Michael P. Fronda

"Rome’s victory in the Second Punic War paved the way for its conquest of the Mediterranean. Yet that victory is bound up with Hannibal's failure in Italy, even though he brought Rome to its knees in the early stages of the war. Previous explanations for the failure of Hannibal's strategy have tended to stress either the hopelessness of this strategy, because of the loyalty of Rome's Italian allies and their willingness to be integrated into the Roman system, or the success of Rome's counter-strategy of attrition, aimed at limiting allied revolts while wearing down Hannibal's forces. Previous scholarship, however, neglects an important dimension of the question of the failure of Hannibal’s strategy; that is, Hannibal’s failure as a diplomat to win over large numbers of Rome’s Italian allies and thus overcome Rome’s long-term strategic advantages.

This dissertation looks at the Second Punic War from the perspective of the Italian states in order to explain why Hannibal did not gain more Italian allies. The dissertation is divided into four regional case studies and brings to bear literary, archaeological, numismatic, epigraphic, and topographic evidence. Thus, local political, diplomatic, and economic conditions that shaped the decision faced by Rome’s Italian allies to revolt or to remain loyal to Rome are brought into focus. Aristocrats in various Italian states were motivated more by local and immediate impulses rather than by an ideological attachment to Hannibal or Rome. Therefore, Hannibal was forced to practice ad hoc diplomacy – at times threatening Italian cities, at times promising freedom, territory, or power – to gain allies. In particular, when Hannibal won over a number of powerful Italian cities, such as Capua or Arpi, he did so in part by promising to extend those cities’ local hegemonic interests. However, this tended to drive cities that were traditional rivals to his new allies more firmly into the Roman camp. In effect, Hannibal’s success in winning over some cities in a given region actually precluded his chances to win over other cities in the same region. Overall, therefore, local conditions contributed greatly to Hannibal’s strategic failure in Italy."

---Michael P. Fronda, dissertation introduction… (plus d'informations)