue that evolution is preferable to Revolution and that European Monarchs should rule in a manner based on Republican Principles. And he foresees that this may indeed be the course of events. Of the Revolution he says,

"[f]or that event is too important, too much interwoven with the interest of humanity, and its influence too widely propagated in all areas of the world to not be recalled on any favorable occasion by the nations which would then be roused to a repetition of new efforts of this kind; because then, in an affair so important for humanity, the intended constitution, at a certain time, must finally attain that constancy which instruction by repeated experience suffices to establish in the minds of all men. (p. 159)"

And it is this evolution, with the French Revolution as its lodestar, which henceforth guides humanity. Now, our author sets no time frame for this process. "But so far as time is concerned, it can promise this only indefinitely and as a contingent event. (p. 159)" In this manner Kant quietly, gently, and politely places the sword of Damocles over the Monarchs of the World. Republicanism is coming; but nobody knows when...

What is popular Enlightenment? "Enlightenment of the masses is the public instruction of the people in its duties and rights vis-à-vis the state to which they belong. (p. 161)" Who does this teaching? The Philosophers. Yes, this is so not what Kant had said in his essay regarding Theology! We have now reached section 8 of the second part of our book. This part is concerned with the conflict between philosophy and law. The title of this section is "Concerning the Difficulty of the Maxims Applying to World Progress with Regard to Their Publicity". What is the difficulty? Well, since philosophy is only concerned with "natural rights and rights arising out of the common human understanding", philosophy comes into conflict with the state, "precisely because this freedom is allowed to them, [the philosophers] are objectionable to the state, which always desires to rule alone" (p. 161).

It is curious, by the way, that Kant specifically extends the concerns of philosophy beyond natural rights to 'rights arising out of the common human understanding' (Nisbet renders this passage as "rights which can be derived from ordinary common sense". - p. 186.) I had underlined this when I first read it, and I still stop short when I reread it. If philosophy is to concern itself with 'common sense' than it has, at least according to Kant, seemingly also set itself up as the final arbiter of mere fashion (i.e., of Nomos). The only possible justification for this that I can see is that this 'common human understanding' must always have some Reason in it in order to achieve any degree of commonality. However, the interest of philosophy in the merely contemporary certainly cannot reassure the State of the moderation (or the good will) of the philosophers!

And again, this is really not exactly what Kant had said in the previous section regarding Theology. How does our philosopher get around this? Oh, "the people take scarcely any or no notice at all of it and their writings"! (But is it really possible for philosophy to always remain uninteresting?) So then, the writings of the philosophers, while put out in the marketplace of ideas for any to peruse, are merely "addressed respectfully to the state" (p. 161). But all this must be done publicly because "if a whole people wishes to present its grievance (gravamen), the only way in which this can be done is by publicity. A ban on publicity will therefore hinder a nation's progress, even with regard to the least of its claims, the claim for natural rights. (Nisbet, 186)." The necessity of 'publicity' seems to be that without it the State will become blind to either the necessities of human nature or changes in fashionable 'common sense'.

Of course, publicity can be used to deceive too. As an example Kant here mentions the english crown, which makes a great show of its 'limited' nature while being, at all crucial points (especially regarding war), absolute. This is likely a warning directed at the Prussian King. Contrary to the deceptive nature of warring Kingdoms, the Republican Ideal (our author calls it a 'respublica noumenon') tends towards peace. "A civil society organized in conformity with it and governed by laws of freedom is an example representing it in the world of experience (respublica phaenomenon), and it can only be achieved by a laborious process, after innumerable wars and conflicts. But its constitution, once it has been attained as a whole, is the best qualified of all to keep out war, the destroyer of everything good. (Nisbet, p. 187.)" It would be foolish to object that republics, both ancient and modern, have in fact fought many wars. Kant would answer that the best instantiation of the 'Ideal Constitution' has not yet been attained. Only if this cannot ever be attained would it be plausible to argue that the attempt to create it was but a 'fools errand'.

Be that as it may, Kant ends this section by again admonishing monarchs to rule as republicans. While an increasingly republican world will likely make everybody behave better, we are surprised to see Kant (in the next section) admit that this occurs "without the moral foundation in mankind having to be enlarged in the least; for that, a kind of new creation (supernatural influence) would be necessary. (p. 167)" People behaving better under republican regimes without the slightest increase in morality! It seems that good republican laws make a people good. Perhaps we can go so far as to say these laws even fix the flaws in the first creation? No. Law doesn't save (or recreate) souls; it merely forms good behavior. And since Republics create their citizens behavior, one wonders how this can ever be thought of as 'popular rule'.

It can't. (At least not in the beginning.) "What sequence can progress be expected to follow? The answer is: not the usual sequence from the bottom upwards, but from the top downwards (Nisbet, p. 188-189)." The Republic trains citizens to be better Republicans. So far so good. But "those responsible for the desired education are also human beings who will therefore have to have had a suitable education themselves (Nisbet 189)." Who educates the educators? Kant, given "the frailty of human nature and the fortuitous circumstances which can intensify its effects", amazingly places his trust in two things: Providence and humans pursuing their own ends, which (with education, hopefully) eventually means the curtailment of war.

The limits of hope and education are revealed in the conclusion of this essay. Here Kant throws up his hands and says, "Sero sapiunt Phryges (p.171)." The Phrygians are wise too late. (Cicero)" Now, in Bulfinch's Mythology (1894) we read, "The Phrygians were noted for their obstinacy; hence, Phryx verberatus melior. They were thrice conquered: by Hercules, the Greeks, and the Latins, and were wise 'after the events'.” Pain it seems is the only effective educator; and in the final paragraph of this essay it is left to vicious warfare to educate us for civilized peace.

This theme of wisdom 'after the events' is one that is common to both ancient and modern philosophy. Recall that Hegel said that, "the Owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk. ("Philosophy of Right", Preface)" And Nietzsche ends his "Beyond Good & Evil" wondering exactly what it is we 'learn' and then audaciously turn into 'Truths': "We immortalize what cannot live and fly much longer - only weary and mellow things!" (BGE, section 296.) The long conversation regarding why it is so difficult for humanity to learn and know is the 'Via Dolorosa' of all Philosophy. It is a question all genuine philosophers return to and strive to answer.

We are running out of space here on Amazon so allow me to end with a few brief remarks on the final discussion of the faculty of Medicine. What strikes one first is how much the conversation is about psychology rather than medicine. And the lesson this psychology teaches is the overriding importance of moderation. I was surprised to find that this last essay ends with a thinly veiled apology for suicide in ones dotage. To be sure, this occurs because one can no longer think with the rigor one was once accustomed to. "So the art of prolonging human life leads to this: that in the end one is tolerated among the living only because of the animal functions one performs - not a particularly amusing situation. (p. 209)"

And so ends our book concerning the philosophical understanding of Religion, Government and the Body. At the end of the Preface (p. 21) Kant tells us that, "Under the general title 'The Conflict of the Faculties' I am now issuing three essays that I wrote for different purposes and at different times. They are, however, of such a nature as to form a systematic unity and combine in one work, though it was only later that I realized I could avoid scattering them by bringing them together in one volume, as the conflict of the lower faculty with the three higher faculties." So you see, while each essay was indeed written separately under different circumstances, Kant affirms that they have a systemic unity, - whether we see it or not. Now, while the 'conflict' delineated in this book might seem unique, it is not entirely unprecedented.

Averroës, in his 'Decisive Treatise', draws similar distinctions between Law and Theology. However, Averroës is somewhat less circumspect than Kant. Averroës believes that philosophy can control (i.e., rationalize) both the politicos (the 'Jurists') and the Religious, while Kant has here seemingly despaired of philosophy ever rationalizing Religion. But like Averroes, Kant hopes to use Law against Theology. And so he praises (in the Preface, p. 19-21) the creation of a 'Higher School Commission' which he believes will curtail "any new invasions of obscurantism."

Now, how do the three essays obliquely refer to and (perhaps) correct each other? Hmmm... If Philosophy cannot change something (in this book, theology) that needs to be changed (either because the 'something' is too strong or there is no viable replacement) it does nothing or as little as is necessary or as is safe for philosophy herself. If philosophy (believes) it can change something (in this book, the existing monarchial system; that is, the Ancien Régime) it does so in as moderate and evolutionary a manner as possible, while attempting to reassure all sides in the ongoing process. This is why Kant disapproves of the theologians enthusiasm but he admires (to a certain extent) the enthusiasm that the Revolution inspires.

When old Kant comments on the sympathy of a 'disinterested public' for the French Revolution and compares it to enthusiasm we of course need to prick up our ears. Kant regards enthusiasm as a bête noire. By gently pointing at their similarity (of enthusiasm and sympathy) Kant is quietly indicating that there is also danger lurking down the Republican road. One is tempted to say that philosophy, when faced with a choice, 'sides' with whatever (hopefully) moderate enthusiasm will carry the day. But moderate enthusiasm, if (or when) it declines into mere enthusiasm, eventually becomes dangerous. Even though Philosophy is often accused by existing Authority of either conspiring against it or of quiet disbelief, it is important to always note that at no point does philosophy disbelieve in the necessity of Authority.

Perhaps we should today wonder if there will ever be circumstances where philosophy will be incapable of changing the political situation for the better, but useful religious change would be possible? And what would Philosophy do then? ...Well, be that as it may, in all cases we learn in this book the value of moderation and self-control. And it is regarding this central theme that, perhaps surprisingly, we find that the faculty most in agreement with philosophy is the medical. The utility of self-control, whether in evaluating oneself, others, circumstances, or a philosophical text cannot be overstated.

Sero sapiunt Phryges! We are all wise too late. The greatest misfortune is that, ahead of time, we cannot even be certain of precisely what we are unwise about. But philosophy is the only one who really knows this. Philosophy, like the Owl of Minerva, is a carrion eater. After the days battles, philosophy consumes the evidence and thus achieves understanding. Five stars for a brilliantly intriguing work that I intend to revisit again. - Especially regarding the question of how these three seemingly disparate essays achieve a systematic unity. ( )