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9 oeuvres 332 utilisateurs 5 critiques

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Œuvres de Kent Masterson Brown

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Date de naissance
1949-02-05
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male

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Brown knows his stuff, especially logistics. His Meade-centric fog of war approach is very effective: in the book Meade is properly judged only on what information he had available at the moment. Good insight into Meade's desire and preparation to fight at Pipe Creek rather than Gettysburg until Reynolds blundered into a general engagement against Meade's orders. Gettysburg needed this deep look into the logistics of the campaign; I had no idea that with limited supply routes to Gettysburg, the Union army (and horses and mules) basically starved for four days before and during the battle.

I do quibble some with Brown cutting Meade way too much slack in the pursuit. Almost impossible to pursue through mountain passes such as South Mountain? Even McCLELLAN did that, and forced those same passes, and against a Confederate Army that had not been devastated by three days of combat. And for every instance cited of the logistical difficulties Meade was facing, multiply that by three or four for Lee. And as late as July 7, Meade was afraid that Lee might sneak around him and go BACK to Gettysburg! The excuse that Meade was still under primary orders to protect Washington and Baltimore reeks of rationalization. I agree that Meade should not have attacked the defenses at Williamsport, but that begs the question: why did Meade give Lee the time to build such extensive fortifications in the first place?

I have Brown's earlier entire book on the retreat, have not read it yet but will, maybe he does a better job fleshing out the rationale for Meade not doing more. I think even the July 1863 version of Grant would have destroyed Lee before he ever made it back to the Potomac.
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Signalé
MarkHarden | 1 autre critique | Jun 23, 2022 |
Excellent discussion of many aspects of logistics for Union Army
 
Signalé
grgay74 | 1 autre critique | May 1, 2022 |
Finally out in paperback, Retreat from Gettysburg is a gem with some stark flaws. The first but minor flaw is the, in my view, faulty thesis of the book which Brown states in the final sentence of his book: "Although a costly tactical defeat of the Army of Northern Virginia, Gettysburg cannot be viewed as the turning point of the Civil War or even as a turning point of the eastern theater of war after Lee's remarkable retreat." I concur with Brown that Lee and his subordinates, Imboden and Harman chiefly among them, handled the retreat admirably, assisted by the indecisive and risk-adverse Meade. Too little, too late was the standard Federal response to a slam-dunk situation. But Gettysburg/Vicksburg was the military beginning of the end. Financially, the Confederacy had already lost the war in 1862. Internationally, the Emancipation Proclamation closed all doors to diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy at the start of 1863. As Brown ably tells, 1863 also marked the rampant Confederate decline in logistics and supply capability. I'd argue for Chancellorsville as Lee's high-water mark, The Confederacy could not absorb the losses he incurred there and at Gettysburg. In order to sustain his thesis of Gettysburg not being a turning point, the author continuously stresses Confederate successes and downplays as well as excuses Federal mistakes.

The major flaw of the book is the author's Southern partiality which surpasses that of most other authors. I even wonder that the University of North Carolina Press didn't ask to excise some of the author's formulations. The author's apologetic remarks about slavery and his constant mention and praise for submissive happy slaves caring for their master, combined with a silence about not so submissive ones, gives the book a rancid flavor. For example on page 31: "Although there is only scant evidence of civilians being physically harmed, the seizures of free African Americans undoubtedly occasioned much grief and heartache amongst those who lost loved ones or who were separated from their families. The unfortunate captives became, in effect, runaway slaves returned to Confederate control." Note first the subtle distinctions between "civilians" and "free African Americans" who languish in some property limbo. The emotions chosen ("much grief and heartache") underplays the horror of enslavement. We are not talking about a broken heart but being put at the mercy of slave drivers (The enslavement of free men in another state would have been illegal according to the states right doctrine at that time.). The main point is that these lines would have been written differently if the author was named Kwame Brown instead of Kent Brown.

The author's Know Nothingism expresses itself further by his negative views about foreigners whose disloyalty to the Cause supposedly led to their higher desertion rates (Although the single digit numbers mentioned by the author would never pass a statistical test.). Again, this general dismissiveness of foreigners is complemented by praise for some individual "good" ones. I didn't expect such formulations in a book authored in the 21st century and I haven't seen this aspect mentioned elsewhere among the many praises of this book. Thus, I was quite shocked and disappointed to see an otherwise splendid book tainted.

Brown masterfully shows the importance of logistics and the tremendous amount of planning and improvisation necessary to move these huge armies over the underdeveloped, rural areas. Moving 70,000 men and thousands of wagons on essentially two roads in only a few days is an exemplary achievement. Lee brought his artillery, his wagons, his wounded, his captives and his plundered forage back to Virginia, a task few defeated armies in enemy territory managed to accomplish. Brown is also good in narrating the suffering the Confederate casualties had to endure.

Overall, an excellent operational study of Lee's retreat and logistics marred by the world view of the author. Do read Wittenberg's One Continuous Fight which describes the Federal movements and actions in greater detail.
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jcbrunner | 2 autres critiques | Aug 23, 2011 |
One of the great what-if's of the American Civil War is the inability the Army of the Potomac to follow up its victory over the Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg. This book explains in great detail why this outcome came to be; a result of favorable ground and weather, the logistical failings the Union army suffered in the immediate aftermath of the battle, and the raw will to survive of Lee's men. This is not to mention George Meade's unwillingness to take a stupid chance, as the window of opportunity was very narrow to do additional damage to Lee, and Meade was not the man to risk throwing a corps of his army away on a blind hope.

Still, the chance Meade really lost was perhaps not to do more direct damage to Lee's field force, but to its logistical apparatus. That Lee was able to take tens of thousands of food and draft animals, tons of fodder and flour, and an unknown quantity of military sundries out of Pennsylvania and Maryland and into Virginia probably made the great raid a qualified success in the author's opinion. Had one Union corps been in the right place at the right time, that success would have been wiped away, and even the loss of that corps might have been a fine trade, if it instigated the logistical ruin of Lee's forces in 1863.

Apart from that Brown does a fine job of capturing the misery suffered by the wounded during that retreat (hard reading there), while keeping a good sense of how contingent the whole achievement was in the narrative.
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Shrike58 | 2 autres critiques | Jan 20, 2010 |

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Œuvres
9
Membres
332
Popularité
#71,553
Évaluation
4.1
Critiques
5
ISBN
17

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