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6+ oeuvres 745 utilisateurs 14 critiques

A propos de l'auteur

John Mosier is full professor of English at Loyola University in New Orleans, where, as chair of the English Department and associate dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, he taught primarily European literature and film.

Œuvres de John Mosier

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Étiqueté

Partage des connaissances

Date de naissance
1944
Sexe
male
Nationalité
USA
Études
Tulane University (1968 | PhD)
Organisations
Loyola University New Orleans

Membres

Critiques

Based on previously unused French and German sources, this challenging and controversial new analysis of the war on the Western front from 1914 to 1918 reveals how and why the Germans won the major battles with one-half to one-third fewer casualties than the Allies, and how American troops in 1918 saved the Allies from defeat and a negotiated peace with the Germans.
 
Signalé
MasseyLibrary | 4 autres critiques | Aug 20, 2023 |
A small but comprehensive biography of Grant and what made him such an effective general. Mosier's most conspicuous achievement is that his narrative foregoes military jargon to present Grant as an ordinary man. This makes 'Grant' a compelling and inspirational read. Mosier's prose is exceptional and simple.

The only downside though, for some readers, might be that Mosier is no Ron Chernow and 'Grant' is not overly detailed like other biographies. But for me, Mosier's greatest achievement is that he retains the man who Grant was and disallows him from becoming lost in historical detail.… (plus d'informations)
 
Signalé
Amarj33t_5ingh | 2 autres critiques | Jul 8, 2022 |
I have given [a:John Mosier|337937|John Mosier|https://s.gr-assets.com/assets/nophoto/user/u_50x66-632230dc9882b4352d753eedf9396530.png]'s The Blitzkrieg Myth four stars as I believe there is a useful role in authors who take a contrarian position, shaking up our thinking. That said, if you have not read other accounts of the campaigns in the Second World War, I suggest that you not start with this book. I also appreciate the arguments made by the reviewers who only gave Mosier two stars - and in particular recommend
Emmanuel Gustin's review
.

In his introduction, Mosier names [a:J.F.C. Fuller|225974|J.F.C. Fuller|https://images.gr-assets.com/authors/1339793603p2/225974.jpg] and [a:Giulio Douhet|964282|Giulio Douhet|https://s.gr-assets.com/assets/nophoto/user/u_50x66-632230dc9882b4352d753eedf9396530.png] as the sources of flawed doctrine - and attempts to group their theories together under term he coined as "breakthrough theory". This seemed to be setting up straw men. Fuller's vision of fully mechanised armies never came about. Douhet's strategy of attacking cities to destroy civilian morale did - but it was a desperation tactic, adopted when airpower proved incapable of reaching and destroying militarily significant targets.

It is unclear exactly how influential these two theorists were. Douhet does not appear to have been studied in the the UK, the only country that attempted to build a strategic bombing force before the war. Fuller was noted for his acerbic criticism of his peers and superiors, and his support for the the British fascists prior to the war made him highly suspect. [a:Heinz Guderian|148433|Heinz Guderian|https://images.gr-assets.com/authors/1239227513p2/148433.jpg] mentioned the influence of "the Englishmen, Fuller, Liddell Hart and Martel" in [b:Panzer Leader|13312947|Panzer Leader|Heinz Guderian|https://s.gr-assets.com/assets/nophoto/book/50x75-a91bf249278a81aabab721ef782c4a74.png|246161], but [a:John Mearsheimer|7456926|John Mearsheimer|https://s.gr-assets.com/assets/nophoto/user/u_50x66-632230dc9882b4352d753eedf9396530.png] points out in [b:Liddell Hart and the Weight of History|7548686|Liddell Hart and the Weight of History|John J. Mearsheimer|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1348514264l/7548686._SY75_.jpg|1130699] that this reference was not in the the German edition of Panzer Leader, but included in the English version at the suggestion of the editor, Liddell Hart. If anything, the the German development of Blitzkrieg seems to be better attributed to Germany's own war experience, including the development of sturmtruppen tactics.

The failure of strategic bombing to break morale has been well documented elsewhere. Mosier adds little that is new.

Mosier gives his opinion freely over land operations. We learn that he likes Montgomery (notwithstanding the Arnhem disaster), thinks Rommel was over rated, and thinks that Eisenhower was wise to to let to pick favourites amongst Montgomery, Bradley or Patton. I put these into the category of opinions that others will want to argue about.

The most challenging point Mosier raises relates to the fall of France. The German drive through the Ardennes in May 1940 all the way to the English Chanel, forcing the evacuation of the British (and other) surrounded forces from Dunkirk is seen as the textbook example of Blitzkrieg. Mosier attributes the German success primarily to a loss of nerve by the French and British high command and politicians. He asserts that the breakthrough could have been countered if the British had only counter-attacked, instead of withdrawing - but a quick look at a map shows that this looks implausible.

Notably, Mosier only comments in passing on the Russian campaign, but this would be important to establishing his case. The German offensives of of 1941 and 1942 were also classic Blitzkrieg, sweeping around pockets of Soviet forces who later became prisoners - and the Soviet counterattacks also followed a similar model, punching through weakened defences in an attempt to surround German forces.

Mosier shows enthusiasm for attacking on a broad front, which must make most of those who have studied strategy worried. This seems to contradict the principle of concentration of force. In practice, what Mosier sees as a broad front is an illusion. The Second World War was ultimately decided by attrition - the Germans lacked the manpower and resources to win, and were gradually worn down, and the land campaigns (particularly in the East) were fundamental to that process. But what looks like a broad front on a large scale map, lacks texture and will have many subordinate (and narrow) offensives when examined at the tactical level. At the tactical level, concentration of force is still needed.
… (plus d'informations)
 
Signalé
dunnmj | 3 autres critiques | Mar 9, 2022 |
Kniha bourá řadu zažitých představ o druhé světové válce. Nejenže kritizuje přežilé válečné teorie, ale odmítá i zjednodušující historické interpretace. John Mosier k tématu přistupuje s provokativním nadhledem a v podstatě nic mu není svaté.

Autor se v knize věnuje fenoménu tzv. bleskové války. Ukazuje, že řada vojenských vítězství ve druhé světové válce nebyla dosažena bleskovou válkou, jak se často uvádí. Svá tvrzení dokládá řadou přesvědčivých důkazů. John Mosier zcela nově interpretuje nejen polské tažení v roce 1939, ale i pád Francie, Rommelova severoafrická tažení, Den D i proslulou bitvu v Ardenách na sklonku druhé světové války. (proč byla blesková válka neúspěšná?)… (plus d'informations)
 
Signalé
guano | 3 autres critiques | Dec 18, 2020 |

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Statistiques

Œuvres
6
Aussi par
2
Membres
745
Popularité
#34,104
Évaluation
½ 3.3
Critiques
14
ISBN
37
Langues
1

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