Always - Never. The dichotomous motto for the nuclear bomb. ALWAYS detonate when we want you to - NEVER detonate when we don’t want you to. Against all probability, this unlikely dichotomy has been held upright for the last 75 years. However, as Schlosser’s well-researched expository work Command and Control uncovers and then describes in detail, one close shave after another, we get the terrible presentiment that our time is running out. We have been playing with Fire for too long and our luck simply cannot last forever. The neutrons have been stacked against us for so long now and they are getting restless.
Schlosser makes it quite clear that there is an incredible profusion of nuclear devices all around us. With brutal, in your face, clarity Schlosser provides a disconcerting tour into the insane, even macabre world of MAD (mutually assured destruction) that thoroughly disillusions us of any false notions we may have held prior as to the perceived safety of nuclear weapons or trust in the people that store and handle such weapons. No matter how so-called foolproof our safety measures are supposed to be, it is in the nature of things that all the fail-safes smart minds may install will, sooner or later, be overwhelmed by the sheer infinite foolishness of average men or by unforeseeable circumstances. Once you have read about the irresponsible and ignorant behavior of some of the weapons handlers, I believe you may agree with the prior statement.
Command and Control is so informative that even if you consider yourself reasonably well-read on the topic, you may learn a thing or two - to express it mildly. For its scope is encompassing, and at the same time it manages to be incredibly detailed and thorough.
Until such time I am taught better, I dare say this is the eminent work on the subject of nuclear bomb safety and chain of command - period. ( )

Command and Control is the terrifying reality of nuclear weapons accidents and the near misses that have occurred throughout the nuclear age. It’s a meticulously researched and gripping exploration of the history, technology, and politics of nuclear weapons, and the complex and often precarious systems put in place to manage these weapons. Schlosser examines the 1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash, the 1980 Damascus Titan missile explosion, and sheds light on the challenges and shortcomings of nuclear command and control systems, including issues of communication, decision-making processes, and the potential for unauthorized use. He emphasizes the fallibility of these systems and the inherent dangers they pose—even in the hands of well-intentioned individuals. Schlosser raises important questions about the ethics and morality of possessing such destructive capabilities, as well as the need for greater accountability and transparency in nuclear policy. Command and Control is a risks and consequence analysis highlighting the inherent risks of human error, technical malfunctions, and the potential for catastrophic accidents. You might never sleep again. ( )

A riveting history of the nuclear weapon that is mostly about how dangerous they are, both to whomever is bombed with them, and to the user when they accidently fall out of airplanes (again and again). The story is gripping, but there is very little analysis. There are comments in the Epilogue pointing out that in an incredibly complex and dangerous system like our nuclear weapons and their command and control, an error rate of .000001% would still be unacceptable since the detonation of a 5 megaton device in Greensboro would be unthinkably horrible. Studies of mistakes in Medicine are similar, since mistakes occur no matter what you do, and they are usually completely unacceptable. I think one could also discuss the old conundrum, that the type of brave arrogant fast-acting no-nonsense guy who rises to the top in a complex organization like a branch of the military, might not be the best person to agree to have the safety of his weapons reviewed. ( )

While much of this book is highly interesting, in my opinion its punch is diminished by its encyclopedic comprehensiveness that overwhelms the general reader, and by the interspersing of chapters on twentieth century nuclear history and the Damascus Incident, which don't have any natural fit. ( )

Fróðleg bók um sögu uppbyggingar kjarnorkuvopnabúnaðar bandaríkjamanna. Það fer sannarlega kaldur hrollur um mann við að lesa frásögn Schlossers af stöðugum mistökum, óhöppum og vítaverðu gáleysi við kjarnorkuvopnin. Margoft virðist heppnin ein hafa komið í veg fyrir að kjarnorku- og vetnissprengjur spryngju í Bandaríkjunum og víðar.
Þrátt fyrir heillandi efni þá fór uppsetning bókarinnar í taugarnar á mér því Schlosser flakkaði fram og til baka í tímanum þegar hann var að reyna að gera línulega frásögn af sögu vígbúnaðarkapphlaupsins og öryggisráðstafana því tengdu annars vegar og hins vegar segja frá því í gegnum ítarlega viðtöl þegar öflugasta eldflaug bandaríkjamanna sprakk með vetnissprengju á jörðu niðri. ( )