I haven't read Tanner and was new to detailed study of the '62 campaign. I found Cozzens to be clear and engaging; it provided a very useful foundation for a series of battlefield visits I made over the past summer. ( )

Surprisingly even-handed account. Good insight and de-mythifying. ( )

Peter Cozzens is one of my favorite Civil War writers. While the book is again written in a pleasing style, the lack of good maps and the only partial inclusion of the Northern view and strategy does not improve on Tanner's classic Stonewall in the Valley.

In contrast to the splendid (often double page) maps in Cozzens' earlier campaign studies, this title's maps are few in number, tiny in size and questionable in design. Apart from tiny errors (such as forgetting to include some regiments or showing regiments in line instead of as skirmishers), some maps directly contradict the text, eg "Milroy's right-most regiment, the 25 OH lined up opposite Steuart's 1 MD" (p. 469) - Map 10 shows the 25 OH opposite 1 VA, six hundred yards away. Most maps are not timestamped and do not distinguish different unit positions by color or otherwise. Successive attacks appear like simultaneous ones - again, one needs to consult the text to understand the maps. Given that Cozzens included some of the best maps in the business, this is a major disappointment and shoddy work by his editors who should have caught such errors. As it is, Cozzens has fewer and and less pertinent maps than Tanner.

The book claims to offer a comprehensive Northern perspective. This only partially true. The Northerners still appear mostly as props. I wish Cozzens had included more about Lincoln's and McClellan's general 1862 campaign planning as well as Valley logistics. A discussion and comparison of Frémont's and Banks' logistics (which railroads were in operation?) with other theaters would have been interesting. Cozzens is also unduly harsh on the Germans and Irish by not putting xenophobic quotes into perspective. So Blenker's men plundering might have something to do with their being on quarter-rations. Discipline is a question of leadership not country of origin.

What the book does well, is show that the old image difference between the stellar Jackson in the Valley and the dismal Jackson in the Peninsula did not exist. Jackson's victories were mostly due to psychological mastery over his opponents. Jackson's crazy secrecy, alternating pushiness and lack of direction left his generals no choice but to improvize. At multiple times, the Northerners could (and should) have wrecked Jackson. If Carroll had destroyed the North River bridge, Jackson would have been trapped. A lucky general indeed.

Overall, a good novelistic approach with weak support materials that fails to dethrone Tanner's book. ( )