Hammond objectively describes the US Army's public affairs policies in Vietnam between 1962 and 1968. More broadly, he traces public relations problems of the Johnson administration stemming from the war. Johnson opted for a strategy of gradualism-increasing the US commitment by degrees, prodding the South Vietnamese government to cure internal corruption and improve military effectiveness, and searching for statistics to prove his case in the media. Confronted with administration assurances yet mounting American casualties, journalists became increasingly skeptical, especially after the 1968 Tet offensive. Dispatches filed from Saigon and Washington reported the inconsistency between observed reality and administration optimism. Army spokesmen, in response to presidential directive, reluctantly moved from informing the press on military activities to defending administration policy. Hammond describes the resulting tensions that developed among the administration, the army, and the media. This outstanding monograph, based on extensive research in official documents, published sources, and interviews, is a welcome addition to the literature on the Vietnam War. Bibliography, notes, and illustrations complement the narrative.