Donald Cameron Watt (1928–2014)

Perché Mussolini non fermò Hitler nell'agosto del 1939 come aveva fatto nel settembre del 1938? Perché Stalin si decise a firmare il patto di non aggressione con la Germania nazista pur continuando fino all'ultimo minuto a negoziare un'alleanza con gli inglesi? Quali informazioni indussero Hitler a sottovalutare il peso degli Stati Uniti fino al punto di considerare il presidente Roosevelt uno sciocco imbroglione?
Oltre cinquant'anni ci separano ormai dall'inizio della seconda guerra mondiale e, per la prima volta, lo studioso inglese Donald Cameron Watt ce ne offre un quadro panoramico a tutto campo, che mette a fuoco dettagli ignorati e svela connessioni decisive, indagando il drammatico sviluppo degli eventi dal punto di vista di tutti i responsabili. Raccogliendo in un vivido affresco documenti ufficiali e una vastissima gamma di testimonianze private edite e inedite provenienti da diciassette paesi, Watt fa apparire chiaro l'intricato scenario diplomatico ed emotivo di quei cruciali undici mesi Ghe, fra il patto di Monaco del 30 settembre 1938 e l'ultimatum britannico del 3 settembre 1939, portarono alla guerra. E una storia di paure e speranze, incomprensioni, errori, falsi allarmi, negoziati impossibili, menzogne, nervosismi, ingenuità delle cancellerie e falsificazioni dei servizi segreti, tradimenti e inefficaci slanci di buona volontà.
Indice
Maggio 1945: la fine dell'Europa; I preliminari del suicidio dell'Europa; Hitler progetta una nuova guerra; Ribbentrop in difficoltà; Riarmo e riassetto: Chamberlain dopo Monaco; Lord Halifax in allarme; Stalin pronuncia un discorso; Opinioni contrastanti a Washington: Roosvelt appoggia Gran Bretagna e Francia; Hitler entra a Praga; Chamberlain sceglie il contenimento; Hitler si volge contro la polonia; Rabbia a Roma; Stalin comincia a fare i calcoli; Decisione a Maggio; Segnali confusi da Washington; La lotta per i Balcani. Primo round: la Turchia; la lotta per i Balcani. Secondo round: la Jugoslavia e lo spostamento verso l'Occidente; Hitler aumenta la pressione: "morire da Danzica"?; L'esercito giapponese corre un griosso rischio; Molotov valuta le offerte; I dilettanti tentano di evitare la guerra; L'Italia tradita; Hitler vuole la sua guerra; Ribbentrop a Monsca: la firma del patto nazi-sovietico; Gli ordini di guerra differenti: il 25 agosto a Berlino… (plus d'informations)

What a sad tale of human failure. This comprehensive--almost obsessively detailed--history of the year preceding the outbreak of the war, is told from a diplomatic perspective, and spares no one. The strategic blindness of the British leadership; the cowardice, indecisiveness, and sheer incompetence of the French; the false bravado of the Italians; the impotence of FDR (and the stupidity and negativism of the Congressional isolationsts); the in-fighting and savagery demonstrated by the Japanese; the monstrosity of Stalin. Only Hitler survives as a psychotic convinced of his Godly mission to strengthen and expand Germany and to exact his terrible toll on humanity; however, on the German side, one is repelled both at the pomposity and evil of Ribbentrop, the double-dealing of Goering, the suspension of the Prussian military tradition and idealism as the Army is taken over by committed and amoral Nazis. Then there are the Poles, who actually believed they could win a battle with Germany and structured their diplomacy after this fallacy: what planet were they living on? Then there are the Hungaraians (not a pretty picture), and the Roumanians, desperate to avoid dismemberment, and the Yugoslavs, barely a country. The Treaty of Versailles becomes one of the the living characters, and is portrayed as the beginning of the catastrophic errors in diplomatic judgment which typified the year under study. One learns something new on almost every page, as the reader is taken into the embassies and seats of government as a fly on the wall. The author writes in a dense, academic style, rather than with dramatic flair (probably preserving the spirit of diplomatic messages). For anyone interested in World War II history, this work would seem essential. Although be warned: with the hindsight of history, the flaws of every major player are stark and overwhelming.… (plus d'informations)

3338. How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939, by Donald Cameron Watt (read Aug. 24, 2000) This is a 1989 book and covers in great detail the time after Munich till the war began. I lived thru that time with great awareness for what was going on, but after all I was only 10 and I thought it might be well to check my vivid memory against scholarly research made with the benefit of things not known at the time. The author has the usual English slant to what he says, and does not hesitate to express his opinions, some of which I did not agree with. But it is a good book and his account of the famous event on Sept 2, 1939, when the cry was made in the House of Commons: "Speak for England" is itself in its context worth the time spent reading a well-done book about a superinteresting time.… (plus d'informations)