Melvyn P. Leffler

In The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953, Melvyn P. Leffler traces the history of U.S. policymakers’ fears of communism from the Russian Revolution of 1917 through the Korean War. He shows “that the lessons of the 1930s cast a huge shadow over postwar foreign policies. These lessons were not simply that appeasement did not work nor that exports were the key to prosperity, but that configurations of power abroad were critical to the maintenance of a free political economy at home. American officials had concluded as early as 1940 that they could not live in a world dominated by totalitarian nations, even if those powers refrained from attacking the United States” (pg. viii). Leffler draws extensively upon newly-declassified or available sources from the time in which he wrote, allowing him to draw conclusions about Stalin and his advisers’ actions.

Leffler writes of the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, “Safeguarding his periphery was critical to Stalin. Peace was desirable in the short run, because his country had been devastated; but war was likely in the long run, so the Soviet Union needed to be prepared for every eventuality” (pg. 39). On the American side, “If victory over the Axis was to usher in a period of peace and stability, Roosevelt believed, Soviet-American amity would need to be a component of that postwar order” (pg. 45) Domestically, “religious ultraconservatives often joined with right-wing extremists and racial segregationists. They equated the struggle against Communism with the eternal battle between Satan and Christ and with the quest to preserve a white-dominated regime in the South” (pg. 60). To this end, “Gradually, between 1947 and 1950, the United States took on the role of hegemon in the international system and in so doing accepted responsibility for revitalizing the international economy, thwarting the spread of Communism, and guaranteeing the security of its partners” (pg. 65). Leffler continues, “A Cold War consensus formed. Truman was willing to fight domestic subversives, as the Republicans demanded, in return for their support of his foreign policy” (pg. 78).

Leffler concludes, “Politicians like Richard M. Nixon initially found anti-Communism an irresistible tool to clobber political foes, win votes, discredit the New Deal, and attack the executive branch. Over time, anti-Communism took on a life of its own. Many Americans found that it helped them make sense of a complex world, a world they knew little about. Its appeal stemmed from the fact that it resonated with their fears or served their interests” (pg. 119). Further, “As the United States became more involved in waging the Cold War and fighting the Korean War, statism, repression, and executive authority appeared to be on the rise rather than free markets and free discourse” (pg. 127).

The Specter of Communism is a useful primer on the early Cold War for both academics and non-academics alike.… (plus d'informations)

At the time this book came out, it could have been one of the most important books written on foreign policy. The book included some of the biggest names in foreign policy, and the policy advice contained in this volume spanned the theoretical and political spectrum. The book is still interesting and relevant today and its insights should surely be evaluated based on what has happened inbetween 2008 and today.

More importantly, volumes like this should be published regularly: soon we should have another volume with similar names entitled "To Lead the World: American Strategy after Obama."

Leffler and Legro organize this book partially as a review of American grand strategy and the Bush Doctrine, but also as a way of learning from this strategy and moving toward a renewal of American power. As the two authors note, Bush’s emphasis on preventive and pre-emptive intervention has largely been discredited (although Kagan gives a staunch historical defense of why the US has not seen the last of pre-emption or unilateralism). Though the authors note how moral issues such as fighting disease, poverty, and tyranny were part of the rhetorical aspect of this strategy, Van Evera’s chapter demonstrates how Bush’s divisive unilateralism has set this agenda back.

According to Van Evera the threats to the global commons—nuclear proliferation, climate change, pandemic disease, and terrorism—can only be fought through deep cooperation facilitated by a “concert” of powers. Leffler and Legro at the end of their introduction, by invoking the example of Wilson, frame their exercise as a balancing of idealism with realpolitik that is able to bring the necessary modes of power to bear on world order.

Van Evera’s argument for a concert of great states ready to fight threats to the global commons rests on a fundamental debunking of the China threat. The US should not pour resources into a future competition with China because 1) China’s rise is still decades away 2) this rise—because of nuclear weapons and the nature of post-industrial economies—will likely not resemble the threat of imperial expansion as it did in the 1930s and earlier and 3) the rising power of nationalism suggests that any Chinese attempt to take over its neighbors will lead it into a Vietnam-like morass. On top of this, I would add that China’s rising economic power will lead to demands from its citizens for greater accountability and living standards (if not full-scale democracy).

At least one of Van Evera's premises failed to hold true. China's rise was accelerated by the global recession, and Chinese actions in the South China seem to suggest that the world still works on power politic rules. Thus, even if great power interest converge on a number of key subjects, cooperation on these issues remains hampered by great power competition.

Kagan’s article represents a counterpoint to Van Evera and many of the other articles in this volume that argue for a return to multilateralism, argue against focusing on deterring peer competition, and argue for a return to building US soft power. Kagan argues that regime change, preemptive military action, and unilateral action are impossible to revoke a priori, and forms an impressive list of examples where disparate presidents have resorted to these strategies. Kagan also argues that the US’s main responsibility is staving off peer competition; this is not only a pragmatic stance but also a moral one because the US “stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world” (p. 41). The next big clash Kagan believes will be that between liberal democracies on the one hand and autocracies on the other.

At the time, this essay seemed like one of the weaker essays. However, much of Kaplan's arguments have been validated by recent events. It seems that a retreat of US military power has been met by challenges by new threats ranging from Islamofacism to Putanism (with Chinese nationalism threatening from the margins). This essay serves as an important reminder that even in a new century, realipolitik (and other forms of realist theory) are still essential.

Maier on the other hand locates a growing threat both internationally and domestically to US legitimacy located in large numbers of people abroad who are denied the benefits of market capitalism and globalization. This he links with the stagnating middle classes and poor in the US. Though Maier suggests that states are not sufficient tools for dealing with the large amounts of misery and discontent seen around the world, the state apparatus nonetheless is the only tool there is to deal with it. Thus, the US should raise its development assistance and give up its focus on a Washington consensus that asks countries to devalue safety nets and social programs. This is the hardest essay to respond to and evaluate. While Maier's assessment is poignant, he fails to find a key narrative that would capture the solution to this problem. In many ways, this is the same problem with the US political system -- where free-floating anger over economic inequality gets harnessed into everything from cultural conservatism, to nationalism, to militarism.

Ikenberry’s article, following from his usual structural liberal model, argues that the US should reinvest in the liberal world order, reinvigorate existing institutions and create new ones when necessary to help incorporate rising states and deal with problems to the global commons. The theoretical base for his argument is what he calls “neo-Rawlsian”: i.e. create the kind of order you would want if you had no way of predicting what kind of power you would have in the future; in this way, Ikenberry’s suggestion hedges against a fall in US power in the future.

Kurth’s article draws a grand strategy which he calls the “boss of bosses.” The central ideas of his work is that the greatest threat to the US will be from nuclear terrorism, that something like a concert strategy that Van Evera suggests can be created with China, India, and Russia as the other great powers, and that, despite Kagan’s warnings, this strategy can be effective because all of these countries can at least agree to concentrate on fighting terrorism. In defining his different forms of government-- autocracy, illiberal democracy, and liberal undemocracy--Kurth argues that what the US wants to avoid the most is a lack of order: “failed states, turbulent frontiers, and anarchy.” Thus, the US should support strong autocratic states if it involves creating some semblance of order that can be managed from afar.

I found this essay one of the most thought-provoking because it challenges a key diplomatic agenda of the US: democracy promotion. The spread of democracy -- especially in societies with weak foundations for such a change, will likely cause more disorder. The US is probably too emotionally invested in democracy promotion to ever take the question seriously, and yet it might be one of the most essential questions of the 21 century: Should the US abandon its democracy program for a stability program? (Or at the very least a more sophisticated democracy promotion program -- in other words, only promote democracy in places that meet certain rigorous conditions).

Another interesting aspect of Kurth's essay is that it asks the US military to focus exclusively on conventional strategy and to shy away from its savage wars of peace—this works with his idea that the US should manage regional orders as best it can from afar. Though there is a lot in this article that needs commenting on, suffice it to say, much of what Kurth argues goes against the fundamental moral grain of US foreign policy: democracy promotion, the extension of US rule through liberalism, and the US’s history (however tenuously it is remembered) as a revolutionary power. Much of this article, like others, however, depends on a threat assessment of the likelihood of nuclear terrorism.

The conclusion by Leffler and Legro brings up several important points that were either missed by the other authors or were only briefly discussed. One, is the need to sub-optimize in preparing for threats; in other words, the US needs to focus not on a few highly probable conflicts, but instead prepare for a large number of potential threats--some of which, however unlikely,must be prepared for because of their catastrophic consequences. The authors thus cite the 9/11 report and its admonishment of failures of imagination. Another issue is the consequences of large trade imbalances, government deficits, and rising Medicare and social benefit costs for baby boomers on military spending. This has been and will continue to be one of the defining issues of the next decade.

Overall, a fantastic book, a useful book, and an exercise in imaginative foreign policy writing that should be repeated regularly.… (plus d'informations)

Stephen Van Evera, Professor of Political Science at MIT, would have us believe that the U.S. is in a similar situation as in the Concert of Europe, c. 1815. After the era of Napoleon and the French Revolution, the Concert was adopted by the old great powers of Europe of meeting from time to time in an International Conference, or Congress, in order to plan a solution by mutual agreement (hence "concert"). Austrian Chancellor Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich was the primary architect of the Concert and its most famous participant. The Concert of Europe became a de facto government of the world. The British balance of power was in abeyance and there followed an era of stability where Europe engaged in no major conflict for 43 years which is no mean accomplishment.

But the historical analogy does not fit. The Congress' first primary objectives were to:

contain France after decades of war;

achieve a balance of power between Europe's great powers;

uphold the territorial arrangements made at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815 and in doing so prevent the rise of another Napoleon-esque figure which would result in another continent wide war.

None of the objectives fit the requirements of effective U.S. foreign policy. There is no nation-state, such as France that needs containing; there is nothing advantageous for U.S. interests to simply maintain parity with other leading nations; and, no territory will contain a Napoleon-like figure to any one territory.

A Napoleon or any monster like him today is much more lethal today given the phenomenon of Islamofascism. Second, the U.S. has prospered during a period of American hegemony which is only more difficult today given the difficulties of the U.S. economy, ongoing international threats, and Islamofascism. Boundaries are not barriers today when you consider the role of the media in the information war and the porous nature of territories as in the case of places like Pakistan.

Van Evera equates the danger of a WMD and Napoleon as a threat-from-below. But as many nations are already engaged in actively defending themselves especially since the threats have often moved beyond threats to actual bombings and killings. Yet, the existing bulwarks such as NATO have proved less than successful in thwarting attacks. Van Evera seems to simply state the obvious. Nations need to cooperate. We already know that. The trick is to get them to move in harmony since they are not.

It is unilateral U.S. action that Van Evera reserves for especial disdain. But what is the alternative? America was under attack following 9/11 and if anything the U.S. dragged its feet, or failed to heed the warnings from Bin Laden experts such as Michael Scheuer during the Clinton administration. In large part the Bush Doctrine arouse from being attacked directly and during war no nation can wait for an international Concert before acting.

Van Evera's idealistic faith in diplomacy is laughable. Here is one such precious gem: "the United States should speak in respectful tones to other governments" (p. 19, Leffler). Maybe if the U.S. said "pretty please" to Hugo Chavez he wouldn't be such a bad guy after all. There are significant portions of the world, the lands where our enemies live, that openly applauded the attacks on 9/11. We can't wait for friends or enemies to take decisive action when our national security is on the line.

Van Evera simply recommends diplomacy to stop WMD. Every sane nation desires this but he never explains how the failed diplomacies of the past will now work. He just knows that Bush didn't excercise enough of it. Even our staunchest allies fail to deliver. For example, in July of this year, Japan backed out of an earlier commitment to dispatch its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to Afghanistan now that the security situation has declined. The self-limitation of allies does not hinder AQAM (al-Qaeda and Allied Movements).

Another unexplained notion is that we have to have ideas to combat al Qaeda. This will convince them? Hardly. No war of ideas will convince AQ that we are right.

As things may get worse Van Evera has the "selective engagement" of Robert Art. This is all well and good but there is no way to distinguish Art from Bush since George would consider himself as targeting the right people and he has selectively chosen to attack the worse threats.

Nations selectively attack their biggest foes. Van Evera approves of Bismarck between 1871-1890 because he "bolstered peace" (p. 24). What Van Evera does not mention is that Bismarck had defeated each of his enemies-–Denmark, Austria, and France-–in isolation. The only way a Bismarckian analogy can be drawn is after the Coalition defeats al Qaeda and its affiliates. In addition, Bismarck as "dove" is questionable at best since he goaded his opponents into war, edited the infamous Zimmerman Telegram, and generally created as much conflict and bloodshed as he desired until it served his purposes to create a peace, a peace that enhanced his power. After 1871 Bismarck was committed to preserving the peace of Europe only because he had already provoked and/or defeated his threats, selectively.

Since the U.S. suffered only 1.7% of war deaths in World War I, and only 3.6% of the deaths in World War II, this is evidence for Van Evera that the U.S. paid a relatively small price while forging great alliances that can work again. The only thing it seems to prove is that the U.S. assisted others in their life and death struggle that if successful, our common enemies would have come for us, and, of course Japan had hit the U.S. mainland.

Van Evera gets the historial parallels wrong so it is not surprising that his arguments for the present conflicts do not fit.

Robert Kagan, Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is more helpful. Kagan challenges the common misconception that Bush represents a radical change from past American foreign policy. Truman, Kennedy, and Clinton, Democrats all, along with Bush, have maintained a consistent American policy since the end of World War II: a "preponderance of power," rather than a balance of power (Cf. Leffler, Melvyn P., National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War, Stanford University Press, 1992).

For example, "regime change" characterized all presidential administrations of the past half-century, Kennedy in Cuba, and Clinton in Bosnia and Haiti. The Clinton administration bombed Iraq over the objection of UN Security Council permanent members, and went to war in Kosovo without UN authorization.

What has changed is the world. The world is a less secure place with the ongoing crisis that transnational rogue elements will deploy WMD; in addition, the fragility of the world's financial situation should be clear in the light of Wall Street's meltdown in the Fall of 20008. Previously, the world acquiesced with an American predominance as a security measure. That world is gone. The American Left will revel in an American fall from grace, and the unrealistic solution is only to offer a multi-polar Concert of the World (p. 49). The world no longer shares what the Concert of Europe could assume, a "common morality and shared principles of government" (p. 49). Kagan suggests a League of Democracies (p.50), to advance American interests in concert with similar nations, since deep-seated divisions already exist between international multi-polar powers. This League could exert and extend our influence to advance our security. A similar proposal was made during the McCain 2008 presidential campaign.

In regards to Bush and Iraq, Charles Maier, Leverett Saltonstall Professor of History at Harvard University, claims that the President's policies have been "calamitous," (p. 60), "reckless," (p. 62), a series of "adventures" (p. 63), and "testosterone-fueled" (p. 78); thus, with that polemic, Maier can hardly be taken seriously. Unless he is willing to engage the issues his analysis is bound to be flawed.

Maier wants to establish that interactions between countries actually occur below the level of official diplomacy, at that level of motivation and the basest instinct of human beings, religion. Yet, he returns to official state representatives, not the below actors considered important earlier, and finds, of all things, moderate Islam (p. 69)? If his intention is to find and discover religion, below the surface, you would think this would be an easy search to conduct. Any number of radical, jihadist examples proliferate in the world but moderate Islamic world spokespersons are much harder to find. Not one moderate Islamic spokesperson has emerged from the Middle East; the discovery of a Martin Luther King, Jr., or a Mother Theresa from the Middle East is not forthcoming. We are left with the world we are actually in and not the world Maier describes.

Maier is all over the place in his search for authentic cultural
expression from below. He even includes "street theater" (p. 72). His argument is not simple as he suggests (p. 61), but simplistic. He approvingly quotes Fareed Zakaria, the celebrator of America's decline (The Future of Freedom, The Post-American World), who naively describes Weimar as a "model democracy" (p. 76), by ignoring its obvious limitations.

The Weimar republic faced severe problems from the start. Politically, it was weak because Germany had many small parties. The chancellor had to form coalitions that easily fell apart.

The government, led by moderate democratic socialists, came under constant fire from both the left and right. communists demanded radical changes like those Lenin had brought to Russia. Conservatives—including the old Junker nobility, military officers, and wealthy bourgeoisie—attacked the government as too liberal and weak. They longed for another strong leader like Bismarck. Germans of all classes blamed the Weimar Republic for the hated Versailles treaty. Bitter, they looked for scapegoats. Many blamed German Jews for economic and political problems.

Weimar was not a model democracy, it was a flawed republic from its creation in 1919.

But Maier is not quite done with analyzing religion. He remarks: "we must work to attenuate the passions of religion" (p. 80). How, he does not say since he is correct in viewing religion as a phenomenon from below and he
should appreciate that the winds of religion blow where they will.

However, it is true that Turkey may be an example of one Islamic country that largely maintains a secular government as opposed to Islamist religionists holding sway. Yet, Maier makes the staggering proposition that "ultimately Iran" will have a "constituency of middle-class electors concerned with property and humane values" (p. 80).

That Iran will peaceably evolve into a European-like Christian Democracy is preposterous. Iranian development is not simply rhetoric but the reality of Iran is alarming. Iran is a country that willingly sacrificed one million of its own citizens in its disastrous war against Iraq from 1980-1988. What European Christian Democracy would do this today? In Europe the Peace of Westphalia settled the question of state violence in advancing the cause of religion. There is no Westphalian equivalent or settlement in the Middle East.

Maier does not seriously consider Bush's doctrine and he alarmingly distorts and misunderstands the phenomenon of religion, particularly Islamism.

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Public and International Affairs in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, can find no singular, specific, current threat to America (p. 85); this is in fact the conclusion of the Princeton Report that Ikenberry published with Anne-Marie Slaughter. What the authors suggest is that the U.S. will confront diffused, critical, and simultaneous threats. The convergence of these threats is what concerns thinkers such as Ikenberry and Thomas Homer-Dixon (p. 90). Ikenberry states: "Taken together, liberal order building involves investing in the enhancement of global social capital so as to creat capacities to solve problems that, left unattended, will threat national security (p. 91).

Ikenberry contrasts this agenda with the failed Bush administration in which he cites himself as an authority in an unpublished paper (p. 98: p. 107 n. 12). Ikenberry mistakes effect for cause for example by claiming that Bush's actions cause the erosion of liberal hegemonic power. At one time, in the post-War period, American power was accepted because there was something worse in the offing. Now, however, Ikenberry views Bush's introduction of unipolarity in world affairs as the "something worse" (p. 99) as international threats dissipate. It is unfortunate that Ikenberry does not view Islamism as an international something worse. At the very least the rising powers of India and China need to be integrated into the fold of liberal nations. It would difficult to imagine taming these forces without a counter-balance formed by a League of Democracies as proposed by defeated Republican nominee John McCain in 2008.

Niall Ferguson contributes a chapter "The Problem of Conjecture."… (plus d'informations)