Lewis Hyde Brereton (1890–1967)

A superb blend of broad strategic reporting (role of air forces in various theaters) with individual combat engagements (enhancing the operations reports from specific aircraft or missions). Brereton was right in thinking his diary entries would be useful and interesting after the war, I have to assume his book has relevance for military tactitions, as well.

One mention of 26th Cav, merely noting its station on Philippines, but Brereton was in command of Air Force so left 24 Dec to continue from Australia after the fall of operations on the Philippines. Some evidence that offensive attacks on the part of air forces based on Philippines were not permitted even after Pearl Harbor as Philippine Commonwealth was not formally a part of the U.S., and from a political perspective the assault on U.S. bases were not to be considered a direct attack on the Philippines. Orders were to wait for Japanese Imperial forces to initiate hostilities (at which time, it was too late for the Philippines based air forces to mount an effective response). More broadly, despite WWI and Battle of Britain making clear the utility of air fighting (Brereton quotes WWI German strategist Fuchs?), these lessons were not taken to heart soon enough. A true Pacific U.S. Air Force was in fact built during WWII for the specific contingencies arising from hostilities, leaving Brereton and the U.S. in a position of reacting to events, rather than a position based on an established air arm with the purpose of preventing or mitigating undesirable events.

//

Read first three sections to supplement my reading of Inside the Bataan Death March and enlarge on the context of the 26th Cavalry / Filipino Scouts in the Philippines campaign. Brereton notes that all Allies but the US had given up on the Philippines after the 12/8/41 attacks; despite his intention to continue supply and support MacArthur, I recall from his narrative only naval supply efforts, many of which were unsuccessful (sunk by Japanese Imperial Forces). The broad conclusion: there simply was insufficient resources and planning for an effective air force (too few aircraft, pilots, field, and support such as communications / protection / early warning), and they never recovered from the December attacks. Efforts expanded to the Pacific, but nothing to the Philippines between December 1941 and April 1942, when Wainwright surrendered through General King, MacArthur having been ordered to Australia.… (plus d'informations)