John B. Lundstrom

It has been a while since I have read this groundbreaking book, so I thought I would enjoy myself once more with the thought of writing this review. I remember buying this book in the Midshipman's Store at the Naval Academy when it came out in 1984, and little did I know how many times I would turn the pages over the years.

I see John Lundstrom as a transitional figure in naval and military historical writing. There is strikingly little about the man out there, possibly because he was not a prolific writer. A long-time member of the curatorial staff of the Milwaukee Public Museum, Lundstrom's first book reflected his interest in the Pacific War. Published in 1977 by the U.S. Naval Institute, "The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy December 1941-June 1942" showed the author's interest in the early campaigns of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and it filled a gap in the scholarship of the Pacific War. It was another seven years before USNI published this volume, but its impact on the naval history community was quickly felt. Since the appearance of "The First Team", Lundstrom has won a number of awards for his writing, and he has served as the inspiration for a new generation of naval historians.

My first edition copy of "The First Team" has 547 pages divided into four parts and a total of 18 chapters. Up front there is a forward by one of Lundstrom's muses for this work, Rear Admiral William Leonard, one of the The First Team Lundstrom will write about. Behind the foreword is a preface, acknowledgement page, a special note that deals with Japanese naval aircraft designations, and a helpful section on abbreviations and special terms. In back, Lundstrom provides no fewer than seven appendices, all of which convey considerable background information. Appendix 1, The Making of Carrier Fighter Pilots; Appendix 2, Fundamentals of Aerial Fixed Gunnery; and Appendices 4 and 5 concerning U.S. and Japanese air combat tactics are most useful in reading the book.

The book is arranged chronologically, covering the early Pacific War from Pearl Harbor to the beginning of July 1942, after the Battle of Midway. Part I (Chapters 1 to 8) covers the war from Pearl Harbor to the Doolittle Raid. Part II (Chapters 9 to 13) runs from the preliminaries for the Battle of the Coral Sea to its aftermath. Part III (Chapters 14 to 18) tells the story of the Battle of Midway and its aftermath. Part IV is the conclusion for the book.

What separates Lundstrom from earlier Pacific War historians is his expert incorporation of primary sources, both American and Japanese. Earlier authors, like John Toland and Walter Lord, depended heavily on Samuel Elliot Morison and interviews for the American side and translations of postwar interrogations of senior Japanese officers for the opposite view. Lundstrom went a bit further by using newly published Japanese scholarly works on the war as well as archival sources for the American story. Lundstrom dove deep into the details of naval air combat, accounting for the actions of individual pilots on both sides in every combat action, including Japanese pilots where such identification is possible. Lundstrom also dives deep into controversies, including brutally honest assessments of the standard U.S. naval fighter of this period, the Grumman F4F-3/3A/4 Wildcat, among which there were significant performance differences, as well as the development of the breakthrough American air combat tactic during this period, the "Thach Weave". Lundstrom also provides something for the aircraft modeler, Appendix 3, which provides descriptions and illustrations of the Wildcats flown by some of the pilots whose actions are described in the text.

"The First Team" is a must-read for any student of air combat in general and of air combat in the Pacific War in particular. It is simply a fabulous read.… (plus d'informations)

Why have I never heard of this book before? Great history of US and Japanese strategies in the South Pacific between Pearl Harbor and Midway battles. Lundstrom does a great job of telling the story from both perspectives. He details how the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy had their battles with both themselves and Combined Fleet to determine how the "Second Phase" of the war would go. On the American side, the competing ambitions of Marshall (US Army), King (US Navy), Arnold (US Air Force), MacArthur, Soviets, and British are also detailed. Lundstrom shows us how if the Japanese had difficulty deciding how to proceed with the war, the US had just as many problems. Just really enjoyed this book by a well-regarded historian on a period of the war that isn't discussed much. My big complaint (of the paperback edition) is that there's 4 small maps stuck in the middle of the book that detail how the Coral Sea battle progressed, but the narrative has already finished the Coral Sea battle by that point. Bigger maps and more often in the text would have helped me understand even more.… (plus d'informations)

From huddled command conferences to cramped cockpits, John Lundstrom guides readers through the maelstrom of air combat at Guadalcanal in this impressively researched sequel to his earlier study. Picking up the story after Midway, the author presents a scrupulously accurate account of what happened, describing in rich detail the actual planes and pilots pitted in the ferocious battles that helped turn the tide of war. Based on correspondence with 150 American and Japanese veterans, or their families, he reveals the thoughts, pressures, and fears of the airmen and their crews as he reconstructs the battles. These are the story of the Wildcat and Zero fighters, and the Dauntless, Avenger, Betty, Kate, and Val bombers. Lavishly illustrated with drawings, maps, and photographs, this fresh look at the campaign set a standard for aviation histories when first published in 1994.… (plus d'informations)

In this study Lundstrom performs a signal service by rehabilitating the reputation of Frank Jack Fletcher and his performance in the classic carrier battles of 1942. Lundstrom finds a pragmatic leader who had to take into account inadequate resources, lousy logistics, unrealistic plans and still be able to foil Japanese offensive strokes. Lundstrom does a good job of showing that many of the supposed failures of nerve attributed to Fletcher can be pinned down to the chronic logistical limitations of the USN until the "Two-Ocean Navy" came on line and the small reality lost on many Americans at the time that the USN was just not as good as it thought it was.

As for why Fletcher has not been remembered better, in part that is due to the man's disinterest in polishing his reputation, but mostly because he was a convenient scapegoat for many parties; these include the USMC, the Brown Shoe Mafia of the USN's aviation community (Lundstrom does a fine job of illustrating the failures of that crowd at Midway) and the general sense that the command complex associated with the Guadalcanal campaign were all culpable of ineptitude at some level. Add Samuel E. Morison's general disdain and you have the explanation of how a man who won three fleet actions can be virtually forgotten, instead of having a reputation rather akin to Gen. George Thomas of Civil War fame.… (plus d'informations)