Gary Sheffield (1) (1961–)

"The First World War was a just and necessary war fought against a militarist, aggressive autocracy. In Britain and the United States it is a forgotten victory. It has remained forgotten for too long."

With this conclusion, the author ends this work which embodies the arguments of the critical mass of modern day historians of the Great War who, taking into account the experiences and knowledge of people at the time, rather than relying on hindsight, have challenged the view that the war was wholly futile and pointless, a pure and simple chaos consisting of trenches, mud and poetry, with little to choose between the warring states. The battles of the Western Front rightly remain the core focus of this and any other history of the war, but the growing role of technology such as tanks, aeroplanes and more efficient artillery and explosives in turning the tide of the war are also covered. The war at sea, often overlooked, is also vital in understanding how Britain was able to keep the Channel open for the supply of the army in France and Belgium. Crucial are the lessons learned after the horrors of the Somme in 1916: following this, the BEF and Haig underwent a "learning curve" or at least a sometimes erratic "learning process", involving better co-ordination of artillery and infantry and better use of communications, which bore fruit as the war of attrition eventually ground down their opponents' resources. Thus the war in 1917-18 was of a very different character from its course in the preceding years, though this was by no means of course a simple linear improvement in the Allies' fortunes. This is a fascinating and very readable exploration of issues connected with the Great War.… (plus d'informations)

There is, or was for a long time, a popular view in Britain of the First World War. It was of idiotic generals uncaring about the fate of their men herding them off time and again to futile attacks which accomplished nothing but leaving many of them dead. July 1st, 1916, the first day of the battle of the Somme, when the British Army suffered 57,000 casualties for small territorial gain, was the apotheosis of this.

This view of the war has now been largely discredited in serious historical circles. As Gary Sheffield argued in a previous book, [b:Forgotten Victory|1377496|Forgotten Victory - The First World War Myths and Reality|Gary Sheffield|https://d2arxad8u2l0g7.cloudfront.net/books/1356463786s/1377496.jpg|1367429], the British Army went from a small, colonial police force in 1914 to a mass army of 2 million men which played perhaps the major part in winning the war in 1918. This was no small achievement and the men and their commanders responsible deserve to be remembered as more than either boobs or butchers.

This book focuses on the battle of the Somme in that thesis. Rather than a disaster followed by a pointless slogging match, Sheffield makes the convincing case that the Somme was a major staging post on the British Army's journey to a war winning force in 1918. In short, the Somme didn't win the war, but the war would not have been won without the Somme.

… (plus d'informations)