Tom Curran

A simple framework to understand the Mass, which we need. There were phrases which deepened my own understanding and it was worth reading for these phrases alone. I sense that the Roman Catholic Church to which I belong, the tradition which grounds me, is tilting in the moment towards a more vertical understanding of relationship with God, a smaller, less catholic and universal understanding which places more emphasis on a priestly culture. This particular angle is the perspective here, but it’s only an angle. It does not invalidate the framework. It really is a useful, thoughtful little book; I just wish there was more of the profound sense that we are the Body of Christ, and this includes, especially includes, those who are hungry, dirty, poor, marginal, illegal, lonely, sick and stupid. Instead, the sense of "community" seems to be limited to those who are in the church building.

One other note: p.118 The second epiclesis is when we receive communion? Maybe not. I think it happens on the altar. Communion is a result of this. Which is why I was refused communion when I was doing RCIA. An exception is made for the ill, but not the able-bodied.

I like his take on the silence in Eucharistic Adoration.
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This is a fascinating book. Although its an adaptation of a doctoral thesis it reads well (you might need to be a bit of an historical geek to wade through some parts such as the historiographical chapter). The author Tom Curran is now sadly deceased.
The book brings together a lot of research and casts greater light on the all important events leading up to that much written about campaign at Gallipoli in World War 1. I believe it needs to be read critically however. Barbara Tuchman quoted a reviewer in the Times Literary Supplement who stated that “the historian who puts his system first can hardly escape the heresy of preferring the facts which suit his system best.” Tom Curran consistently selects evidence which all points to Churchill being guilty of interference, dishonesty and completely responsible for the failed naval attack at the Dardanelles. Curran claims "That [the naval attack] was undertaken was due entirely to Winston Churchill, who deceived all the main protagonists involved in order to have his naval venture sanctioned." He goes further, even blaming Churchill and British Prime Minister Asquith for the ensuing military invasion.
The source of his claims is an extensive study of primary sources. He claims that "for some inexplicable reason, this evidence has never been subjected to an exhaustive examination by Britain’s scholars". This claim is excessive - for example virtually all of the sources mentioned are utilised in Sir Martin Gilbert's Churchill biography of 1971 dealing with the 1914-1916 period. That book is a masterpiece of scholarship and manages to present a more balanced view of both the criticisms of Churchill as well as evidence in his favour.
One of the central problems is the fact that First Sea Lord Fisher's claims in letters and subsequent evidence to the Dardanelles Commission seem to be taken uncritically as gospel evidence from a professional naval man. Gallant Fisher's extensive professional knowledge, Curran claims, was wilfully and dishonestly ignored and suppressed by Churchill.
This argument is problematic. Fisher in fact swung erratically between support for differing schemes involving invasions in northern Europe. When a solely naval attempt to 'force' the Dardanelles was first postulated on the 3rd of January. He approved telegrams to Carden, the Admiral 'on the spot' in the eastern Mediterranean developing a plan, and on the 12th
suggested adding the battleship Queen Elizabeth to the plan. Although later in January he expressed reservations to Admiral Jellicoe and indirectly to the Prime Minister through the War Council Secretary Hankey (Prime Minister Asquith did nothing) his first open opposition to Winston Churchill as First Lord over the plan didn't come until the 25th of January. Its very difficult to argue that Churchill was wilfully ignoring his advice.
Additionally to claim that Churchill was able to deliberately over-rule his advisers doesn't bear a broader examination. Any number of other schemes such as invasions of Borkum, Holland or Zeebrugge had been opposed successfully by his subordinates. Certainly through most of January other advisers at the Admiralty such as Jackson, Oliver and Richmond had influenced the plan but not said outright that it was impossible.
The supposed January 5th War Council meeting where Carden was authorised to proceed with planning an attack is portrayed as a "pure fabrication" by Curran. He makes this out to be a central part of Churchill's retrospective vindication of himself through manipulating the historic record. The basis of this claim is that the Secretary's notes of meetings don't include this meeting. Curran would perhaps have been wise to remember the maxim that "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence". Minutes were taken by Hankey who possibly wasn't there if the meeting did occur. It may have actually been the meeting on the 8th that discussed this. In reality all that is claimed is that the Council was generally enthusiastic, and that this along with the support of Admirals Oliver and Jackson prompted Churchill to reply to Carden that "Your view is agreed with by high authorities here. Please telegraph in detail what you think could be done by extended operations..".
Curran relies extensively on the evidence given at the Dardanelles Commission the following year by Admiralty figures. The question that has to be considered with this evidence though is can the statements be backed up with evidence from the time. Admirals giving evidence following the costly failure of a campaign are hardly likely to say they supported it. Chief Planning Officer Sir Henry Jackson is asked if he thought a purely naval attack was feasible. Curran quotes his reply; "No, I never did; I wrote that quote plainly". In fact although Jackson opposed 'rushing' the Straits he recommended reducing the forts one by one. Although he was certainly hesitant, after Carden's plan arrived he concurred 'generally' although warning that much ammunition would be required, and suggesting that only attacking the forts at the entrance be approved. He did not condemn it as infeasible. It was only on the 13th of February that he clearly stated that troops were required.
Curran also doesn't really show enough caution with Fisher. His opinions varied from opposition to excitement at the early stages back to opposition. The time of his resignation seems to have shown erratic and bizarre behaviour.
This is an important, well written book with some interesting and varied evidence. Churchill certainly was interfering. However Kitchener was certainly behind the scheme and wavered in his commitment of troops. The War Cabinet was dysfunctional in effective decision making, largely due to deficiencies in Asquith's leadership. Churchill did show a willingness to make decisions, take risks and think imaginatively. His actions in mobilising the fleet at the beginning of the war fit the bill. He did push on for too long with the naval only option and made it difficult to extricate from the campaign by publicising the attack in The Times. Its important to remember though that all prior evidence pointed to the Ottoman Empire being a weak power, and publicising intentions or the mere presence of battleships off Constantinople were believed to be enough to cause capitulation. This book certainly makes a valuable contribution to the debate.


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