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1John
MARGARET MACMILLAN
Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World
Nixon in China: The Week that Changed the World
The parallel in the subtitles of these two books is not an accident; publishers love that kind of thing. However, the changes brought about by these two events were vastly different. The changes engendered by the first, the making of the Treaty of Versailles, were much more complex, involved a much larger cast of characters, and have had far-reaching repercussions that are still with us today almost 100 years later (e.g. re-drawing the map of the Balkans, the creation of Iraq). The opening to China was a bold step and a geopolitical triumph for Richard Nixon, but in the end, neither side got its primary objective (complete US withdrawal from Taiwan, and Chinese pressure on the North Vietnamese to bring the war in Vietnam to a close), and one might argue that the opening of, and to, China was inevitable even if it might have taken a little longer.
The two books are similar in approach: very broad research, balance between understanding the larger picture while describing the details, fluid writing style, and history informed with illuminations of the personalities involved. In addition to scholarly sources, MacMillan has mined diaries and memoirs, biographies and autobiographies. She reminds us that great moments and events in history do not occur through spontaneous combustion; they might be driven by powerful societal forces and personalities, but they are conceived, engaged and experienced by individuals, and understanding those individuals in all their strengths and weaknesses brings the history alive.
The drafting of the Versailles Treaty at the end of WWI was a monumental and complex task, but it was one conducted by men who displayed varying strengths, weaknesses, hopes, fears, arrogance, humility (not too much of that in this group!), hates, nationalist fervor, generosity, petulance, hypocrisy, pettiness, honesty, intrigues, manipulations, open-handedness, happiness, disappointments, anger, despair....the whole panoply of emotions that come into play when people are working, sometimes together and sometimes (more often) at cross-purposes, in high stakes games.
The rapprochement represented by Nixon's visit after twenty years of distrust and distance, owed itself partly to larger geopolitical considerations involving relations with the Soviet Union and the desire of each country to rethink global policy and strategies. There were also individual or domestic considerations: Nixon prided himself as a global statesman and was attracted by the bold and unexpected move (Kissinger was originally dubious) while he also saw that the profile it would be useful for his re-election; Mao was at the tail end of the Great Cultural Revolution that had turned China upside down and was re-thinking China's role in the world. But MacMillan also gives credit to the principals involved:
"It is true that Nixon and Kissinger were able to take advantage of a powerful current hat was already flowing in favour of a Sino-American relationship, but without their skilful and, yes, secretive handling of the opening, it might well not have happened."
Similarly, despite the cast of characters involved in arguing and drafting the Versailles Treaty, much of its direction came down to the whims and wiles of three main personalities: Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George, and Georges Clemenceau.
MacMillan describes the negotiation of the US-China communique as proceeding by "a combination of clear statements, hints, and suggestions". Both Kissinger and Chou En-Lai were adept at this and they spent countless hours together drafting the document. At one point, discussing Taiwan, Kissinger said, "The Prime Minister seeks clarity and I am trying to achieve ambiguity", but this could equally have been flipped around on other issues. It could equally apply to many points in the drafting of the Versailles Treaty when, unfortunately, ambiguity might serve to paper over differences at the time, but could, and often did, come back to haunt the players.
MacMillan's final words in each book summarize the scope of the impact of the two events.
"The peacemakers of 1919 made mistakes, of course. By their offhand treatment of the non-European world, they stirred up resentments for which the West is still paying today. They took pains over the borders in Europe, even if they did not draw them to everyone's satisfaction, but in Africa they carried on the old practice of handling out territory to suit the imperialist powers. In the Middle East, they threw together peoples, in Iraq most notably who still have not managed to cohere into a civil society. If they could have done better, they certainly could have done much worse. They tried, even cynical old Clemenceau, to build a better order. They could not foresee the future and they certainly could not control it. That was up to their successors. When war came in 1939, it was the result of twenty years of decisions taken or not taken, not of arrangements made in 1919. ...The peacemakers...grappled with huge and difficult questions . How can the irrational passions of nationalism or religion be contained before they do more damage? How can we outlaw war? We are still asking those questions."
"For Nixon and the Americans, the visit was a bold and dramatic move which placed Nixon himself in the centre of great events and the United States as the pivotal power between China and the Soviet Union. The China card did not produce as much as the Americans hoped for, but cards, particularly if they have a will of their own, usually do not. For a time the Soviet Union was more amenable in its negotiations with the United States, and unease about China certainly played a part in that. The North Vietnamese did not stop fighting and, in the end, gave away very little in the Paris negotiations to conclude the war. China's new relationship with the United States did, however, help to deepen the suspicion with which the Vietnamese regarded the Chinese and paved the way for the later war between China and a newly reunited Vietnam.
For the Chinese, there were also losses and gains as a result of the Nixon visit. They agreed to wait on Taiwan and they are still waiting. On the other hand, the visit was an acknowledgement of China's importance in the world and marked the end to the isolation of the 1960s. Although the legacy of the Cultural Revolution was to lie heavily on China until Mao's death, the beginnings of the reawakening and revitalization of China after 1976 lie in this period."
Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World
Nixon in China: The Week that Changed the World
The parallel in the subtitles of these two books is not an accident; publishers love that kind of thing. However, the changes brought about by these two events were vastly different. The changes engendered by the first, the making of the Treaty of Versailles, were much more complex, involved a much larger cast of characters, and have had far-reaching repercussions that are still with us today almost 100 years later (e.g. re-drawing the map of the Balkans, the creation of Iraq). The opening to China was a bold step and a geopolitical triumph for Richard Nixon, but in the end, neither side got its primary objective (complete US withdrawal from Taiwan, and Chinese pressure on the North Vietnamese to bring the war in Vietnam to a close), and one might argue that the opening of, and to, China was inevitable even if it might have taken a little longer.
The two books are similar in approach: very broad research, balance between understanding the larger picture while describing the details, fluid writing style, and history informed with illuminations of the personalities involved. In addition to scholarly sources, MacMillan has mined diaries and memoirs, biographies and autobiographies. She reminds us that great moments and events in history do not occur through spontaneous combustion; they might be driven by powerful societal forces and personalities, but they are conceived, engaged and experienced by individuals, and understanding those individuals in all their strengths and weaknesses brings the history alive.
The drafting of the Versailles Treaty at the end of WWI was a monumental and complex task, but it was one conducted by men who displayed varying strengths, weaknesses, hopes, fears, arrogance, humility (not too much of that in this group!), hates, nationalist fervor, generosity, petulance, hypocrisy, pettiness, honesty, intrigues, manipulations, open-handedness, happiness, disappointments, anger, despair....the whole panoply of emotions that come into play when people are working, sometimes together and sometimes (more often) at cross-purposes, in high stakes games.
The rapprochement represented by Nixon's visit after twenty years of distrust and distance, owed itself partly to larger geopolitical considerations involving relations with the Soviet Union and the desire of each country to rethink global policy and strategies. There were also individual or domestic considerations: Nixon prided himself as a global statesman and was attracted by the bold and unexpected move (Kissinger was originally dubious) while he also saw that the profile it would be useful for his re-election; Mao was at the tail end of the Great Cultural Revolution that had turned China upside down and was re-thinking China's role in the world. But MacMillan also gives credit to the principals involved:
"It is true that Nixon and Kissinger were able to take advantage of a powerful current hat was already flowing in favour of a Sino-American relationship, but without their skilful and, yes, secretive handling of the opening, it might well not have happened."
Similarly, despite the cast of characters involved in arguing and drafting the Versailles Treaty, much of its direction came down to the whims and wiles of three main personalities: Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George, and Georges Clemenceau.
MacMillan describes the negotiation of the US-China communique as proceeding by "a combination of clear statements, hints, and suggestions". Both Kissinger and Chou En-Lai were adept at this and they spent countless hours together drafting the document. At one point, discussing Taiwan, Kissinger said, "The Prime Minister seeks clarity and I am trying to achieve ambiguity", but this could equally have been flipped around on other issues. It could equally apply to many points in the drafting of the Versailles Treaty when, unfortunately, ambiguity might serve to paper over differences at the time, but could, and often did, come back to haunt the players.
MacMillan's final words in each book summarize the scope of the impact of the two events.
"The peacemakers of 1919 made mistakes, of course. By their offhand treatment of the non-European world, they stirred up resentments for which the West is still paying today. They took pains over the borders in Europe, even if they did not draw them to everyone's satisfaction, but in Africa they carried on the old practice of handling out territory to suit the imperialist powers. In the Middle East, they threw together peoples, in Iraq most notably who still have not managed to cohere into a civil society. If they could have done better, they certainly could have done much worse. They tried, even cynical old Clemenceau, to build a better order. They could not foresee the future and they certainly could not control it. That was up to their successors. When war came in 1939, it was the result of twenty years of decisions taken or not taken, not of arrangements made in 1919. ...The peacemakers...grappled with huge and difficult questions . How can the irrational passions of nationalism or religion be contained before they do more damage? How can we outlaw war? We are still asking those questions."
"For Nixon and the Americans, the visit was a bold and dramatic move which placed Nixon himself in the centre of great events and the United States as the pivotal power between China and the Soviet Union. The China card did not produce as much as the Americans hoped for, but cards, particularly if they have a will of their own, usually do not. For a time the Soviet Union was more amenable in its negotiations with the United States, and unease about China certainly played a part in that. The North Vietnamese did not stop fighting and, in the end, gave away very little in the Paris negotiations to conclude the war. China's new relationship with the United States did, however, help to deepen the suspicion with which the Vietnamese regarded the Chinese and paved the way for the later war between China and a newly reunited Vietnam.
For the Chinese, there were also losses and gains as a result of the Nixon visit. They agreed to wait on Taiwan and they are still waiting. On the other hand, the visit was an acknowledgement of China's importance in the world and marked the end to the isolation of the 1960s. Although the legacy of the Cultural Revolution was to lie heavily on China until Mao's death, the beginnings of the reawakening and revitalization of China after 1976 lie in this period."
2tomcatMurr
Amazing review! It's Kissinger's ambiguity that keeps Taiwan protected today, thank god, as it's where I have my home. Perhaps old throaty voice wasn't so bad after all!
Have you read Barbara's Tuchman's book on the civil war in China: Stillwell and the American experience in China?
it covers the period between your two books here.
More reivews please! They are truly interesting.
Have you read Barbara's Tuchman's book on the civil war in China: Stillwell and the American experience in China?
it covers the period between your two books here.
More reivews please! They are truly interesting.
