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Chargement... Spyflights and Overflights: US Strategic Aerial Reconnaissance 1945-1960 (édition 2016)par Robert S. Hopkins III (Auteur)
Information sur l'oeuvreSpyflights and Overflights: US Strategic Aerial Reconnaissance 1945-1960 par Robert Hopkins Iii
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Few aviation subjects have been shrouded in more secrecy or been more controversial than Cold War aerial reconnaissance. Former reconnaissance pilot Robert S. Hopkins, III, offers new insights into strategic intelligence flights during the early years of the cold war. Primarily undertaken by RB-50s and RB-47s of the Strategic Air Command and by CIA U-2s, other Western nations such as Britain, Sweden, and Taiwan were equally committed to gathering intelligence about the Soviet Union and its allies, and conducted their own peripheral and overflight missions. Hopkins challenges longstanding beliefs that the flights served to prevent war, curtailed needless defense spending, and were undertaken by rogue generals bent on starting World War III. For the first time he shows the Soviet perspective on the flights, and makes a compelling case that reconnaissance flights did not have a sustained adverse effect on Soviet relations with the West. Using newly-declassified materials, interviews with crews and policy makers, and his own experience flying strategic reconnaissance missions, Hopkins links the daily operations of courageous fliers with decisions by presidents and prime ministers that decided the outcome of the Cold War. Aucune description trouvée dans une bibliothèque |
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Google Books — Chargement... GenresClassification décimale de Melvil (CDD)358.450973Social sciences Public Administration, Military Science Air forces and other advanced weaponry Air Forces ReconnaissanceClassification de la Bibliothèque du CongrèsÉvaluationMoyenne:
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What this means in practice is that Hopkins is trying to bridge the gap in this work between the aviation enthusiast, and the serious academician. So, while paying his respects to the people who flew and maintained the aircraft, Hopkins is also going out of his way to try and debunk some of the misconceptions that have attached themselves to the missions over the years, culminating in the sensationalism attached to the U-2 mission of Gary Powers.
First, this means illustrating the routine nature of the overflights and the surveillance missions around the periphery of the USSR and the People's Republic of China. Masses of tabular material have been provided attesting to how these operations attained the status of being a war of attrition between the "West" and the Soviet air defense forces.
Two, the next point is to illustrate that these missions never left control of the highest authorities of the United States government even if, over time, a command structure was established that allowed all but the most sensitive flights to be delegated to the most senior military officials; who were not necessarily Curtis LeMay. Hopkins goes to some lengths to disabuse readers that LeMay was some sort of loose cannon who desired a preventative war against Moscow. Though LeMay did see armed reconnaissance as a potentially useful tool of intimidation, there is no evidence that the man ever lost respect for the chain of command.
Finally, Hopkins concludes with how President Eisenhower chose to manage strategic air reconnaissance, particularly the U-2 missions. While recognizing that Ike might have been losing his grip towards the end of this presidency, and was certainly somewhat wishy-washy in regards to maintaining a balance between military posture, diplomacy, and the rest of his political agenda, Hopkins thinks that he has found a way to square the circle of what was trying to be achieved. Essentially, Eisenhower's tight control of the U-2 missions was his way of continuing to collect useful intelligence, at least until the recon satellites came on line, while at the same time avoiding the slippery slope of adopting armed reconnaissance as a policy, which could have led to preventative war being in the cards.
Hopkins intended this book to be the first part of a trilogy, and I hope those books do get published. ( )