Not what I expected, but interesting nonetheless. I had a couple of books on The March to the Sea, and expected this to be the third; instead it concerns Sherman’s initial advance into Georgia (i.e., the beginning of the Atlanta campaign). What’s more it’s not a conventional military history. Author John R. Scales is a retired US Army general; what he does here is take current Army staff and operational doctrine and applies it to 1864 – as if Sherman was in possession of (and followed) Field Manual 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations and Field Manual 100-5 Operations.


After introductory chapters describing the organization of Civil War armies and a description of the situation in North Georgia in early May, 1864, Scales invites the reader to work their way through the modern US Army Military Decision Making Process:


* Analyze the mission

* Examine the current situation for factors that could affect mission accomplishment

* Develop courses of action that could accomplish the mission

* Analyze each course of action to determine its advantages and disadvantages

* Compare the course of action with each other and against the desired outcome

* Make a decision


Thus, the reader is invited to examine General Grant’s orders to Sherman and restate them as a mission statement, then break them down into subtasks in order of priority, and two facing pages of the book are devoted to a blank table for the reader to fill out. Having done that, the reader is then invited to examine the Confederate situation, with the emphasis on Confederate capabilities rather than trying to deduce Confederate intentions (again with handy tables for the reader to fill out). Next comes the analysis of Sherman’s courses of action. Sherman’s orders constrained him to attack, but the actual mode and direction of attack was up to him. The reader is again given a table to fill out with courses of action; then Scales presents his own solution, with nine possible attack courses: frontal attack, penetration on the right of the Confederate line, penetration on the left of the Confederate line, single envelopment on the Confederate right, single envelopment on the Confederate left, double envelopment, a shallow turning movement, a deep turning movement, and a very deep turning movement. The next table presents the potential Confederate capabilities to respond to each of these actions, and finally a choice of action. (Interestingly, Scales decides Option 4 – single envelopment on the Confederate right – was the best choice, while Sherman actually chose Option 7 – a shallow turning movement around the Confederate left. Scales notes Sherman correctly decided that a Snake Creek Gap would not be strongly defended and McPherson’s Corps could get through it and get into the Confederate rear. (Scales notes that Sherman may have had information about the Confederate defense that didn’t make it into his memoirs or official reports; he also notes that the Confederate strengths and positions he initially gives to the reader are those that were available to Sherman, not the actual numbers determined after the campaign).


The actual outcome of this operations work is given relatively minor coverage; McPherson did find Snake Creek Gap virtually undefended. Unfortunately for the Union, McPherson didn’t press his advantage; he was killed in battle a few days later in the campaign and never had a chance to explain. Scales suggests McPherson had just been promoted to command of a corps and may have been cautious while he was getting used to the position; he also acknowledges that McPherson (and the whole Union army) was short of cavalry and therefore couldn’t send out cavalry patrols to see what the Confederates were doing. He moved slowly to avoid the risk of having the entire Confederate army fall on him, and thus the Confederates were able to withdraw to another defensive position.


The last chapter is a “staff ride”, with directions to various sites on the battlefield that illustrate what Scales has been discussing. This is intended as an exercise for military planners – much of the “ride” is intended to take place in a classroom rather than the field (and Scales provides a list of places in the area with appropriate facilities).


I learned quite a bit here. Scales gives some gentle criticism of “armchair generals”, noting that the capabilities of military units – especially logistic considerations – are often assumed to be much greater than they actually are. In particular, Scales goes into considerable detail about Sherman’s supply situation. The railroads serving Sherman could deliver two days of supply per day – in other words, all the supplies the army used that day, plus one day extra. Thus it took considerable time for Sherman to build up enough supplies to go on the offensive, and a considerable amount of his resources were devoted to keeping his rail lines protected from raiders. Once a Civil War army started to move, Scales estimates it could go three days before having to halt and resupply (he doesn’t comment on the later March to the Sea except to note it was an aberrant situation). The supply situation strongly affected Sherman’s options; he couldn’t do some of the deep turning movements that were proposed because he would run out of food and ammunition on the way.


This is a relatively short book, and a good part is taken up by the aforementioned tables for the reader to fill out. The references are military manuals plus general histories of the Civil War (which for the broad scale that Scales is using are all that is needed) plus USGS maps of the area. Contemporary photographs; extensive maps (including the maps that were available to Sherman). ( )

Scales offers an extremely well-researched applied study of military operational decision making. The book is a self-contained staff ride - equivalent sources would have been invaluable for the staff rides that I have been on. While some of the opening material on Civil War units and operations will be elementary for those familiar with military history, it is a valuable reference. The many maps and tables throughout the book help the reader visualize the unfolding situation. ( )