Don Higginbotham (1931–2008)

Summary Paragraph:

In the book, George Washington and the Military Tradition, the author investigates George Washington’s military career and how he played a big role in the United States' victory for independence. The author describes the interplay of the militiaman, professional soldier, and legislator, that shaped George Washington. The author then lists Washington’s legacy of successes, revealing the critical combining of civil and military concerns of the Revolution has been frequently regarded and only rarely repeated by later generations of American soldiers. It starts with Washington's training in the 1750s, it included a frontier command in the Virginia militia. Through his training he showed appreciation of tactics and professional discipline, he also showed sensitivity towards political conflict. Later in 1755, Washington accepted command of the Continental Army. He possessed enough experience by 1783 to enable him to move the Declaration of Independence into victory over the British.

Opinion Paragraph:

The book, George Washington and the American Military Tradition is historically accurate on how George Washington tipped the scales in favor of the colonies to win their fight for independence. It describes how he developed into a legislator and how he gained the trust of Congress through his political views. Ultimately, this is a great book and I would recommend it for people who have a passion for history and are fascinated with George Washington.… (plus d'informations)

Don Higginbotham expertly combines both primary and secondary sources providing the reader a composite historical narrative of the American Revolution as “seen through American ideas.” Higginbotham was Dowd Professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill until his death in June 2008. Higginbotham contributed several articles on comparative revolution and many other books and articles about the American Revolution.

The book’s subtitle is Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice 1763 – 1789. However, Higginbotham devotes substantial attention to other themes providing the reader with a synthesized version of the political and military aspects of the war. He also addresses the cultural and social aspects of the war. In doing so, he illustrates how the war affected the development of an American identity and how whig philosophy translated into everyday reality for the common man. Finally, he uses the book to compare the Vietnam conflict to the American Revolution.

The author never directly discusses the development of an American identity, but one can see that thread as he discusses the militia system and its reinforcement of the provincialism and localism during the period (7). Higginbotham continues this theme, contending that a group of “American political leaders” emerged within the Continental Congress who were nationalists and desired to go beyond the simple provincial assemblies (81). Higginbotham maintains this concept, proposing that Manifest Destiny may have been an issue as early as 1776 in the colonial discussions concerning the invasion of Canada (108). The concept of an American identity came to fruition in 1776 when opinion concerning independence grew increasingly favorable (117). One could argue, however, that most Americans possessed little concept of an identity even after the Declaration was signed. Nevertheless, in 1781 the Pennsylvania line must had some concept of an American identity. After revolting due to lack of pay and other necessary items, one soldier remarked that, “Clinton might ‘bribe such a mean toadeater as Arnold,’ but ‘it is not in his power to bribe an American soldier’” (404). Without an innate knowledge of what an American soldier was, it seems unlikely that such a remark would have been made.

Higginbotham clearly demonstrates how colonial Americans internalized whig beliefs and turned them into action not only resisting British authority, but also resisting its own Continental Army. This created somewhat of a quandary for colonial authorities throughout the war, for in resisting the militarism of George III (118), they needed to establish a military that became what they were fighting against. Higginbotham describes Congress’ first attempt at this in a “restrained military code” that would reflect the society from which it originated. Their efforts initially caused the Army to be ineffectual and subsequently forced them to “put more teeth in the article of war.” Congress believed that “so long as American soldiers were little more than a reflection of American society,” they would pose “no threat to free institutions” (93).

Higginbotham describes a few examples that illustrates how Americans distrusted the army. While at Valley Forge Pennsylvania officers made a direct appeal to state civil authorities for clothing. “The politicians accused the officers of desiring to deck themselves out in beaver hats, gold lace, and other unbecoming finery.” In another instance in 1776, an officer offended Congress and authorities ordered him to apologize personally. Finally, Sam Adams argued “that an officer who would drink a toast to the army before first downing a tumbler in honor of Congress exposed himself to suspicion of favoring a military dictatorship” (206-7). Interestingly, the tradition of toasting the nation, president and congress before toasting the U.S. Army continues at Army formal functions.

Finally, Higginbotham makes the book relevant to his time by addressing comparative revolutions. As early as his introduction he argues that modern revolutionaries “ignored the American War of Independence and called for guerrilla activities along Marxist-Leninist concepts of revolutionary conflict” (x). Later, he compares other revolutions to the American Revolution and claims that “all dynamic revolutions are exported at the first opportunity” (106). Higginbotham goes to some length to assert that “the experience of America” is “counter to that of many of the twentieth century’s emerging nations” (204). He asserts that the end of the Revolution also saw the end of the army which run “counter to trends found elsewhere in the past and present” (438). This whig belief, fear of standing armies, culminated in the disappearance of the army upon war’s end. But it not only put actions to words for America, it set them apart from other revolutions.

Higginbotham makes extensive use of both primary and secondary sources to support his contentions. He engages other scholars on various points of disagreement and justifies his evaluation. Particularly, he places the military and political events within the context of the social and cultural framework of the era. But at the same time, he makes it relevant to his own time by comparing it with other revolutions. Through doing all this, Higginbotham accomplishes what few authors can do and that is to make a book both informative and entertaining.… (plus d'informations)