Daniel P. Bolger

Very well written page turner about the Soviet misadventure in Afghanistan. The author is a (now) retired American airborne general and expert on Russia and the Soviet Union. Think Tom Clancy with real experience, and on the ground rather than at sea. Very insightful about the true nature of modern warfare - and the perpetually weird nature of the Russian military. A work of fiction, but highly recommended for history buffs. My only quibble is with the ending, where 2/3rds was essentially omitted - but no spoilers here. Read it for yourself.… (plus d'informations)

Nominally a biography of Gen. Maurice Rice, whose death in action at the end of World War II in ETO made him something of a martyr, the available details of the man's life are so sparse that one is mostly left with speculation about what really motivated him. So what one is left with then are basically two themes. One, this is a good campaign history of the 3rd Armored Division and its war in Western Europe, a division that deserves one. Two, the other matter that really concerns Bolger is generalship, and what constitutes good generalship, as might be expected from a man who became an officer at a time when the U.S. Army was very concerned over what professional failures it had made in Vietnam. Bolger essentially sees the trap to be escaped as failing to differentiate between military management and military leadership, and Rose was certainly a front-line leader; maybe too much. Earnest Harmon, another noted American tank general, and something of a mentor to Rose, thought the man took too many chances, and those chances eventually caught up to Rose.

As for downsides to this book, it is written for a popular audience, and some of Bolger's rhetorical choices can be a little off-putting. It was also off-putting to spend the first twenty or so pages mostly reading about the famous "Easy" Company of 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment before one really gets to the point of the book, though that was probably a framing device for said popular audience. Still, Bolger does seem to have his sources in order, and if you can overlook some of what I consider misplaced flippancy, this is a worthwhile study of a mechanized unit in action.… (plus d'informations)

"It's all my fault. I thought my men were invincible." So lamented Robert E. Lee after the third day of Gettysburg. For some reason not easily understood by a non-military person, an element of near infallible judgment is imputed to those who wear stars of rank on their uniforms. From the outside looking in, we are confounded. In management, mistakes are anticipated, and tolerated, so long as the person who errs learns. Not so the Flag Officer. Once in the upper strata of command, a person forgoes the right to make a mistake. Given such a premium placed on inerrancy, it is little wonder that other than a tiny fraction of Flag Officers will seize the moment and do something totally unexpected and risky.
Bolger presents an above average detailed history of our military in Iraq and Afganistan; and then attempts to answer the presumed question of what went wrong. His assumption that something did go wrong is key to this work. His assumption is correct but for the wrong reasons. The military does not take us into war; our civilian leadership takes us into war. IF the military took us into Iraq or Afganistan, then it would be correct to identify and correct their erroneous thinking. If we failed in either or both of those wars, it was due to the civilian leadership. I suppose it is not an especially difficult process to conclude that war with another country is necessary, and I think a good case can be made for both. Where the civilian leadership failed is clearly tasking the military with what was desired to be accomplished and what would constitute a successful performance. If I have a clogged drain, I hire a plumber to make necessary repairs. I consider the job done when the drain works as I expect it to work. Except for the loss of life, turning the military loose to exert the National Will is really no different. Neither President Bush nor President Obama clearly stated what would be a satisfactory conclusion.
Where the Flag Officers failed in Iraq and Afganistan is not fighting the war as they were taught to fight. In this, they acted no differently than most of us would act: avoid blame at all costs.… (plus d'informations)

This book took me longer than normal to read, because I had to keep stopping to think about the points that it made. And it wasn't until I got to the epilogue that all those points really got tied together into a coherent theory, but that theory makes so much sense at that point. If you want an honest look at how the Global War on Terror was conducted, both from the top down and the bottom up please read this book. If you just want to understand how things ended up the way they did, at least read the epilogue. Thoughtful and insightful, should be mandatory reading for anyone involved in the military or foreign policy.… (plus d'informations)